to good government, as a bad or incapable minister could be got rid of without difficulty; and where there is a difference of opinion among ministers on any question of policy, the public are more likely to get at the truth of the matter if the issue were made an open one.

The other side of the question has been very forcibly put by Sir G. C. Lewis. In a letter to Mr. W. R. Greg, he points out what he conceives would be the consequences which would follow from any attempt to break up the political unity of the cabinet. "You appear," he writes, "to assume that the government would be a government by departments; that each man is to do what seems best to himself in his own department, provided he can carry it in Parliament, even against the opposition of his colleagues. You put the case of a foreign minister in favour of continuing the war, and a chancellor of the exchequer in favour of making peace. Now, in the first place, it seems to me that your system would render meetings of the cabinet useless or mischievous. Ministers would meet to dispute, and part to differ. Besides, how would it be safe to read confidential despatches before persons who were in communication with men of an opposite party, and would immediately go and disclose the information? However, I will suppose that no cabinets were held, that each minister acted

for himself according to the best of his judgment. What I do not understand is, how a war could be conducted by a warlike foreign minister, if the chancellor of the exchequer was peaceful. He would say, I am against war; I think it impolitic and mischievous, and I shall propose a peace budget. When the estimates came in from the War Department to the Treasury for approbation, he would withhold it, unless they were reduced to peace scale. The same argument might be extended to every department in succession."1 Sir G. C. Lewis here supposes that if government by cabinet were abolished we should have to fall back upon government by departments. But there is another obvious alternative which has not yet been tried. I mean, of course, Government by Parliament. We have had government by prerogative, government by the army, government by departments, government by party, and now we have government by cabinet; but we have never had government by Parliament. When government by departments was in operation, the heads of departments were controlled by the sovereign; we have not yet had government by departments directly controlled by Parliament. Yet this is precisely the kind of government that the Constitution provides for. The functions of ministers are, or ought to be, simply

1 Life and Letters of Sir G. C. Lewis, p. 284.

administrative.

Ministers are the executive committee of Parliament. It is their duty to carry on the departmental business of government, and nothing more. And there is no more reason to anticipate that the members of a committee of this kind would meet only to differ and dispute, than would any select committee of the House appointed for any other purpose. If a select committee do not agree, the minority may submit a separate report setting forth the reasons why they differ from the majority, and when the question submitted to them comes up before the House the fullest light will be thrown on the whole matter in dispute. There is no reason why ministers should not follow the same rule. The remark that it would be unsafe to read confidential despatches before persons who might be in communication with men of an opposite party is beside the question, because I am assuming a state of things altogether different from what at present exists. Sir G. C. Lewis professes not to be able to understand how a war could be conducted by a warlike foreign minister if the chancellor of the exchequer was inclined for peace, as the latter, in such a case, would withhold appropriation for war purposes. There need, however, be no difficulty in the case, if we assume it to be the duty of ministers simply to advise Parliament, and the duty of Parliament to instruct ministers. Sir

G. C. Lewis's whole argument rests on the assumption that ministers are independent of parliamentary control.

But, say the advocates of party government, a popular assembly like the House of Commons must be brought under discipline; there must be some one to guide it, or nothing but hasty and ill-advised results will follow from its deliberations. According to the system of party government the head of the ministry is the recognized leader of the House, who brings it under his discipline and guides its decisions. The dread of the resignation of ministers, we are told, will induce their followers to support the measures they bring forward, while their opponents will, at the same time, be deterred from the factious opposition by the fear entertained by its leaders that in succeeding to office they might find insuperable difficulties in the way of acting differently from their predecessors. Ministers," says Earl Grey, "could not be held answerable for the conduct of a Parliament they had no power to direct, and the only responsibility left would be that of the House collectively. Experience, as I have already remarked, proves that a responsibility shared amongst so many is really felt by none; and that a popular assembly, which will not submit to follow the guidance of some leader, is ever uncertain in its conduct and unstable in its decisions. After the

Revolution of 1688, when the House of Commons had by that event acquired great power, and had not yet been brought under the discipline of our present system, these evils were grievously felt. They would be far more so in the present state of society, and we must expect to see the House of Commons arriving at many hasty and ill-judged decisions, and its members giving their votes much oftener than they now do contrary to their judgment in deference to public clamour, if they were relieved from the apprehension of creating the difficulties that arise from a change of government. Those who have watched the proceedings of Parliament cannot be ignorant how many unwise votes have been prevented by the dread of the resignation of ministers, and that the most effective check on factious conduct on the part of the opposition is the fear entertained by its leaders of driving the government to resign on a question upon which, if they should themselves succeed to power, they would find insuperable difficulties in acting different from their predecessors."

"1

Now, in the first place, it is not ministers that should be held answerable for the conduct of Parliament, but Parliament that should be held answerable for the conduct of ministers. In the second place, Government by Party necessitates the existence not of one

1 Grey's Parl. Gov., p. 102.