husband cohabiting with his wife impliedly constitutes her his agent for the purpose of contracting for necessaries suitable to his station and condition in life (m).

It seems that the mortgagor or assignor of a ship, contracting in his own behalf with a third person to let it, &c., cannot be regarded by the mortgagee or assignee as his agent, so as to enable the latter to sue for the freight, &c. in his own name: for the mortgagee or assignee is no party to the contract that is made after the transfer; and it is not material that he is entitled to the ship's earnings (n).

It seems that in the case of clubs, the affairs of which are managed by a committee, the extent of the authority of such committee to pledge the credit of the members of the club depends on the rules and formation of the club, and is not analogous to a trading partnership, but is entirely a question of principal and agent (o). And therefore where a club was formed, subject to the following among other rules, viz., that the entrance fee on admission should be ten guineas, and the annual subscription five guineas; that if the subscription were not paid within a certain limited period the defaulter should cease to be a member; that there should be a committee to manage the affairs of the club, to be chosen at a general meeting, and that all members should discharge their club-bills daily; the steward being authorised, in default of payment on request, to refuse to continue to supply them: it was held, that the members of the club, merely as such, were not liable for debts incurred by the committee for work done or goods supplied for the use of the club, for the committee had no authority to pledge the personal credit of the members (o).

Nor has a member of a joint stock banking company any implied authority to accept bills in the names of the directors or the company (p).

It is a general principle, that the subsequent sanction or adoption of the contract which another party has made without ade

391; 1 II. Bla. 317, n.; Morrison v. Parsons, 2 Taunt. 407; Case v. Davidson, 5 M. & Selw. 79; 2 B. & B. 379, S. C.; Abbott, 5th ed., 17; Dean v. M'Ghie, 4 Bing. 45.

(0) See Flemyng v. Hector, 2 Mee. & W. 181.

(p) Bramah v. Roberts, 3 Bing. N. C. 963; 5 Scott, 172, S. C., and

v. Blackman, 3 Doug. post, 251.

quate authority, as the agent of the party, who afterwards assents to it, is tantamount to a previous authority; or in other words, as an authority may be presumed from previous employment in similar acts, so the same presumption arises from subsequent acts of assent and acquiescence, according to the maxim omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur (q). Where, therefore, a broker made a contract in writing for the sale of goods, not being authorised by one of his principals at the time, which the latter afterwards assented to, it was held that the broker was an agent duly authorised to bind his principal, under the statute of frauds, at the time the contract was entered into (r).

So where H., the managing owner of a ship, directed an insurance broker to effect an insurance on the entire ship, upon an adventure in which all the part owners were jointly interested, and the amount of the entire premium was carried to the ship's account in H.'s books, which were open to the inspection of all the part owners, who saw the account, and never objected to it; but it did not appear that the insurance broker knew the names of all the part owners, or whether or not they had given authority to H. to insure it was held that the jury were warranted in inferring a joint authority to insure, and that all the part owners were jointly liable for the premium to the insurance broker, notwithstanding he had debited H. alone, and divided with him the profits of commission upon effecting the insurance (s). But where the party making the contract had not a shadow of authority to contract for the third person, and did not profess at the time to act for him, it seems that the subsequent assent of such third party to be bound as a principal has no operation (t).

A contract made by an agent, as such, is in law the contract of the principal. Qui facit per alium facit per se. The agent is considered merely as a conduit. He is simply the medium by

(4) Ward v. Evans, 2 Salk. 442; 2 Lord Raym. 928, S. C.; Wilson v. Poulter, Stra. 859, and post, 219, note, (z), Maclean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722; 1 M. & P. 761; and see Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 161. Qy. whether a ratification of the agent's acts after action brought, and plea pleaded, is sufficient, Taylerson v. Peters, 2 Nev. & P. 625.

(r) Id., and ante, 17.

(s) Robinson v. Gleadow, 2 Bing. N. C. 156; 2 Scott, 250; 1 Hodges, 245, S. C.

(t) See Finn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757; 4 id. 177, S. C.; Saunderson v. Griffiths, 5 B. & C. 909; 8 D. & R. 643, S. C.; Vere v. Ashby, 10 B. & C. 293, per Parke, J.; ante, 17, 18. to when such agent may be personally sued, see post, 227.

As

which the contract is effected. His assent is merely the assent
of his principal; he need not therefore be competent to contract
for himself; so that infants, married women, persons attainted or
outlawed, or aliens, may act as agents for other persons (u).
An agent's authority may be determined either—

1stly. By the express revocation thereof by the principal.
2ndly. By his death (x).

3rdly. By efflux of time when a specific period is fixed for the execution of the act to be done by the agent; or,

4thly. By the execution of the commission, whereby the agent becomes functus officio (y).

A bare authority is revocable by the party who conferred it at any time before it has been executed; but if there be an interest coupled with the authority, that is, if the party receiving the authority acquire with it a beneficial and valuable personal interest in the subject matter, or in the execution of the act which he is authorised to perform, the power granted cannot be countermanded (z).

But the implied authority arising from general employment continues, it seems, even after the agency has in reality ceased, as regards parties who have before given and continue to give credit to it, and who have not actually received, and cannot be presumed to have had, notice of the change (a). A servant had power to draw bills in his master's name, and was afterwards turned out of his service, and it was ruled, "that if he draw a bill in so little a time that the world cannot take notice of his being out of service, or if he were a long time out of his service, but that it is kept so secret that the world cannot take notice of it,

(u) Co. Lit. 52 a. By the French law, married women and emancipated minors may be agents. Code Civil, book 3, tit. 13, art. 1990. And see Wilson v. Barthrop, 2 Mee. & W.866: 1 Jurist, 949, S. C.

