that all the persons who were so arrested and detained, and who were not prosecuted, have been at different times discharged, as the state of the country, and the circumstances attending the several trials which had taken place, were judged to permit.

The committee understand that, up to a certain period, expectations were entertained of being able to bring to trial a large proportion of the persons so arrested and detained; but that these expectations have from time to time been unavoidably relinquished.

On the whole, therefore, it has appeared to the committee, that the government, in the execution of the powers vested in it, by the two acts before mentioned, has acted with due discretion and moderation; and as far as appears to the committee, the magistrates in the several disturbed districts have, by their activity and vigilance, contributed materially to the preservation of the public peace." The report was ordered to be printed.

The Duke of Montrose, on February 25th, presented to their lordships a bill founded upon the Report of the Secret Committee, and intituled a "bill for indemnify ing persons who, since the 26th of January 1817, have acted in apprehending, imprisoning, or detaining in custody, persons suspected of high treason, or treasonable practices, and in the suppression of tumultuous and unlawful assemblies." It was not necessary for him to say any thing in its support in this stage. He should merely propose that the bill be now read a first time.

The Earl of Lauderdale would not have troubled their lordships with any observations on the noble duke's proposition at the present moment, if he did not conceive that it involved a question of considerable constitutional difficulty and importance. From the title of the bill it appeared to be for the purpose of indemnifying his majesty's ministers for every act they had done under the suspension of the Habeas Corpus. Now what was the situation in which their lordships were placed? They knew by the Journals of the other House of parliament, that papers had also been sent to that House, and referred to a committee. That committee had not yet reported; and their report might be such as to render any proceedings of the kind now proposed, very improper to be adopted by their lordships. He reminded the House that on a former occasion they had decided, in agreement with the opinion of a noble and learned lord, that they would not entertain a certain measure because it might come before them in a judicial capacity. On the same ground this bill was not fit to be entertained; for if any principle of their proceedings was more to be regarded than another, it was this-that the House ought never to give an extrajudicial opinion.

The Earl of Liverpool saw no possible ground for delay in the objection stated by the noble lord. If it was good for any thing, it would be equally good against the appointment of a committee to inquire into the conduct of ministers on the papers which had been submitted to

their consideration. The committee had, by the order of the House, examined these papers inquisitorially, and had come to an opinion which was now on their lordships table. In pursuance of that opinion, his noble friend considered himself bound to introduce the bill he had presented. Whether the bill was warranted by the report was the question to be argued on the second reading. Their lordships were not bound to regulate their proceedings on a measure of which they could know nothing, except through the medium of the votes of the House of Com

mons.

Lord Holland expected that the noble duke would have stated more at length what was the nature of the bill he had presented. He would not, however, occupy their lordships time with any observations of that kind, but rose merely to answer an objection made to his noble friend by the secretary of state, which appeared to him to have been in some measure misunderstood. His lordship finally moved, that instead of the word "now" for the first reading, the words "this day se'nnight" be inserted.

The question, that the word "now" stand part of the original question was put, and carried in the affirmative. The bill was then read a first time, and ordered to be printed.

On the 27th of February, the order of the day standing for the second reading of the Indemnity bill, the Duke of Montrose began by saying, that it appeared to him necessary, as a justification of the measure, to refer to the

circumstances which had caused it to be brought forward. This, in fact, was nothing but a short recapitulation of all the arguments made use of by the most strenuous defenders of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act, and may therefore be laid aside. His grace concluded his speech by moving that the bill be now read a second time.

A considerable number of speakers on each side succeeded to the duke; but the tenor of each approached so nearly to their former discussions on the same subject, that it would be a waste of room to enter into particulars. With respect to the Indemnity bill, the lord Chancellor sufficiently delivered his reasons for supporting it, by saying "that the Indemnity bill arose necessarily from the Suspension act; and the Suspension act went to the preservation of our laws and constitution." This appeared to be the general opinion of their lordships, at least as far as voting could declare it.

The question being at length put, that the word "now" stand as a part of it, the House divided: Contents, 56; Proxies, 44-100: Non Contents,15; Proxies, 18-33: Majority, 67.

The bill was then read a second

could do. The first of these was, that all former acts of indemnity in this country had acknowledged or implied that certain illegal acts had been committed, on the ground of which the indemnity was granted; but the present bill, according to the assertions of those who supported it, and its own preamble, came before their lordships with the allegation that no illegal act had been done. The report which had been made by their lordships' committee stated, that the persons taken into custody had been arrested on oath. According to all the assertions and allegations there had been no illegality; and if there was none, there could be no need of indemnity. But it was said, that if ministers should be called upon to justify them. selves in courts of law, they would be obliged to produce evidence, which it would be improper to disclose. He could

not say that it might not be pos sible that a bill on this subject was requisite; but the object of such a bill could not be indemnity.

There was another point which also appeared to him worthy of their lordships' consideration. It had been asked, how their lordships could suppose that the Habeas Corpus could be sus pended, without this bill becoming necessary? He must confess, that he had not seen this natural consequence; but if it really existed, ought it not to be their lordships business to make out that connexion in the committee? The bill, as it stood, contained no reference to the Suspension act from which it was said to

spring. The preamble declared that a traitorous conspiracy had existed, that numerous persons had tumultuously assembled, &c. and stated acts to have been done, which, under the supposition of all the proceedings being legal, were proper to be resorted to.

