viding there is any proportion between the great and the small. Are not the words of Christ, Matt. xii. 31, where he speaks of sins and blasphemies that should be forgiven unto men and of blasphemies that should not be forgiven men, a sufficient evidence that some sins are more heinous than others? Again, 1 Epistle of John, v. 16, where some sins are said to be not unto death, and some unto death, &c.

Now, admitting the matter proved, that sin is not infinite, it follows, of course, that it is proved to be finite. However we will now attend to the direct ⚫ evidences of the finite nature of sin.

The law which takes cognizance of sin is not infinite, it being produced by the legislature which I have before noticed, viz. a capacity to understand, connected with the causes and means of knowledge. In order for a law to be infinite, the legislature must be so; but man's ability to understand is finite and all the means which are in his power for the acquisition of knowledge are finite; all his knowledge is circumscribed, and the law produced by such causes must be like them, not infinite but finite. An infinite law would be far above the capacity of a finite being, and it would be unreasonable to suppose man amenable to a law above his capacity. All our knowledge of good and evil is obtained by comparison. We call an action evil by comparing it with one which we call good. Were it in our power to embrace all the consequences that are connected with our actions in our intentions, our meanings would seldom be what they now are. Had it been so with the brethen of Joseph, when they sold him to the Ishmaelites, that they then knew all the consequences which would attend the event, they would not have meant it, as they did, for evil, but seeing with perfectly unbeclouded eyes their own

salvation, and that of the whole family of promise, they would have meant it for good, as did the Almighty who superintended the affair. Now the act of selling Joseph was sin, in the meaning of those who sold him; but it was finite, considered as sin, for it was bounded by the narrowness of their understandings, limited by their ignorance, and circumscribed by the wisdom and goodness of him who meant it for good. If this sin had been infinite, nothing we can justly call good, could have been the consequence; but whoever read the event without seeing that the best of consequences were connected with it?

The promised seed, in whom all the families of the earth are to be blessed, according to the word of promise to Abraham, was to descend from that family which was preserved through seven years of famine, as a consequence of the good intended in that event. And who but God can comprehend the infinite good contained in all the glorious plan of meditorial grace? We then see, that what in a limited sense, we may justly call sin, or evil, in an unlimited sense is justly called good. We say, of the top of yonder mountain, it is exceedingly high; and of yonder valley, it is low; and this we justly say, by comparing one with the other, in respect to the centre of our earth. But the moment we extend our thoughts to contemplate the millions of worlds in unbounded space, and take the whole in one grand system, the idea of high and low is lost. So is sin finished, when, by divine grace, our understandings are enlightened, and we hear our spiritual Joseph say, "Grieve not yourselves, ye meant it unto evil, but GOD meant it unto good." It will be granted, on all sides, that no action unconnected with design ought to be considered sin; it is then an evil intention

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that constitutes an evil action. For instance, a man exerting himself to the utmost of his abilities to save the life of his neighbor, accidentally takes his life, the consequence is not the guilt of murder, but heart-aching grief for the loss of his friend. Again, a man exerting himself with all his ingenuity and strength to take the life of his neighbor, misses his intention and saves his life from immediate danger; the consequence is not the approbation of a good conscience for having saved the life of his neighbor, but condemnation for having designed his death, and perhaps mortification in his disappointment. By these instances, the reader may see, that no act can be determined to be morally good, or evil, by the consequences which follow, but only by the disposition, or intention, which the actor possesses when the act is done. Then, in order for the sin to be infinite, the intention of the transgressor must be infinite, embracing all the consequences that can ever arise from what he does; but this is never the case with finite beings. We never know all the effects or consequences, that will be produced from the smallest of those acts which we do in time. It is the immediate consequences which we have in our power to calculate upon, and in them we are often deceived. Our acts as moral accountables, are all limited to the narrow circle of our understanding; therefore our goodness is limited, being of the finite nature of our knowledge, and our sin is in the same finite and limited circle. It may be argued very justly, that as no finite cause can produce an infinite effect, no finite creature can commit an infinite sin; and as every effect must stand in relation to its cause, so man being finite, cannot be the cause of an evil which does not stand in relation to man the finite cause. Should the reader suppose, that my admit

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ting the act of selling Joseph was attended with unlimited consequences, in opposition to my sentiment wherein I limit all actions which originate in finite causes; I reply, as the act of selling Joseph respected the purpose of Deity, and the plan of grace, those who sold him do not stand as even the shadow of a cause, but only as instruments, by which God effected his own divine and gracious purpose. Perhaps the reader by this time, is ready to say, according to this reasoning, there can be no such things as real evil in the universe. If, by real evil, be meant something that ought not to be, in respect to all the consequences which attend it, I cannot admit of its existence; for I cannot conceive of any productive cause whatever, that can be, strictly speaking, limited in its consequences. For instance, the first transgression of man, no one can suppose, has ceased in its consequences; for, from that cause, the knowledge of good and evil exists in moral beings, and when the effects of that knowledge will cease, I cannot imagine. If it be objected, that to call that a sin which produces an infinite continuance of good effects, must be absurd; I say, in reply, the objection comes too late; for it is already proved, that the consequences of an act do not determine whether the act be good or evil.

I have, in the foregoing queries, spoken of that kind of sin which is productive of remorse; however, we read, besure, of the sin of ignorance, see Num. xv. 27, &c. ; but this I conceive to be more of a legal than of a moral nature, and it is sometimes called error; it is in a thousand instances productive of sorrow and disappointment, but never of guilt. If we consider the Jews under this law, or the Gentiles, who, the apostle says, were a law unto themselyes, we shall find them exposed to guilt, on

the same principles.

Therefore, moral transgression must vary, as the knowledge and understanding of men vary, in various circumstances.

If it be thought by the reader, that I have passed over the spirit of the law, which is love to God in a superlative degree, and an esteem for our neighbors equal to that which we have for ourselves; I answer, I have not altogether passed by it. This law of divine love is that infinite law of perfection, which is higher than our capacities extend, in a finite state. The law given to Israel, literally speaking, was only a shadow of the spirit of love; and all our knowledge of moral holiness is but a faint resemblance of that sublime rectitude from which the most upright of the sons of men are at a great distance.

Having hinted so much on the nature of sin as to make the subject plain to the reader's understanding, I will now pass to an inquiry into its cause, or origin.

The origin of sin has, among christians in general, been very easily accounted for; but in a way, I must confess, that never gave me any satisfaction, since I came to think for myself on subjects of this nature. A short chimerical story of the bard, Milton, has given perfect satisfaction to millions, respecting the introduction of moral evil into the moral system which we occupy. The substance of the account is, sometime before the creation of man, the Almighty created multitudes of spiritual beings, called angels: Some of these creatures of GOD were much higher in dignity and authority than others, but all perfectly destitute of sin, or moral turpitude. One dignified-above all the rest, stood Prime Minister of the Almighty, clothed with the highest missive power, and clad with garments of primeval light; obsequious to nothing but the high behest of