upon the ministers, especially upon lord Sidmouth, which concluded with an amendment that the bill be read a first time that day six months.

Several gentlemen on both sides took part in the subsequent debate, which, however, made little addition to the fund of argu. ment. The question being at length put, "That the bill be now read a first time," there appeared Ayes, 190; Noes, 64: Majority,

126.

The Attorney General having moved that the bill be read a second time to-morrow, Mr. Brougham indignantly exclaimed, that surely ministers would not so far lay aside all regard to appearances as to force on the second reading of this important bill tomorrow. After some farther observations from the hon. member, Lord Castlereagh rose and adverted to his attack on the ministers, because they had not spoken on the question. His lordship was supported by Mr. Canning, who was replied to by Sir J. Newport. At length Sir S. Romilly, who had risen to move an amendment, withdrew it, on the understanding, that if the second reading of the bill could not come on to-morrow before a late hour, it should be postponed.

On March 10th the Attorney General moved the order of the day for the second reading of the Indemnity bill. Several members on each side spoke on the subject, when the House divided, the Ayes being 89; and the Noes, 24. The second reading accordingly took place.

The Attorney General moved, on March 11th, the order of the

day for going into a Committee on the Indemnity bill, when a speech, the summary of which will be given in the following extract, was delivered on the occasion by Sir Samuel Romilly.

He said, that as the objections which he had to the bill were rather those to its principles, he ought properly to have stated them on the second reading, and it was his intention so to have done. It was through deference to the opinion of others, and not from his own judgment, that he had deferred his object to the present stage of the bill. Whether considered by itself, or as a precedent to be acted upon in future times, it appeared to him a most objectionable and dangerous measure. It was improperly called a bill of Indemnity: the object of indemnity was only to protect individuals from public prosecutions, without interfering with the rights of private men; but this object was to annihilate such rights. Its true description was a bill to take away all legal remedies from those who had suffered from an illegal and arbitrary exercise of authority, and to punish those who presumed to have recourse to such remedies by subjecting them to the payment of double costs.

There were only three objects which the bill had in view: first, to protect the ministers in the acts of authority they had exercised: secondly, to indemnify magistrates for the acts they had done for suppressing insurrections, or guarding against imminent danger to the state: and thirdly to protect private individuals who have given information to govern.

ment,

ment, from the danger which it is supposed may attend the disclosure of their names and evidence. As far as the bill related to the first of these objects it had been considered by several persons in a very erroneous point of view. For the exercise of the powers given by parliament, the ministers wanted no indemnity: the act that gave the powers, indemnified them in their exercise. An indemnity had been thought necessary when ministers, in times of scarcity, had taken upon themselves to lay an embargo on the shipping which there was no law to authorize; but when an act of parliament had previously passed to sanction such an embargo, who ever heard of an indemnity for the ministers who had commanded it? If ministers are to be indemnified, it must be for conduct which the Suspension act did not authorize; not for detaining men in custody under that law, but for committing them to prison against all law. It has been said, indeed, that the ministers have not in a single instance committed any man but upon informations taken upon oath. If this be so, what occasion have they for an indemnity? The evidence upon which magistrates are authorized to commit men, is that evidence upon which they are afterwards to be brought to trial. It is to answer that charge that they are committed, and not upon the chance that some other charge may be brought against them.

Ministers, it was said, had not in any instance abused any of the extraordinary powers they had exercised. This might be so; but the House had no reason to

say that it was so; they had no information on the subject but what ministers had themselves thought proper to afford. The House had refused all examination; it had rejected all proof'; and it was now about peremptorily to decide. It was about to declare that there should be no investigation even in the ordinary course of justice, and to exercise the powers of the legislature by closing up the avenues to our tribunals. But there had been an inquiry, it was pretended, by the committee,

a committee named by the ministers, and upon which they had not blushed to nominate themselves. It had been declared by a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Canning) that his majesty's ministers had taken no part in the debate, because it was a subject on which it became them rather to submit to the opinion of others, than to take any prominent part themselves; and yet those ministers, who pretended to be so modest in public, had no objection to name their own committee, to become themselves the most active members of it, to supply all the evidence, to bring forward and to keep back what they thought proper, and thereupon to draw up their exculpatory report. It was alleged, indeed, that the secret committee was of the choice of the House, and not of the nomination of ministers; and it had been gravely said, that a nomination by ballot excluded the influence of ministers, and gave the fair result of the opinion of the House. Such might be the effect of a fair ballot, but not of a ballot where the minister sent round to his adherents lists of the persons

persons who should compose the committee. No lists had, ever since he had been in parliament, been made out by the opposition; nor did the ministers send their lists to all the members, but only to those on whom they could securely rely. It was a committee thus named, it was themselves and their nominees, whom the ministers had satisfied that their conduct had been free from all reproach.

But suspensions of the Habeas Corpus had always, it was said, been followed by acts of indemnity; and inproof of this, precedents had been resorted to. Of those precedents there was not one, except that of 1801, which could be said to be in point. This, however, was a precedent to be avoided rather than followed. So great was the injustice done by it, that taking away all remedies by a sweeping provision for wrongs that might have been done in the course of the eight preceding years, it reversed judgments recovered; and punished the injured party by making them pay double costs for having brought actions when it was perfectly legal to bring them, which had been brought months, or even years, before any such retros pective measure was in contemplation.