Another difficulty arose in considering the bill, which, instead of being founded on precedent, differed in one material respect not only from all the old bills of indemnity in this country, but from that of 1801, inasmuch as it granted indemnity not only for arresting and detaining prisoners, but for discharging them. Have prisoners then been illegally discharged? It would become their lordships well to consider what might be the effect of the introduction of this word into the bill, not merely with respect to the protection of ministers, but to the future security of the persons to whom it applied.

The Lord Chancellor remarked, that with respect to what had been said to this bill being founded on precedent in all its provisions, he certainly had never so argued it. He had, on the contrary, observed, that when the Habeas Corpus was suspended in the reign of king William, it was distinctly acknowledged in the bill of indemnity that illegal acts had been committed; but it was at the same time declared, that these acts were so necessary for the safety of the country, and the preservation of the constitution, that it was fit no persons should be put to the expense defending themselves in suits which might be brought against them. The principle of the act

of

of

of 1801, though different, was a just principle also. It was, that the names of persons who had given information should not be disclosed. What their lordships decision on this point ought to be, it would be for them to consider in the committee; but if that principle was one which ought to be acted upon, there was another which possessed a claim not less urgent on their lordships' attention, namely, the protection of the magistrates who had executed the laws. To leave these individuals who had caused such arrests, to contend with the multitude of actions which would be brought against them, would be to allow them to be over whelmed and crushed with an incalculable expense.

As to the chief point in the noble lord's question, he would state his opinion, for which such allowances should be made as his practice, confined to courts of equity, required. It certainly appeared to him a point of great importance; and speaking what occurred to his mind on the subject, he could only say, that he did not think a man discharged in the way described by the noble lord, would be discharged according to law. But this formed precisely a case in which the magistrate ought to be protected. If, when a rising against the government was apprehended, a magistrate arrested on information a number of persons suspected of engaging in a treasonable design, was he to be punished for discharging those persons when the danger was over, and when he conceived he had no longer any right to detain them? Surely

no clearer case for granting indemnity could be suggested.

The House having then gone into the committee, the Lord Chancellor proposed that they should consider the preamble first, instead of postponing it as usual; his reason being because it was closely connected with the enacting part of the bill. His lordship was supported by Lord Redesdale, but was opposed by the Earl of Lauderdale, the Earl of Carnarvon, and Lord Grenville; and in fine, the two former peers gave up the point.

The Earl of Lauderdale moved as an amendment, that the 4th of March should be substituted to the 1st of January, as the period to which the operation of the Indemnity act should be extended. What he wanted to understand was, whether the Indemnity bill was a consequence of the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus; for if it was, the indemnity should extend only to the period at which the suspension had commenced, and not, as the present bill was drawn, to a period long before it.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that abandoning the particular case (on which he had made some remarks) he should make his stand upon the general principle, that government might, upon its own responsibility, take steps for the general security of the kingdom, before parliament had passed the bills which it would afterwards be bound in strict justice to recognize. However, as he was not aware that any acts of this nature had been done antecedent to the meeting of parliament, he should have no

objection

objection to limit the operation of the bill to the 26th of January, the day before parliament met. The Earl of Lauderdale acceded to this proposal, and the amendment, substituting the 26th of January, was then agreed to. Lord Holland said, it was his intention to move that the word "discharged" should be left out of the bill; but in consequence of what had fallen from the noble and learned lord, he was induced not to press that motion. But if it was right that the magistrate who had irregularly discharged persons from confinement, should be indemnified by parliament, it was also right that the person so discharged should have the advantage of a full discharge according to law. He therefore hoped that if it was thought necessary that the word should be retained. for the protection of magistrates, a proviso should be admitted into another part of the bill securing persons of a different description.

The Earl of Liverpool answered, that two principles were applicable to the bill: one to prevent the disclosure of testimony on which the magistrates had acted; the other, to indemnify them for certain steps which they had taken when the country was in a state of insurrection. Now no person could say that it was not the duty of the magistrates, under that act, to prevent such a purpose, and to detain individuals, and afterwards to release as many as they could, without danger to the public tranquillity. The question therefore was, whether under such circumstances they could properly discharge such as VOL. LX.

had been arrested without farther proceedings, though, perhaps, such discharge might not be strictly legal? If any question was more clear than another, he thought it was the propriety of arresting these persons in a moment of considerable danger, and the release of them as soon as was consistent with the public safety. He thought this must appear on all sides the least exceptionable part of the bill.

Lord Holland agreed that this was the least exceptionable part of the bill; but the House had now heard it avowed for the first time, that this bill was not passed for the sole purpose of preventing unpleasant disclosures of evidence, but to cover acts in themselves strictly illegal. This was no answer to the question he had put respecting the situation of persons so illegally discharged. These persons could not bring any action for damages without averring on the record that they had been duly discharged, so that they were at present deprived of the very right of seeking for redress.

The Lord Chancellor adhered to his argument, that if magistrates discharged persons illegally, they would require to be indemnified.

The Marquis of Lansdowne moved for the omission of those words in the bill which went to extend indemnity to magistrates for arresting persons in tumultuous assemblies. The principle of the bill was to indenmify for acts dangerous in themselves, but justifiable for reasons of state which could not be disclosed in evidence. Could any of the [D] arguments