Prussian Law. g of trade, and generally inconvenient, within the meaning of the Statute of James the First;" for no addition to or improvement of such an invention could be made by any one during the continuance of the monopoly, without obliging the person using it to purchase the useless invention.h In R. v. Arkwright, the point was raised on a scire facias, to repeal the Patent, but Buller, J., considered "the issue merely a consequential one; it stated no fact which the defendant could come prepared to answer," and he therefore refused to hear any evidence in support of the allegation. In this respect it is much to be regretted that some provision is not made, as in Prussia, to the effect that, in the event of the Patentee not realizing within a certain time the pretensions put forward in his specification, he should forfeit the privileges conferred on him by the Patent, laxity in the completion of the idea being exactly the reverse of that forcing process which Patents should produce.* With reference to this point, one French writer' is of opinion that an inventor does not lose his right to the privilege by delay while he exercises his invention in secret; while another thinks a distinction is to be made on this point, and that if the inventor delivers the product of his (1836) Parke, B., Morgan v. Seaward (paddle-wheels), 2 M. & W. 544; Web. P. R. 198. Palmer v. Wagstaff (1853), Exch. 1 C. L. Rep. 448 (candles), Pollock, C. B. "It is a fraud on the Law of Patents to take out a Patent with a view to the obstruction of improvements." 1 (1785) Web. P. R. 71. j (1851) Evid. 2167. Patent must be at work, with satisfactory results, within six months from the date of the grant. * Turner, 29. See as to American Law on this subject, Evans v. Weiss, 3 Evans' Law Journal, 180, and Goodyear v. Matthews, 1 Paine's Rep. 301. I M. Merlin (1825), Rep. Univ. et Raisonné de Jur., Brevet d'Invention. m Renouard, c. 5, § 1, p. 173. invention in the mean time, and others by examining and analyzing it detect the secret, he loses the privilege." In Palmer v. Wagstaff it was stated, that, although the Patent dated from 1840, no use had been made of the invention in 1853. The case of Bentley v. Fleming P established that a machine does not become incapable of being patented by being kept a length of time by the Patentee after it has become complete and workable. The One invention. rules published under the new Act have provided against the necessity of asserting the principle of Hill v. Thompson and Brunton v. Hawkes, that a Patent for two or more inventions, where one is not new, is void altogether. They provide that "no warrant is to be granted for the sealing of any Letters-patent which contains two or more distinct substantive inventions." The most extraordinary instance of disregard of the principles of Patent law was evinced in the grant of Mill's Patent, which, under the title of "Instruments for writing and marking," included things so heterogeneous as "penholders, pencils, seals and inkstands."" A perhaps still stronger was mentioned by Lord Campbell, in a recent judgment.* Even so lately as May, 1850, a Patent was enrolled “for improvements in propelling and ploughing." n Hancock v. Somervell (1851), 39 Rep. Arts, 158, substance to be used "for shoes, slippers, floorcloth, and for a substitute for leather and other purposes." ⚫ (1853) candles, 1 C. L. Rep. Exch. 448; Evid. H. of Lords (1851), 2167. P (1844) 1 C. & K. 587, Cresswell, J. 4 2nd Set of Rules, 15 Oct. 1852. 8 Taunt. 375; 2 J. B. Moore, 424. $ 4 B. & Ald. 541. See Beard v. Egerton (1849), photographs, 8 C. B. 207. Reg. v. Mill (1850), 10 C. B. 379. * Crossley v. Potter, carpets, printed case, 65. "I recollect perfectly well," said his Lordship, "when I was Attorney-General, a Patent being presented for my approbation, the title of which was Improvements in Locomotion,' and I said this title embraces every description of assistance from a balloon to a gocart or a walking-stick. I would not grant the Patent." Bogue's Patent. CHAPTER III. THE PATENTEE. THE legal interpretation of "the true and first inventor" furnishes another instance of the extent to which the subjective treatment of Patent Law has succeeded in infixing a technical meaning upon words, almost subversive of their original signification. Its progress has been similar to that above detailed. As in the subject matter intrinsic merit in the improvement has gradually been postponed to the extent of the improvement effected by successive decisions, so here the practice has by degrees been established of viewing the Patentee merely as the channel through which the public is to be made acquainted with the invention in detail. The decisions on this head, it is true, are unusually conflicting and confused; yet amid the melée this principle (the only one reconcileable with the general theory of Patent rights) may clearly be discerned. Subject to the deductions to be hereafter made, the "true and first inventor, within the terms of the Statute, is the publisher by means of a specification of the invention" above defined." "If I discover a certain thing for myself," says Bailey, J., "it is no objection to my claim for a Patent that another also has made the discovery, provided I first introduced it into public use." This view of the subject here asserted was adopted by the present Chancellor in a very recent case, on an ap a Supra, 49, n. (q). b Stead v. Anderson (1847), wood paving, 16 L. J. (N. S.), C. B. 251, per Wilde, C. J. © Lewis v. Marling (1829), K. B., clothshearing machine, 10 B. & Cr. 27. In re Bogue's Patent, L. C., printing surfaces suitable for type or engraving, April 25, 1854. plication made by Bogue to seal a Patent for an invention of a French gentleman named Martin. The application dated from October 24, 1853. The warrant of the Attorney-general and the permission of the Solicitorgeneral, who had assented to the application, had been granted. The application was opposed by Vizetelly, who asserted that Martin had pirated the invention from M. Gillot, who held the French Patent and had disposed of his interest to him, Vizetelly. The Court held that Bogue had purchased the invention bonâ fide from Martin, and that the mode in which Martin had become possessed of it did not affect the question. It was quite sufficient that Bogue believed the vendor to be the inventor. The Patent was ordered to be sealed, Vizetelly to pay the costs of the opposition. d Patent. The earliest indications of this principle are in the de- D'Arcy v. Allen. cision of the case of monopolies, and in the provisions Baker's Patent. of Baker's and Mansell's Patents. In Edgebury v. Mansell's Stephens the point seems to have been first raised upon Edghury v. the wording of the Statute. It was there decided that Stephens. the introducer into England of an invention in use beyond seas was an inventor within the terms of the Statute, which was "intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom, and whether learned by travel or study is the same thing." Subsequent cases have proceeded on the same grounds. In Beard v. Egerton" the argument Beard v. that a Patentee must be meritoriously connected with his Egerton. invention was disallowed; and if the remarks of Lord Brougham in a recent case' may be taken to be Law, the necessity supposed to exist for a "communication" from a foreigner to a British subject no longer exists. d D'Arcy v. Allen, 44 Eliz. (A.D. 1602); Web. P. R. 6. * 4 Feb., 6 Jac. 1. malt; Web. P. R. 9. f 22 May, 21 Jac. I., glass; Web. P. R. 17. 8 3 W. & M., rollers instead of carriage wheels; 2 Salk. 447. h (1846) 3 C. B. 97, photographs; (1847) 2 C. & K. 667, Wilde, C. J. In re Berry's Patent (1850), 7 Moo. P. C. 189. Berry's Patent. Principle of Minor. Feme coverte. Bankrupt. 'The Patent Law," says his Lordship in that case, "is framed in a way to include two species of public benefactors; the one those who benefit the public by their ingenuity, industry and science, and invention and personal capability; the other those who benefit the public, without any ingenuity or invention of their own, by the importation of the results of foreign invention. Now the latter is a benefit to the public incontestably, and therefore entitled to be placed upon somewhat, if not entirely, the same footing as inventors." It is in this spirit the French Law has determined that persons civilly dead, that is, who have abjured, or who by way of punishment have been deprived of the rights of civil society, may, notwithstanding such disability, apply for and take out a Patent; though they cannot pursue any person for infringing it, or otherwise derive any benefit from contracts made respecting the use of it. On the hypothesis that the transaction is one by which society is the gainer, the question of the disqualifications of a Patentee receives a ready solution. Viewed from a legal point he is simply the vehicle for communicating the particulars of an important invention; and, provided he can discharge this duty satisfactorily, it is sufficient. Nothing prevents a Patent being taken out by an alien," a minor or a married woman, though in the latter case the property in it would, as a matter of course, belong to the husband. An American writer" considers the position of the minor as similar to the finding by him of treasure trove. A bankrupt is not disqualified pending the proceedings * In re Berry's Patent (1850), 7 Moore, P. C. 189; Beard v. Egerton (1849), 8 C. B. 165, photographs. Renouard, p. 311, ch. 8, § 2. m Bloxam v. Elsee (1825), paper, 1 C. & P. 558; Beard v. Egerton, (1849), 8 C. B. 165. |