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is the party liable for the additional rent; Lambert v. Norris, 2 M. & W. 333.

272, line 16.-Add reference to Buckworth v. Simpson, 1 C.,

M. & R. 836; 5 Tyr. 344, S. C.

275, line 4.-Refer to Wentworth v. Cock, 2 P. & Dav. 251. There it was held that a contract to supply A. from 50 to 100 tons of blocks of slate, of certain dimensions, monthly, and also from 100 to 130 tons of blocks of other dimensions, monthly, and any further quantity that he might require, such contract to be in force to a certain time, unless previously cancelled by mutual consent, is a contract not personal to A., but binding on his administrator. 275, note (b).-Ordering the funeral of deceased, and collecting debts reasonably sufficient to pay expenses, not sufficient to render person so doing executor de son tort; Camden v. Flather or Fletcher, 5 M. & W. 378.

284, note (t).-For " Bruce" read "Bunce."

299, note (o), line 2.-For "1st and 2d sections" read" 1st and 3d sections."

305, line 3.-Add "but a contract to relinquish possession of premises in favour of A. in consideration of his paying a sum of money towards completing repairs is within the statute, and must be in writing; Buttermere v. Hayes, 5 M. & W. 456."

312, 313-See Walker v. Moore, 10 B. & C. 416; there A. having contracted with B. for the purchase of a real estate, the vendor acting bonâ fide delivered an abstract showing a good title; and A. before he examined it with the original deeds, contracted to resell several portions of the property at a considerable profit. Upon a subsequent examination of the abstract with the deeds A. discovered that the title was defective, and thereupon the sub-purchasers refused to complete their purchases, and he refused to complete his purchase from B., and brought an action, wherein he claimed as damages the expense which he had incurred in the investigation of the title, the profit that would have accrued from the resale of the property, the expense attending the re-sale, and the sums which he was liable to pay to the sub-contractors for the

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expenses incurred by them in examining the title. Held that he was entitled to recover only the expenses that he had incurred in the investigation of the title and nominal damages for the breach of contract, as no fraud could be imputed to the vendor.

What amounts to a lease, or an agreement for a lease only, Brashier v. Jackson, 6 M. & W. 549; 8 Dowl. 784, S. C.

322, note (n), line 3.-For "post, 272" read " 349.”

329, note (m).-Refer to Johnson v. Jones, 1 P. & Dav. 651; post, 335.

333, line 4.-Refer to Hall v. Butler, 2 P. & Dav. 374; there the plaintiff was let into possession by N. as tenant for a year, and before the expiration of the year defendant claimed title, and desired the rent might be paid to him, and defendant and plaintiff went to N. who admitted defendant's title, and it was held that the plaintiff, who thus admitted defendant's title and paid rent to him, could not afterwards dispute his title, and refer to the same case at the end of note (w).

342. For definition of a disclaimer, see Doe d. Ellerbrook v. Flynn, 1 C., M. & R. 137; Doe d. Williams v. Cooper, 1 Scott's New R. 36; 1 Man. & Gr. 135. As to distinction between a disclaimer and a surrender, Doe d. Wyatt v. Stagg, 5 Bing. N. C. 564; 7 Scott, 690, S. C. Delivering possession of premises to a third person in fraud of landlord, is a disclaimer; Doe v. Flynn, supra.

343, note (z).—But a denial by parol of landlord's title is no forfeiture of lease for years; Doe d. Graves v. Wells, 2 P. & Dav. 396.

345.-Notice to quit by two of three Commissioners of Woods and Forests; Combes v. Dutton, 5 M. & W. 469. 347.-Notice to quit, when should expire; Cadby v. Martinez, 3 P. & Dav. 386. There an indenture of lease contained a clause that if the lessee should be desirous to put an end to the term at the end of the first fourteen years, and should leave or give six calendar months' notice in writing, immediately preceding the end of the first fourteen years, then the demise should cease and determine.

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The lease commenced at Michaelmas, and in November of the fourteenth year of the term, the lessee gave notice in writing that he should deliver up the premises on the 24th June next, agreeable to the covenants of the lease. The jury found that the lessor understood the notice to be to give up at the end of the fourteen years; but it was held that the notice was bad, as it varied from the proviso in the lease

371, line 2.-But rent will be apportioned where the tenant is

evicted by a company requiring possession of the premises under an act of parliament; Wainwright v. Ramsden, 5 M. & W. 602.

385, note (1).-A shop or warehouse in the city of London is however market overt, though from the construction of the premises a person outside cannot see what is going on within; Lyons v. Depass, 3 P. & Dav. 177; 9 C. & P. 68, S. C.

386, 387, in notes.-Shares in a banking company are not goods within statute of frauds; Brumbell v. Mitchell, 3 P. & Dav. 141.

398, line 11.-Read "written and signed by an agent of the seller."

