I have entered into these details because they may help to solve a difficulty which to many persons may seem insuperable. For my part, I can see no means of reconciling representative institutions with popular government, unless on the supposition that the constituents exercise uninterrupted control over their representatives. Independence on the part of the representatives is not only incompatible with the representative idea but with the principle of popular moving innumerable amendments in committee, and Mr. Alderman Thompson, one of the reforming members for the City of London (then a thoroughly Liberal constituency), spoke and voted in favour of an amendment to save the borough of Appleby from disfranchisement. His constituents, however, regarded his vote on that occasion as an act of treason against his party; and the livery of London, acting on behalf of the whole constituency, summoned him before them, and distinctly informed him that he was sent into Parliament to support the bill as it stood, and not such portions of it only as he approved of. The result of the meeting was, that Mr. Thompson expressed his sincere regret for his vote, pleading that such a prostration of body and mind had seized him, owing to the fatigues arising from his close attendance at the House, that he had committed an inadvertence, and promised that in future he would vote against every proposal to alter the bill which was not sanctioned by the government. The meeting accepted his protestations and promises, and concluded by passing the following resolution :- -"That the meeting of the livery of London, after a full and complete inquiry into the vote of Mr. Alderman Thompson relative to the borough of Appleby, and his explanation of the same, are of opinion that he acted therein inadvertently, and Mr. Alderman Thompson having renewed his pledge to give entire support to the Reform Bill, this meeting feel themselves called upon to continue their confidence in Mr. Alderman Thompson as one of the representatives of the City of London in Parliament." The action of the livery had the desired effect. Neither Mr. Thompson nor any other member of the reform party after this ventured to support any amendment on the bill not sanctioned by the government.

government. Popular government can only exist where the people can exercise control over their representatives at all times and under all circumstances. It has therefore been my endeavour to present some scheme which would combine the principle of representation with the principle of the sovereignty of the people; and in no other way can this be done, in my opinion, than by recognizing to the fullest extent the right of the constituent body not only to elect, but to instruct, and, if necessary, to dismiss their representatives at any time they may think proper.

Is it considered hard on a member to be taken to task in this manner by his constituents? It is not the member that has to be considered so much in such a case, however, as his constituents. What is he if he does not truly represent them but an impostor? What little sympathy there may be to spare, therefore, in such a case, should be bestowed on the victims and not on the victimized. The marvel to me is that any member should desire to hold his seat if he had even a suspicion that he had no moral right to it. That there are many members in every Parliament that suspect, and many more that know, that they do not honestly represent the views of their constituents is, unfortunately, a matter beyond dispute.

But it would not follow that a member and a

constituency would part company whenever there was any difference of opinion between them. Absolute uniformity is, of course, out of the question. Even on the leading question of the day, a constituency might not insist on uniformity. I can imagine a case of a member being retained even when he differed from his constituents on a very important question. If a member has rendered good service to his country and his views in the main are in accordance with those of his constituents, there can be little doubt as to what the result would be. All that I insist upon is that the constituency should have the option of retaining their member or his vote.

I shall no doubt be told that it would be derogatory for a representative to hold a position of dependence such as I have described. But how it would be derogatory is a question to which no explicit answer is ever forthcoming. We hear a great deal about the dignity, but very little of the duties of a representative. The position of an ambassador is surely as dignified as that of a representative-he is, in fact, a representative in the true sense of the term; yet an ambassador holds his appointment at the pleasure of his minister. The authority to dismiss is the complement to the power to appoint; if it is not derogatory for a representative to receive his appointment from his constituents, it cannot be derogatory to be called upon

by the same authority to resign it. A representative can suffer no indignity in submitting himself to his constituents; on the contrary, he would suffer both in dignity and in honour if he retained his seat in defiance of their wishes. It can be no discredit to a representative to hold his seat on the same terms as ministers hold office. Ministers do not consider it derogatory to be called upon to resign their portfolios whenever they have lost the confidence of Parliament. Even Parliament itself may be dismissed at a moment's notice, although elected for a definite period; but no one ever heard of a dissolution being derogatory, although it may be both inconvenient and expensive. A representative cannot reasonably complain if he is treated no worse than a minister of the Crown, or no better than the Assembly to which he considers it an honour to belong.

It may also be objected that electoral control would interfere with the exercise of the deliberative functions of the representative. But we have already seen that the representative has full scope for the exercise of his judgment within as well as without the limits of his instructions. A parliamentary representative cannot be converted into a machine because he is bound by his instructions, any more than can an agent or an ambassador under similar circumstances. His instructions may be definite as to the ends, but

not as to the means to obtain them. He may not be able to do all that is required of him, but he must do the best he can, leaving his constituents to be the judge of his conduct. His instructions extend only to his general policy; the framing of measures for embodying that policy will be left to himself. Outside the scope of his instructions there is also ample room and verge enough. Only as far as they are known to him is he bound to carry out the wishes of his constituents; in all else he must follow what his judgment dictates. The cabinet is an executive body, but it is also deliberative. Nevertheless its executive acts must be approved of by Parliament. The practice we have seen is common enough for ministers to take the sense of the House by a resolution, or a series of resolutions. But ministers do not resign if their resolutions are condemned. They in effect ask for instructions when they present their resolutions; and if they did not accept them when offered they would immediately be met by a vote of want of confidence. If ministers, therefore, are not prevented by instructions from Parliament from exercising their judgment, why should ordinary members be considered to be placed in a false position by instructions from their constituents?

The advantages of the system proposed are numerous and manifest. It would secure continuity