In some cases very liberal presumption of payment is made in favor of the master; as where the servant has left his master for a considerable period; and where it is usual to pay wages weekly. (m)

As the contract of service is mutual, the employer has a claim (against the employed for his neglect of duty; and it is held that the employer does not waive this claim by paying the servant and continuing him in his service. (mm) 1 (x)

1 But if an employer keeps a hired person through a term of service, he cannot deduct his wages for time lost, or compel him to make it good. Bast v. Byrne, 51 Wis. 531. See Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Bost, 104 Pa. 26.

The English law of apprenticeship grew out of, and with nearly all its incidents rested upon, the ancient establishment of guilds, or companies for trade or for handicraft, which were once almost universal throughout Europe, and still generally subsist, although much modified in form and effect. No one could pursue a trade or mechanical occupation, on his own account, who was not a member of such guild or company. Nor could he become a member except by a regular apprenticeship.

Hence, a change of trade became very difficult; and the several companies provided with great care against such increase of their numbers as should render it too difficult for all to find occupation. Under such circumstances, to enter upon an apprenticeship which led to such membership was to acquire a support for life, and it was usual to pay large fees to the master. This custom exists in England now very generally. In this country we suppose it to occur much less frequently; and the entire freedom of employment, and the absolute right which every person has to engage in what business he pleases, and to change his business as often as he pleases, has undoubtedly operated to make apprenticeships less common with us than in Europe. In some parts of our country they are comparatively infrequent, and perhaps in none are they so necessary or so universal an introduction to business as they still are in England.

The contract of apprenticeship is generally in writing, and it has been said, that it could be made only by writing; (n) it is also most frequently by deed and is to be construed and enforced as to all the parties, by the common principles of the law of contracts. Usually the apprentice, who is himself a minor, and his father or guardian with him, covenant that he shall serve * his master faithfully during the term. (x) And the master (n) Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337.

50

employ of a friendly society, is not entitled to give to a rival society written lists of the members of the society. Liverpool Victoria Legal Friendly Society v. Houston, 3 F. (Sc.) 42.

Without an express agreement therefor, the master is not entitled to claim the discoveries or inventions made by his servants while in his employ. Dalzell v.

Dueber Watch-Case Manuf. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 13 S. Ct. 886, 37 L. Ed. 749; Lane v. Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U. S. 193, 14 S. Ct. 78, 37 L. Ed. 1049; Baldwin v. Von Micheroux, 83 Hun, 43; Eustis Manuf. Co. v. Eustis, 51 N. J. Eq. 565, 227 Atl. 439; see 1 Michigan L. Rev. 384.

() As to infants' contracts of apprenticeship, see Dearden v. Adams, 19 R. I.

covenants that he will teach the apprentice his trade; but it is said that the indenture is not made valid by the omission to specify any trade or profession as that to be taught. (o) He also covenants to supply him with all necessaries, and at the end of the term give him money or clothes. Slight informalities would not make the indenture void. Even if they are of sufficient magnitude to have this effect, the indenture will, it is said, prescribe and measure the claim of each of the parties against the other, if they have lived under this indenture as master and servant. (p) It is also said, that the apprentice's consent will not be inferred from his mere signature, but must be expressed. (g)

In case of sickness the master is bound to provide proper medicines and attendance. (r) At common law the infant is not himself responsible, on his covenants as apprentice, being a minor; (s)

(0) Fowler v. Hollenbeck, 9 Barb. 309. (p) Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 473. (9) Harper v. Gilbert, 5 Cush. 417. (r) Regina v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 153. (8) Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 59. At common law, an indenture of apprenticeship was not binding upon an infant. See Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. C. 179; Jennings v. Pitman, Hutton, 63; Lylly's case, 7 Mod. 15; McDowle's case, 8 Johns. 331; Whitley v. Loftis, 8 Mod. 191. In Woodruff v. Logan, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 276, it was said, that a contract of apprenticeship was binding upon an infant, as being for his benefit; but this is not consistent with the current authority, or the analogy of the law. But the father might be bound on the covenants, and it would be no defence to an action by the master against the father, for the deser217, 36 Atl. 3; Purviance v. Schultz, 16 Ind. App. 94, 44 N. E. 266; Craig v. Van Bebber (100 Mo. 584), 18 Am. S. Rep. 569, 626. An infant may, after reaching majority, so ratify such a contract by accepting wages, or other acts, as to be bound thereby, though it was not executed in accordance with a statute. McDonald v. Sargent, 171 Mass. 492, 51 N. E. 17. On disaffirming his contract for labor, the infant may recover on a quantum meruit for what work he has already done. Dearden v. Adams, 19 R. I. 217, 36 Atl. 3; Hagerty v. Nashua Lock Co., 62 N. H. 576; Thompson v. Marshall, 50 Mo. App.

145.