401, note (g).—Add "but the subsequent recognition must have clear reference to the prior document; Jacob v. Kirk, 2

M. & Rob. 221."

412, line 1.-For "assignee" read "assignor."

414, note (c).-For "Townsey" read "Towsey."

425, note (n).-Add "post, 775."

431, note (u).-For "Adland" read "Adlard;" and refer to Rees v. Lines, 8 C. & P. 126; post, 566.

439, note (a).-For "Bulls" read "Burls."

444.-Lovatt v. Hamilton, 5 M. & W. 639. The defendants

by their broker entered into a contract for the sale to the plaintiffs of fifty tons of palm oil, to arrive per the Mansfield, &c. &c. In case of non-arrival, or the vessels not having so much in after delivery of the former contracts, this contract to be void. At the time this contract was entered into, the defendants had several vessels on the coast of Africa for the purpose of obtaining palm oil, and amongst others, the Mansfield and the Watt. After the

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date of the contract, the Mansfield was loaded with 315 tons of palm oil, and sailed homewards. On her arrival at Cameroons, the defendant's agent ordered the captain of the Mansfield to transship part of her cargo to the Watt, which was the larger vessel. This transshipment was according made bonâ fide and without fraud, for the purpose of enabling the Watt to proceed home with a full cargo. The Watt proceeded on her voyage, and arrived in Liverpool on the 8th of April, 1838, and the Mansfield on the 20th of May following. The Mansfield, on her arrival, had on board 235 tons of palm oil; but the contracts made previously to the above contract amounted to 228 tons, leaving only seven tons applicable to this contract, which were delivered by the defendants to the plaintiffs. Held, in an action for the non-delivery of the oil-first, that the arrival of the oil in the Mansfield was a condition precedent, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the oil brought by the Watt; secondly, that the contract for the fifty tons was entire, and that plaintiffs were not entitled to the seven tons brought by the Mansfield over what was required to satisfy former

contracts.

448.-Refer to Wilson v. Butler, 6 Scott, 540; 4 Bing. N. C. 754, S. C.

464, note.-Add "post, 743, 773; Wells v. Hopkins, 5 M. & W. 7; Trickey v. Larne, 6 M. & W. 278; 8 Dowl. 174."

476. An innkeeper has no lien on a horse, unless placed in his care by a guest; Binns v. Pigott, 8 C. & P. 208.

479, note (ƒ).-Add reference to Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. &

W. 499. There it appeared that the owners of a carriage were in the habit of hiring horses from the same person to draw it for a day or drive, and the owner of the horses provided a driver, through whose negligence an injury was done to a third party, it was held that the owners of the carriage were not liable to be sued for such injury. And it was held to make no difference that the owners of the carriage had always been driven by the same driver, he being the only regular coachman in the employ of the owner of the horses, or that they had al

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ways paid him a fixed sum for each drive, or that they had provided him with a suit of livery, which he left at their house at the end of each drive, and that the injury in question was occasioned by his leaving the horses. while so depositing the livery in their house.

501.-Contribution between sureties. Davies v. Humphries, 6 M. & W. 168, cited page 598.

506, 514, 522.—A promise to a debtor to pay his debts to a third person is not a promise to answer for the debt of another, within the statute against frauds; that statute applies only to promises made to the person to whom another is answerable; Eastwood v. Kenyon, 3 P. & Dav. 280. 561, note (z).—And see the case of Huntley v. Bulwer, 8 Scott, 325, when the court refused to set aside the nonsuit.

581, note (a).-For" Gill" read "Grill."

587.— Witness, expenses of. Evans v. Philpotts, 9 Car. & P. 270. There an attorney, who, at the time of serving the subpoena, promised the witness payment of his expenses, received such expenses from the opposite party, and subsequently gave the witness an I. O. U., was held personally liable to the witness; and see ante, 229.

Action and declaration againt witness for disobeying subpoena; Lamont v. Crook, 8 Dowl. 737.

600, note (t).-The case of Alcinbrook v. Hall was observed upon in M'Kinnell v. Robinson, 3 M. & W. 442, and cannot, it should seem, be supported, post, 714.

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636, note (b).—Add " But see Hargreave v. Hutchinson, 2 Ad. & E. 12, and post, 707, note (q).”

641, note (n).—Read " Lightly v. Couston."

730.—When contract to be performed. In action for breach of

an agreement to let a house to the plaintiff for one year, from 25th of March, the plaintiff to take the fixtures at a valuation, and pay for the same on entry: it was held that the plaintiff might show a tender of the price of the fixtures, and a demand of possession at a day subsequent to the 25th of March, the plaintiff not being bound by the terms of the agreement to enter on or before the 25th of March, though his tenancy and liability to pay rent would commence from that day; Edman v. Allen, 8 Scott, 261.

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