the most expedient, but the only practicable way of proying words.

Court of Common Pleas.-Saturday, Dec. 3.-Wood v. Fletcher: -Separate Maintenance. Mr. Serjeant Lens stated, that this was an action brought by the plaintiff, who was a considerable coaldealer, to recover of the defendant, a merchant in the city, the very small sum of 221. for seven chaldron of coals furnished to Mrs. Fletcher. The facts were these. Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher had for some years been separated from each orher. The lady lived in Dean-street, Park-lane, and Mr. F. resided at Ealing. He should prove that the coals were delivered at Mrs. F.'s house, and as it could not be contended that they were not a necessary, the husband was bound to pay for them.

It ap

The delivery of the coals was proved. Mrs. F. gave the order for them, and the credit was given to her, and not to her husband. peared she had dealt with the plaintiff seven years, and had paid regularly, with the exception of the articles in question: but when the plaintiff last applied for payment, she referred him to her husband. It appeared that Mrs. F. had a complete establishment of her own, that she kept a house and servants, and must have been al lowed a separate maintenance: but it was proved, that such maintenance was not secured to her by deed. It was stated, that her husband paid two sums of 757 to her agent about the time this debt was contracted.

Mr. Serjeant Best, on these facts, contended defendant was not liable,

The Chief Justice said, there was no case in the books that exactly resembled the present one. He must, therefore, decide it as well as he could upon the principles laid down in other cases. The authorities were not all reconcilable to each other: but thus far had been decided, that if there was a separate maintenance, if the money was regularly paid, and the husband and wife lived separate from each other, the husband was not answerable for the debts which the wife might contract. Now what were the facts of this case? It appeared, that the lady had, for the last seven years, been resident separate from her husband in the house which she inhabited, and to which the plaintiff had for that period been accustomed to send his goods. It appeared, that she had not ordered them as a married woman; that during the 7 years she had paid the plaintiff herself; that the plaintiff had never any intimation of her being a married woman, till long after she had ordered the goods as a single woman. When the bill was sent in, she then for the first time refused to pay it, on the score that she was a married woman. He had before stated, if the wife had a separate maintenance regularly paid, that the husband had been held not to be answerable. The facts proved were, that the husband and wife had lived sepa→ rately; that certain payments had been made by the husband to the wife; that the husband, for seven years had never been called upon by the tradesmen, who sent in goods to the wife, but that they had always been paid for by her; that two sums of 757. had been

paid to her attorney, which she received. He must take it for granted, that payments to the same amount had been previously and regularly made by the husband, to her, for otherwise, as she was living separate, she could not have have been enabled to have supported herself separately. The payments, if regular, would amount to 300/.; and he had no evidence before him to shew that 300l. a year was not a fair and ample provision for this lady, who by agreement was living from him. Taking the facts to be that the husband and wife had agreed to live separate, and had done so upon her receiving a separate maintenance from him, though there was no stipulation as to the exact sum, and, considering 300l. a year a competent. provision for a woman living apart from her husband, he was of opinion that within the principle of the doctrines laid down, the husband was not liable, -Plaintiff nonsuited,

Court of Common Pleas.-Monday, Dec. 5.-Crim. Con-Knight, Esq. v. Lord Middleton.-This was an action under very peculiar circumstances. The plaintiff, as it appeared by the testimony of one of his own witnesses, had, in the year 1807, brought an action against Colonel Fuller for criminal conversation with his wife, and had received large damages. He afterwards went into Doctors Commons, with the view of obtaining a divorce, but this was resisted on the ground of collusion with Colonel Fuller, and he then thought proper to withdraw the proceedings. He had, however, separated himself from his wife

since that time. In November, 1813, Mrs. Knight was delivered of a child. The plaintiff conceived Lord Middleton to be the father of it, and brought his action against his Lordship accordingly.