It was, indeed, with a view to the second object of the bill, the protection of the magistrates for illegal acts of power committed by them, that those precedents could alone be resorted to. It would not, however, with any semblance of truth, be pretended that the country had in the course of the last year been in any such

state as could call for the exercise by the magistrates of any thing more than the legal power with which they were invested. The acts of Indemnity relied upon had been justified by the state of the country, which had been matter of public notoriety. It was not then necessary to have secret committees, and sealed bags, and a mysterious concealment of evidence, to apprize the House that it had been necessary for the public safety that ministers should act with promptitude and decision, and without regard to the strict rules of law. What he complained of principally was, that the House was kept in the dark: they knew nothing of the nature of the acts for which an indemnity was to be given. The operation of the bill was carried back to the 26th of January; but for what reason, the House had never been told. Some dark and mysterious purpose must be in view which was kept profoundly secret. Surely the House would not vote with so blind a confidence as to extend this denial of justice to a period beyond that which was mentioned in any of the reports on which this proceeding was founded, merely because ministers had chosen so to frame this bill. It was of most dangerous consequence by such a bill to inform magistrates that whenever the Habeas Corpus was suspended, they might exercise what acts of authority they thought would be most agreeable to ministers, and that every thing would be covered by an indemnity. The petitions upon the table furnished evidence how grossly the law might be violated where there seemed some

invitation

invitation to it by ministers. This complicated violation of all law, in seizing papers, in punishing before any guilt was established, in treating suspected libellers like convicted felons, was to be traced to lord Sidmouth's Circular Letter; and a stronger instance could hardly exist of the mischief of government's interfering with magistrates, and prompting them as to the mode in which they were desirous that their judicial functions should be exercised. An hon. friend of his (Mr. Lambton) had called this bill the winding up of that system of injustice which the ministers had been acting upon. He wished it could be so considered. To himself it rather appeared as a prelude to farther exertions of power, and to future denials of justice. The reports of the committee of both Houses declared, that it would be necessary for the magistrates to persevere in the same exertions as they had hitherto made. It has been there fore necessary to violate the law; fresh violations of it by the magistrates will be necessary, and a better ground is thus laid for a bill of Indemnity in the next session for those illegal acts of authority which the magistrates seem thus encouraged to commit. Let it be recollected that all this has taken place under the mild government of king George 3rd, exercised by a viceroy in his name, and by his authority.

It remained for him to speak of the third object of the bill; the protecting those who had given information to government, from supposed danger. In England this was a policy quite

But

new and unheard of. It was true, that in the bill of 1801, an act in which a similar recital was found, as in this; but the circumstances of those times were quite different from the present. The traitorous designs then spoken of, were an alleged correspondence with a foreign enemy, and the information received was said to be from persons then in the power of that enemy. But the danger that it is pretended now exists is from popular outrage or private revenge, against those who may have dared to give evidence against offenders. what symptom has ever yet discovered itself of any such feeling in this country? No complaint of the kind has ever been made: no alarm respecting it has ever been expressed: none of the reports of the Secret Committees make any mention of, or have any allusion to it. At Derby, in London, at York, there appeared no unwillingness in any witness to give his evidence; and nothing had happened to impede, in any way, the due administration of justice. It was plain, then, that this was an unfounded pretext. It was not that the government supposed there was any danger, but they were desirous of concealing the unworthy means which had been used to obtain information, and of sanctioning the future recourse to this new system of employing spies and

informers.

cluded with the following animated apostrophe: "That this example may appear in the greater force to future times, our Journals will preserve that long detail of multiplied sufferings which are enumerated in the various petitions that have been presented to us, and with them the record of our having twice refused to institute any inquiry into the truth of them. When those who are to come after us shall suffer under the evils we are now inflicting upon them; when their liberties shall be violated after the example which we are establishing, and they shall reflect with bitterness on the memories of those who have been the authors of all their wrongs; it is at least some consolation to us to reflect that it will be remembered that there was a small number of members of this House who endeavoured to avert this evil, who, though overpowered by numbers, and discouraged by the triumph of a confident majority, yet made the best stand they could in defence of the constitution, the laws, and the liberties, which had been transmitted to them by their ancestors, and who feel more satisfaction in having thus discharged their duty, though without success, than their opponents can derive from the victory they have gained."

The Solicitor General, who rose next, exerted himself with all his powers to confute his adversary. He seriously called upon the House to consider what had taken place in the last year; and urged that it would be dealing unfairly both by ministers and magistrates, to refuse them the

protection required. The state of the country was such as to induce parliament to suspend a part of the liberties of the people. The papers laid before the committee last year, clearly proved that there existed a treasonable conspiracy in the country, and the report of that committee recommended to parliament to arm ministers with a power sufficient for the preservation of the public tranquillity. Ministers applied for such power, and obtained it. When this power was about to expire, another committee was appointed, in consequence of the report of which, ministers were allowed to retain the power vested in them for a further period. As soon as the public disturbances were quelled, and that such power was no longer necessary, ministers voluntarily resigned it, although the period for which it had been entrusted to them had not expired.

Another question which presented itself was, whether an indemnity ought to be granted as an act of justice to those to whom the execution of the trust contemplated by the acts of suspension had been confided. Here he must at the outset deny the proposition of the hon. and learned gentleman, that no indemnity could be desired, except for the purpose of guarding his majesty's ministers against the consequences of their unjust or illegal acts. He denied that the present measure had ever been introduced or sup ported on the presumption that ministers had been guilty of the least irregularity. The reports of committees appointed by the House had led to the two acts of Suspension, and, together with

the