Mr. Brown.-The letter received by me from the Banksolicitor.

The letter was then read by Mr. Shelton, the Clerk of the Arraigns, and is as follows:"New Bank-buildings, Nov. 30,

1818.

"Sir;-All the prisoners in your custody, charged with having feloniously uttered forged Bank-notes, against whom true bills may be returned by the Grand Jury, will be arraigned at the Old Bailey on Friday morning, the 14th of December.

"Two bills of indictment, the one for the capital offence, and the other for the transportable felony, will be preferred against each of the prisoners, except John Williams, John Dye, and William Connor, against whom indictments for the capital offence only will be preferred.

"Your obedient servant,
"J. ROOKER.

"A. Brown, Esq."

Mr. Brown. This is the letter I received, and I explained the nature of the case to them as clearly as I was able.

Mr. Sergeant Bosanquet. Will your Lordship be kind enough to ask Mr. Brown whether he had received any other communication from the Bank, or elsewhere, and whether he had any authority to persuade them

into this act?

Mr. Baron Wood.-Well, Mr. Brown, did you receive any other communication?

Mr. Brown. I never did. The only letter I received on the sub

that I never used the least persuasion with the prisoners. It is entirely their own act.

Mr. Baron Wood.-Prisoner, do you understand what you are about? Do you know that there are two indictments against you; the one for disposing of and putting away a forged Bank-note, knowing it to be forged, which is a capital offence; and the other for having in your possession without lawful excuse a forged note, knowing it to be forged, which latter offence only subjects you to transportation? You have pleaded guilty to the minor offence of having the note in your possession, subjecting you to 14 years' transportation. Do you wish to withdraw your plea? Prisoner. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron Wood. You plead guilty then?

Prisoner. Yes, I do.

ment, charging the prisoner with having uttered the Bank-note, knowing it to be forged.

Mr. Sergeant Bosanquet informed the jury that he should not offer any evidence against the prisoner in this case.

Mr. Baron Wood.-No evidence being offered, gentlemen, you will of course acquit the prisoner upon this capital charge. The jury found a verdict, Not Guilty, immediately.

VICE- CHANCELLOR'S COURT, SATURDAY, DEC. 19.

Blenheim Estate.

The Attorney General, at the relation of the Marquis of Blandford and the hon. Agar Ellis, v his Grace the Duke of Marlborough. This day the Counsel on both sides having been heard,

The Vice Chancellor delivered his judgment. He referred to the Acts of Parliament passed in the reign of Queen Anne, for vesting Blenheim-house and its domains in the Duke of Marlborough, as a mark of gratitude of the country, and a reward for his military achievements. He considered that the limitations in these Acts of Parliament left in the Duke of Marlborough, the absolute ownership of the property, subject only to the disability of levying fines or recoveries, with a view to its alienation, or settlement, different from the course adopted by the Legislature. All that had been done by Parliament was for the purpose of preventing the possessors of Blenheim-palace from injuring

or defeating the rights of their successors. It did not lessen a single incident belonging to the rights of the possessor. It left him, as a tenant in tail, in the enjoyment of the common and statute law rights belonging to a tenant in tail, with the exception, that he was not to have the power of levying fines, or recovering, or doing any act tending to alienate the property. The Legislature, therefore, left the then and every subsequent Duke of Marlborough, absolute owner of the timber. It gave him the authority which the law gave to every tenant in tail, in the same manner as if he was the absolute owner in fee-simple. Thus, observed his honour, it would stand if he looked only to the acts of parliament; but it had been said, that there was some jurisdiction in a court of equity which called on it to interfere with the acts of parliament, and to control the legal incidents of property which the common law bestowed on tenants in tail who were deprived of the power of alienation. This seemed to him a very singular proposition. If a tenant in tail had by law a right to enjoy a property with certain incidents, how, he would ask, could a court of equity deprive a tenant in tail of those incidents which belonged to his property? If the law made the tenant in tail absolute owner of the timber, was it possible to be contended that the judge of a court of equity had a right to make a new law? A court of equity could never affect to entertain such a principle-a court of equity could not entertain a