The evidence in support of the plaintiff's case went on two grounds. The first was to shew such familiarities between the defendant and Mrs. Knight as to raise a presumption that the criminal intercourse had taken place. The second ground, and what was most relied on, was, that the conduct of Lord Middleton had been such as that the Jury must believe him to be the father of the child, and consequently that he must have committed adultery with Mrs. Knight. Upon the first point, several servants of Mrs. Knight's proved, that Lord Middleton was in the habit of visiting her at her residence at Hampton-cottage, in Warwickshire. It did not appear, however, that there was any thing very particular in those visits, as his lordship was in the habit of intimacy with her father, Lord Dormer, and her whole family. His lordship had also frequently visited her at her residence in Manchester-street, London. Lord Middleton, however, seldom visited her after it was dark, and never slept there. Other gentlemen had also visited her as well as his lordship. The circumstances of suspicion on those visits were very slight. On the second point there was nothing proved, except that Lord Middleton had called at Mary-le-bone church to see the register of baptism of the child, and had taken an extract of it. This circumstance was accounted for, by its having appeared that

he

he had been reported to be the father of the child, and an action threatened against him. It appeared also that he had been once seen coming from the house where the child was nursed.

Serjeant Shepherd, on the part of the defendant, submitted that there was no evidence to go to a jury, and that the plaintiff must be non-suited.

The Chief Justice said the evidence was indeed extremely slender, but he thought it better that the case should go to the jury. Serjeant Shepherd then stated to the Jury, that, if under those orcumstances they were inclined to find for the plaintiff, the smallest coin known in this country would be sufficient to give as damages. He contended, however, that no circumstances at all were proved which could warrant a Jury in finding that an adulterous connection had taken place between his Lordship and Mrs. Knight. If the lady, in her state of separation from her husband, had produced a child, it was evident that she had committed adultery with somebody or other; but that was no proof against Lord Middleton, any more than against any other gentleman who visited her. As to the circumstances which had been stated, there was nothing which could give them a right to infer that at any particular time or place this adulterous conpection had taken place.

The Chief Justice began his charge to the Jury by informing them, that it had been held by Lord Kenyon, and had since been ruled by the Court of King'sbench, that as the action for crim. con. was an action to recover da

mages for being deprived of the aid and comfort of the society of a wife, a husband that had voluntarily separated himself from that society could not maintain this action. In the case, however, where this doctrine was held, the separation had been a regular one. As it did not appear that the separation here was a regular one, he should allow the case to go to them, giving at the same time a power to the defendant's counsel (in case their verdict should be for the plaintiff) to move the Court of Common Pleas for a nonsuit on this ground. His Lordship then recapitulated the evidence, and pointed out the slightness of the grounds upon which the adulterous connection had been inferred.

The Jury without retiring found a verdict for the defendant.

COMMERCIAL CAUSES.

York Assizes.-Thursday, March 31.-Before Sir Simon Le Blanc · and a Special Jury.-Price v. Sandys.-This was a cause which excited much interest in the north. The real plaintiffs were the Magistrates of the county of Durham, and the defendant was an eminent architect, residing in Manchester-square, London. It appeared that, about the year 1809, the Magistrates having determined to erect new courthouses and a gaol for the county of Durham, the defendant sent in his proposals and plans, and wished to have the superintendance of these structures, which were intended to be raised in a splendid and durable style. His terms and plans were approved of,

and

and the whole was placed under his control and direction. No cost was spared, and he expressly undertook that the buildings should be finished in a manner to merit the approbation, not only of the magistrates, but of every architect in the kingdom. After two years had been employed in completing the courts and gaol, and he had been paid, pursuant to his contract, the whole was found to be defective. The foundation was ill laid, weak, and inefficient, for such a weighty superstructure. It was not above two feet under ground, and was composed partly of what was called rubble, and no ways adapted to the soil. The walls, instead of being solid massy stone, were formed of two external cases, and the intervals filled up with rough rubble. Pillars, which should have been of stone, were of wood, cased with stone. The consequences of these and many other similar defects, was, that the building gave way in many of its parts. It became dangerous, and could not be applied to the purposes for which it was erected, and the greater proportion was obliged to be taken do vn and rebuilt. It was to recover a compensation for the loss the county had sustained by the defendant's negligence or want of skill that the present action was brought. The facts were clearly and distinctly proved by two architects, who had had the direction of several buildings and prisons.

