of course, the right to dictate the policy of the cabinet and to guide the destiny of the country. George III. clung to this prerogative to the very last day of his life, and nothing would make him consent to forego it. He threatened over and over again to abdicate and leave the country rather than give way one hair'sbreadth on this point. The nomination of his ministers was a bagatelle in comparison with this. A sovereign might well forego his right to select and even to appoint ministers so long as he could impose on them his own policy. Having surrendered the substance there need be no difficulty in giving up the shadow. Formerly ministers were really the servants of the sovereign. They were appointed by him, and were responsible to him alone, and his policy was their policy. Not only was the existence of the cabinet formerly unknown to the law, but the individual members of it were not even represented in Parliament till comparatively recent times, and all deliberations in the cabinet were conducted in the presence of the sovereign. But all this is now changed. Cabinet meetings are no longer held in the royal presence. It is even considered necessary that the sovereign should be expressly excluded from its deliberations, in order that the cabinet may be able to arrive at impartial conclusions on matters which come before it.

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Parlia

The nomination of the executive by Parliament would, in my opinion, bring about a vast and beneficial change in the government of the country. It would put an end to the dominating influence of the premier and destroy the unity of the cabinet. ment could then remove at pleasure any minister whose conduct it disapproved of. It would have the selection of ministers in its own hands, and the best men from both sides of the House would be eligible for office in the same way as the speaker is now.' The selection would not be from one section of Parliament but for all sections, and the ministry would represent all shades of opinion. At present one half of the best men in Parliament are permanently excluded from office.

There would also be a possibility of differentiating the functions of administration and legislation. Both kinds of functions are now exercised by the cabinet. Ministers attempt too much when they undertake to administer the affairs, and at the same time to provide legislative measures, for a great empire. The functions of administration are sufficiently onerous and important to engage their undivided attention. By relieving them of the business of legislation, which

1 The speakership is no longer a political office. Mr. Brand has been elected speaker by three successive governments, in 1872, 1874, and again in 1880.

properly belongs to Parliament, there would be some chance of obtaining an efficient system of depart▾ mental supervision; while by leaving Parliament unhampered by considerations of changes of government, it would be able to devote itself zealously to the work of legislation. If the heads of departments found it necessary to recommend legislation, their proposals would, no doubt, be impartially considered by Parliament. In this as in other matters ministers would take their instructions from Parliament, not Parliament from ministers, as at present. Probably it might be necessary, in order to prevent the time of the House being wasted in discussing the various proposals which might be introduced by private members, to appoint a legislative committee to exaine and report, as is now done in France and in several continental states where parliamentary government exists.

The whole system of party government could in this manner be quietly and effectually got rid of. There would then be no striking at ministers through their policy; no rejecting of good measures in order to bring about a change of government. Members would be in a position to discuss measures on their merits, or, at all events, without permitting party questions to influence them. There would be no weak governments, and no danger to the liberties

of the people from too strong ones. As ministers would not be appointed because they belonged to a party, there would be no motive for turning them out of office. They would be in deed and in truth the ministers, not the masters of Parliament.

Parliament would also be able to exercise an effective control over every department of state, as each member of the executive would be directly and exclusively responsible to it. If friendly relations with a foreign power were imperilled by a bellicose minister, if the commissariat were mismanaged, if the army were improperly officered, if unsuitable persons were appointed to the bench or the magistracy, the offending minister would alone be held accountable to Parliament. There would be no secrecy, no screening of colleagues; the public would know, in every instance, who was to blame for the mismanagement; the delinquent alone would be liable to censure or punishment, and the administration of affairs would pass into the hands of efficient and capable men.

Such a change as is here indicated ought to specially commend itself to the conservative mind. The present system is almost too revolutionary in its character and tendencies. A change of ministers is absolutely a change of rulers. It means the retirement, sometimes sudden and always inconvenient, of

one set of masters, and their replacement by another set. It means more than this. It means the overthrow of one set of masters and the substitution of another set holding diametrically opposite opinions on almost every question of the day. It means, therefore, a complete and entire reversal of the foreign and domestic policy of the country. It means also a change in the method of administration. The new ministers bring with them into office new ideas and new habits, and may undo in an hour arrangements for carrying on the business which may have taken their predecessors years to elaborate. What would be thought if the managers of a factory, of a school, of a prison, or of a lunatic asylum, if they changed their officials after this fashion? What method of administration, what kind of discipline, could be carried out under such conditions? Only a nation habituated for centuries to self-government, could withstand the strain of such a vicious system.

In the foregoing pages I have attempted to show that our process of legislation is slow, tedious and laborious; that some of the most necessary and valuable measures have taken generations of agitation before they were passed into law, and that many useful and urgent reforms still await legislative sanction. I have also endeavoured to point out how our present Constitution differs from the old, and wherein it is