of the House of Commons, read General Registrars

of Voters for England, Scotland, and Ireland.

203, lines 6 and 7, for certify the aggregate numbers to the Speaker annually, read ascertain and certify the quota of voters at general elections.

227, lines 3 and 4, for the privilege amongst them to succeed, read the chance amongst them of succeeding.

,, 227, line 13, for cancelled, read unreturned.

INTRODUCTION.

THE subject of political representation now assumes an aspect entirely different from that which it presented in the discussions that preceded the Act of 1832. The question was then between a partial representation, the inequalities of which were in their general effects balanced by many compensating influences, and a scheme which, dispensing with most of such influences, made the representation more direct and real, and established it on a wider basis. That Act, which was the offspring of a political compromise, extended the application of the representative principle, without excluding, and not intending to exclude, many imperfections and irregularities. The anomalies which remained were chiefly owing to the attempt to give effect to two principles which the arrangements of our electoral system made it impossible to reconcile,— the representation of interests and the representation of persons. Some constituencies were retained, framed or modified, upon the supposition that they would, in all circumstances, support what were conceived to be special interests. The idea of the constituency as the

constituted exponent of an interest having been once received, excluded the idea of personal representation within that constituency, and therefore led to the consequence,-that if persons not governed by the prevailing interest found their way within the prescribed limits, it was necessary, in pursuit of the representation of interest, to exclude such intruders, as far as it could be done, from the electoral power. As the law, however, did not, and could not adopt, as an electoral qualification, a test of fidelity to the special interest contemplated, it is not found possible to exclude from the constituency some who are guided by other motives, and form an antagonistic class. The electoral bodies which are regarded as the exponents of special interests are thus exposed to internal conflicts, which render their action more or less uncertain.

In the mobile and susceptible condition of population and society at this day, it is impossible not to observe the purely speculative character of all conclusions founded upon what the permanent interests of the inhabitants of a particular district may be,-upon what they will themselves consider them to be, or upon what their majority may resolve. In a revision of our electoral system, all those who would found the Parliamentary strength of interests or classes upon the basis of constituencies formed for their support, should consider with what degree of

safety they can rely upon a body of electors within any certain area remaining permanently faithful to the principles by which they may be at present guided. So long as any definite or indefinite number of persons shall be attached to those principles by the force of mental association or material interest, their support may be reckoned upon; but if it be a further condition of rendering this support, that such persons shall be so numerous within any geographical limit as to preponderate and overpower all opposing forces within it, the security to be derived from their attachment is certainly not strengthened. The sources of permanent support are weakened by the introduction of a condition which does not increase sympathy,—which may be impracticable, and which is of no value unless it can be used as a means of disregarding or setting at defiance the opinions of a minority. The territorial condition must be one of two things, a source of strife if it succeeds,-or a cause of weakness if it fails. It is deserving of the most profound consideration of all who desire to perpetuate any definite political principle, whether it is possible to insure for it a geographical ascendancy; and whether there are any means of promoting its maintenance so certain and lasting as would be found in a consistent adoption of the sole and simple principle of personal representation.

Earl Grey, in treating of the representative portion of the constitution, observes: "A reform is wanted, though not for the same reasons as formerly. In the present state of things, the objects that ought to be aimed at by such a measure are, to interest a larger proportion of the people in the constitution, by investing them with political rights, without disturbing the existing balance of power; to discourage bribery at elections, without giving more influence to the arts of demagogues; to strengthen the legitimate authority of the executive government, and at the same time to guard against its being abused; and to render the distribution of the Parliamentary franchise less unequal and less anomalous, but yet carefully to preserve that character which has hitherto belonged to the House of Commons, from its including among its members men representing all the different classes of society, and all the different interests and opinions to be found in the nation."*

In framing the constitution, there has been little of that kind of aid which physical science derives from experiment. Government is necessarily established before the question of circumscribing its powers can arise,—and powers once possessed are not often willingly given up.

* Essay on Reform in Parliament, p. 128.