Mr. Scarlett asked his Lordship, whether it would have any effect upon the law of the case, if he shewed that the working plans and directions of the defendant had been departed from in conse

quence of a conspiracy formed against him by those who had the subordinate contracts.

Sir Simon Le Blanc said, it certainly would not have the least weight. The defendant had undertaken to see that every part of the building was finished in a proper manner. He was paid on the ground of his presumed ability; and, therefore, whether the county had suffered by his defect of judgment or inattention, the injury and the right to satisfaction remained the same. The Jury, accordingly, under his Lordship's direction, found a verdict for the plaintiff-Damages twenty thousand pounds, subject to be reduced. in conformity with the opinion of an arbitrator, to whom the inspection of the items was referred.

owners.

Court of King's Bench.-Tuesday, Nov. 1.-(Special Juries.)Gomez v. Tunno.-This was an action upon a policy of insurance upon goods on board the Spanish ship Union, of which Messrs. Fissen, brothers, were from Vera Cruz to the Havannah, and back to Cadiz or Malaga. The insurance was effected on the 21st February, 1810, at eight guineas per cent.; and on the 27th July following, a permission was indorsed upon the policy, and signed by the defendant, for the ship to change her destination from Old Spain to any port in the United Kingdom, if it should be found xpedient. The ship sailed from Vera Cruz on the 11th of March, and arrived at the Havannah about a month afterwards, where she found a great difficulty in procuring a cargo for Old Spain, on account of the intelligence

from

from the Mother Country. Consequently a letter was written to the insurance broker, dated 19th of June, desiring him to alter the insurance, as the ship was not to return to Old Spain, but to some port in the North, for which she could more easily procure a cargo. She was more than a month taking in her cargo at the Havannah, and waited three days for convoy. In the gulph of Florida she met with a hurricane, and was wrecked on the 25th of October, in company with 150 other ships, five only of her crew escaping. It was proved by the defendant that after the 31st of August commenced the winter risks, for which a higher premium than eight guineas was paid.

Mr. Park, for the defendant, admitted the lengthenment of the risk by the permission indorsed upon the policy, but contended that it did not permit an alteration of the terminus à quo of the insurance, which was still from Vera Cruz and the Havannah, and not directly from the Havannah, and that it was not contemplated that the ship had not then her cargo on board.

Lord Ellenborough held that the underwriters must be taken to have contemplated the possibility of all the political changes which had taken place, and which might take place with relation to Spain; and that they had consented to the ship's procuring a cargo for England, if she could not get one for Spain. It had been proved, that it was impossible to get a cargo at all for the latter country, and sooner for the former. The Jury would say whether the waiting three days for convoy was not pro

tected by the liberty in the policy to join convoy. They found their verdict for the plaintiff.

Same v. Reid. This was an action, under the same circumstances, upon the ship.

Mr. Park, for the defendant, contended, that the letter of the 19th of June did not convey to the underwriters such information as would induce them to turn a summer risk into a winter one. The liberty given by the policy was to touch and unload; and if the underwriters had been informed that the ship would have run the chance of lying five months at the Havannah, they would never have undertaken the risk; they merely meant by the indorsement on the policy to give the assured full opportunity of changing their destination.

Lord Ellenborough laid it down, that a policy of insurance contemplated the performance of the voyage with all reasonable expedition; but if a voyage were protracted to a subsequent year, if this were done bond fide, the under writer would still be liable. He remembered a case before Lord Kenyon, where a ship not being able to put into a port in the north, actually came back to Eng. land, and tried again the next year, and the assured having used no undue means to protract the risk, the underwriter was held still responsible. No doubt the present became a winter risk; but if this were by no fault of the assured, but by the extraordinary occurrences of events, to which the assured was not contributory, or over which he had no control, he was still in a situation to recover

upon