principle

principle which would destroy a legal right. It was impossible any principle should exist in a court of equity which entitled the judge to contravene those incidental advantages which the law cast upon a legal ownership of property. It was consequently not upon any such general principle this Court could be called upon to interfere; but whatever objection there might be to the power of controlling the incidents of a tenant in tail upon abstract principle, yet, if he found a long course of precedents on the records of the Court, sanctioned by common consent, and the authority of different judges, and that such a jurisdiction had been uni formly exercised, it would not be his duty to inquire whether the principles upon which such precedents were founded could be sustained. Whatever he might think of such principles, he must be bound by them. It had been pressed upon the Court that there had been a course of precedents which proved that the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief they prayed. The remain ing part of the duty of the Court was, to examine whether there were such precedents-if there were, he must adopt them, however he might think of them. Had the course of precedents been uninterrupted, whatever might have been his opinion of the usurpation of a court of equity, he should have adhered to them; for it would be too late for him to attempt to correct the principle on which they were founded; that was a matter only to be referred to the legislature. The great body of cases consisted VOL. LX.

of cases respecting tenants for life, without impeachment of waste; and certainly this Court never would permit a person to whom the original grantor of an estate had given its temporary possession, the power of injuring, or rendering it less beneficial to those who were to enjoy it after him. The question was, did that furnish any principle that was applicable to the present case? The question in the present case was not one which called upon the Court to construe the will of a grantor, but it was whether a court of equity could control the principles of the common law, and deprive the Duke of Marlborough of those legal incidents which, by the common and statute law, he had a right to enjoy. He was decidedly of opinion, therefore, that the precedents referring to tenants for life, had no applicability whatever to this case. His Honour then adverted at some length to the precedents with reference to the cases respecting the rights of tenants in tail after possibility of issue being extinct, and the cases of ecclesiastical preferments. He should have had great difficulty in supporting the principles of some of the decisions. It appeared to him that, notwithstanding any of such decisions, his interference upon the present occasion to restrain the defendant would amount to a legislative act on his part: for, supposing the cases which had been referred to in the course of the arguments at the bar, to have acquired that current of authority which would bind him in that case, it was clear they could have no application Z

to

to this subject. The question was this was the Duke of Marl. borough a tenant for life by provision of law? He was no tenant for life, but he was a tenant in tail, having a descendible estate, and all the legal incidents which belonged to that character. He was, therefore, clearly of opinion, that this Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the legal ownership of the Duke of Marlborough. It had been said, that this estate, which was a national monument, would, by the exercise of the right insisted on by the defendant, be at the mercy of every successor. Arguments, ab inconvenienti, were of importance, when a court was considering the intention of the author of a grant, or when there was any doubt as to the intention of the grantor; but when there was no doubt, when the words were too plain to be misunderstood, arguments of inconvenience amounted to nothing. In this case he was of opinion the construction of the statutes under which the Dukes of Marlborough enjoyed Blenheim-house and lands, were clear and distinct, and that the argument of inconvenience ought to have no weight. Among other things, it had been said, that the Duke of Marlborough might tomorrow lay the whole of this estate waste, and reduce this noble mansion and spacious domains to a barren heath. True, he might do so. He derived an uncontrollable title from the legis lature; he might do what he pleased with the property, with the exception of alienating it. Why did the legislature leave him at liberty to do so? The

legislature had undoubtedly reposed confidence in the illustrious Duke of Marlborough, the first object of its gratitude and bounty, and intended the same confidence should be reposed in all succeeding Dukes of Marlborough, that they would deal with the property as became their rank and dignity; and was it for a court of equity to recall that confidence which the legislature had thought fit to bestow? Undoubtedly not. Inconvenience was an argument often fairly addressed to a court, but the legislature had itself calculated on those feelings which belonged to all great and good minds; they had considered that the future possessors of Blenheim would feel a pride and an honour in maintaining that national monument which was a tribute by the country to their illustrious predecessor, and it could not be supposed that the present Duke of Marlborough would so far forget what was due to his honour as to deal improperly with this property. Judgment for the defendant.

CORNWALL ASSIZES.

Nisi Prius.

The King v. Mary Ann Tucker.

This was an indictment against the defendant for a libel published in a country newspaper called "The West Briton and Cornwall Advertiser," upon the plaintiff, Mr. R. Gurney the younger, vice-warden of the Stannary Court in the county of Devon. The cause was no sooner called than the lady appeared in Court as her own advocate, and

was