Apprenticeship is not beneficial to the infant when the master does not provide for his continued employment. De Francesco v. Barnum, 45 Ch. D. 430. And if a deed of apprenticeship contains a stipulation which is so much to the detriment

tion of the infant, that the infant was not bound by the indenture; for if the son does not choose to do that which the father covenanted he should do, the covenant is broken, and the father is liable. Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 57. In Hiatt v. Gilmer, 6 Ired. L. 450, where a boy was bound by his father as an apprentice to a copartnership, to be taught a mechanical trade, and the father took away the boy before his time was expired, and soon afterwards the partnership was dissolved, the period of apprenticeship being still unexpired, it was held by a majority of the court, Ruffin, C. J., dissenting, that the persons composing the partnership could only recover damages for the loss of the boy's services during the time the copartnership continued, and not afterwards.

of the infant as to render it unfair that he should be bound thereby, the entire contract will be treated as disadvantageous to him, and no part of it can be enforced. Corn v. Matthews, [1899] 1 Q. B. 310, 316; Green v. Thompson, [1899] 2 Q. B. 1. But a contract by which the infant obtains employment and instruction in a useful trade is for his benefit, and is classed among necessaries, though a college education is not. Evans v. Ware, [1892] 3 Ch. 502; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Crowder, 61 Texas, 262; Pardey v. American Ship-Windlass Co., 20 R. I. 147, 37 Atl. 706, 78 Am. St. Rep. 844; Waugh v. Emerson, 79 Ala. 295. Even if the contract is void as against the apprentice because not signed by him, it may still bind his parent, who signs it, as a common-law assignment of the child's services and custody. Anderson v. Young, 54 S. C. 388, 32 S. E. 448, 44 L. R. A. 277.

and therefore an adult also covenants with him; and at the age of majority the infant may repudiate the contract if it extends beyond that period. The master cannot transfer his trust, or his rights over the apprentice. (t) He has no right to employ the apprentice in menial services not connected with the trade or business which he has agreed to teach him. (u) And when he neglects to take due charge of the apprentice, the parent's or guardian's authority will revive. (v)

* 51 *The sickness of the apprentice, or his inability to learn or to serve, without his fault, does not discharge the master from his covenants, (w) because these covenants are independent, and he takes this liability on himself. Nor will such misconduct as would authorize a master to discharge a common servant, discharge the master of an apprentice from his liability on his contract. (x) But if the apprentice deserts from his service, and contracts a new relation which disables him from returning lawfully to his master, the latter is not bound to receive him again if he offers to return. (y)

1

The parties who covenant for the good behavior and continued service of the apprentice are not liable for trifling misconduct; but it seems by the English cases that, for whatever produces

substantial injury to the master, as long-continued absence, *52 repudiation at majority, or the like, they are liable. (z) *But it seems not to be so in this country under our common statutory apprenticeships, (a) although doubtless phraseology (1) Futrell v. Vann, 8 Ired. L. 402; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.

(u) Commonwealth v. Hemperly, 12 Pa. Law Rep. 129.

(v) Commonwealth v. Conrow, 2 Penn. St. 402.

denture of apprenticeship, by the master against the father; the breach assigned was, that the apprentice absented himself from the service; plea, that the son faithfully served till he came of age, and that he then avoided the indenture. Held, that this was no answer to the action. See Branch v. Ewington, Dougl. 518; Ellen v. Topp, 4 E. L. & E. 412; s. c. 6 Exch. 424.

(a) Blunt v. Melcher, 2 Mass. 228, where it was held, that in an indenture of apprenticeship made by the master, the apprentice, and the guardian of the apprentice, the covenants that "the apprentice shall faithfully serve his master," &c., are not the covenants of the guardian. See also Ackley v. Hoskins, 14 Johns. 374. See further, Sackett v. Johnson, 3 Blackf. 61; Chapman v. Crane, 20 Me. 172.

1 But where the master's covenants are subject to the express proviso that the apprentice shall obey all commands, and give his services entirely to business during business hours, the master may dismiss the apprentice for wilful disobedience and habitual neglect of duties. Westwick v. Theodor, L. R. 10 Q. B. 224. — W.

might be adopted which would have that effect. Where the indenture can be construed as meaning only that the parent or guardian sanctions the binding of the apprentice, and does not bind himself, it will be so construed, although the covenants may seem to be covenants both of the apprentice and of the parent.

Not only a party who seduces an apprentice from his service is liable, (b) but where one employs an apprentice without the knowledge and consent of his master, the employer is liable to the master for the services of the apprentice, although he did not know the fact of the apprenticeship. (c) It may be added,

that if an action be brought for harboring an apprentice *53 against the will or without the consent of his master, the plaintiff is bound to prove that the defendant had a knowledge of the apprenticeship. (d) But a defendant who did not know the apprenticeship when he hired or received the apprentice, and who, being informed thereof, continued to retain and harbor him, thereby makes himself liable. (e) (2)

In a recent case in Vermont, where a boy of ten was bound as an apprentice by his father until he should be twenty-one, it was held that the contract was voidable when the boy reached the age of fourteen years; and was revoked by his enlisting into military service after that age. (ƒ)

(b) Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112; Foster v. Stewart, 3 M. & Sel. 191. So, it seems, that the seduction of a minor, who is a servant de facto, though not a legal apprentice, from the service of the master, is actionable. Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337.

(c) Bowes v. Tibbets, 7 Greenl. 457; Conant v. Raymond, 2 Aik. 243; Munsey v. Goodwin, 3 N. H. 272; James v. Le Roy, 6 Johns. 274. In Ayer Chase, 19 Pick. 556, where the plaintiff put his apprentice into the service of another person exercising the plaintiff's trade for a short time, on wages to be paid to the plaintiff,

(x) The master has the right, if not the duty, to reclaim a runaway apprentice, and to notify the trade not to harbor him. Blumenthal v. Shaw, 77 Fed. 954, 23 C. C. A. 590. The master may obtain an injunction to restrain others