(x) Watson v. King, 4 Camp. 274; Lepard v. Vernon, 2 V. & B. 51; Odes v. Woodward, Lord Ray. 849; Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167; 4 Man. & Ry. 1244; cited ante, 132; Bac. Ab. Authority, (E); Cholmeley v. Paxton, 11 Moo. 17; 3 Bing. 211, per Best, C. J.; Lepard v. Vernon, 2 V. & B. 51. (y) Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. jun. 276; Paley, 137; Macbeath v. Cooke, 1 M.

& P. 513; Blackburn v. Scholes, 2
Camp. 343.

(z) Walsh v. Whitcomb, 2 Esp. R.
565; Bromley v. Holland, 7 Ves. jun.
28; Paley, 135. A power of attorney
is revocable, Bromley v. Holland, 7
Ves. jun. 28.

(a) See Paley, 136, 137, 123, 124; and see 1 Pothier, Tr. Oblig. 47, by Evans, part 1, c. 1, s. 1, art. 5. The same principle applies in the case of a dissolution of partnership, post. But it seems that the death of the principal, though not known, absolutely and at once extinguishes the agent's power. See Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 167. Sed vide Pothier, ubi supra.

the bill in those cases shall bind the master (b)." And where a servant who had been used to raise, receive, and pay money for his master, borrowed 200 guineas in his master's name after he had quitted the service, the lender recovered against the master, by the direction of Keeling, C. J.; and this direction was approved of by the whole court, on a motion for a new trial (c).

3. Extent of Authority, and Liability of Principal.—The rules of law by which the extent of an agent's authority to bind his principal is regulated, are in general the same, whether such agent be appointed for commercial or domestic purposes. Of course, however, the nature of the employment, and the difference of the pursuit, will occasion some distinctions. The leading principles are, however, the same in both cases. Thus it is always material to ascertain, when the power of an agent is the point at issue, whether he be a general or a special agent (d). There does not appear to be any authority on the part of the committee of management of a club house to pledge the personal credit of its members, at least this must depend on the rules and formation of the club (e).

A master is liable, civiliter, for the acts (f) and contracts of his

(b) v. Harrison, 12 Mod. 346; Moll. 107. See ante, 170, note (g).

(c) Monk v. Clayton, Moll. 282; cited also in Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 110.

(d) It is for the court to put a construction on a written authority, Collis v. Emmett, 1 H. Bla. 313; Howard v. Baillie, 2 id. 618. Authority to receive rents is no authority to distrain, Ward v. Shew, 9 Bing. 608. But an agent appointed to receive rents and let, has authority to determine a tenancy, Doe d. Manvers v. Mixem, 2 M. & Rob. 56; but he cannot waive a forfeiture, Doe d. Nash v. Birch, 1 Mee. & W. 408. As to agent of committee of candidate at election, Thomas v. Edwards, 2 Mee. & W. 215. When general authority to indorse bills may be presumed, Prescott v. Flinn, 2 Moore & S. 18; 9 Bing. 19, S. C.; Esdaile v. La Nauze, 1 Y. & Col. 394; Cunliffe v. Booth, 3 Bing. N. C. 823, & post, 218, 550. If two persons be ap pointed jointly, one alone cannot act, even in the case of clerks to trustees of a turnpike road, Bell v. Nixon, 2 Moore & S. 534; 9 Bing. 393, S. C.

Where four parties constituted a firm, and two retired, the business being carried on in the name of the old firm, an agent afterwards appointed by the two continuing partners is not an agent to bind the four, Jones v. Shears, 4 Ad. & E. 832.

(e) Flemyng v. Hector, 2 Mee. & W. 181, ante, 212.

(f) Not liable for the wilful act of his servant in committing a tort, M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106. See Gregory v. Piper, 9 B. & C. 591. But where it appeared that the defendants in an action, who were occupiers of a bonded warehouse, engaged a master porter to lower and convey a barrel of flour from their warehouse, and the master porter engaged a master carter, and both of them attended with their men, and during the process of lowering it from the warehouse the barrel fell, and injured the plaintiff, owing to the defectiveness of a rope furnished by the master porter, it was held that the defendants were liable; Rundleson v. Murray, 3 Nev. & P. 239; and see Huzzey v. Field, 2 C., M. & R. 435, post, 220.

servant, within the scope of his employment, on the ground of an authority delegated by the master, expressly or impliedly, to the servant (g). The responsibility for the act of a domestic servant does not rest on the circumstance of the master being pater familias; but because the servants are of his choosing (h). The master's assent must in all cases appear, either by express evidence thereof, or by the proof of facts, from which the law raises an inference that such assent was given.

We have already remarked, that a husband's liability on the contracts of his wife rests on the ground of an implied authority on her part to act as his agent, or servant (i).

It is necessary and expedient, that parties should be allowed to communicate with each other, through the medium of a third person; but business would be impeded, if on all occasions it were necessary that the public should consult the master. If, therefore, a servant be accredited and invested by his master with a general discretion and authority to act generally for him in his affairs, or, in other words, be a general agent, so that the public cannot discriminate what are, in any particular case, within the general scope of the agent's powers, the wishes and directions of the master, the latter is liable, although his orders be violated. In such case the master, having for his own convenience induced the public to consider that his servant is possessed of general powers to act for him, is not permitted to delude, by suddenly withholding such general authority, and confining it within prescribed limits, where, from his previous conduct, a continuance of a general discretion in the agent, might reasonably be presumed. But where the servant had never before been employed, and is retained only for a particular purpose, in other words is a special agent, he is invested with a limited power; it is the duty of persons dealing with such agent to ascertain the extent of his authority, and the principal or master is not bound by any act of the agent not warranted expressly, or by fair and necessary implication (k), by the terms of the authority delegated to him.