ther it expressed the general sentiments of the nation. Certainly, early in the war the Spanish troops were local and irregular: but this force was soon found to be ineffective. Even in Andalusia, a regular army had been established, and it was not till they were in possession of a regular army, that the Spaniards were enabled to make an effectual struggle, and to reduce the power of the enemy by the defeat of Dupont at the memorable battle of Baylen. The ourse of events decided the question between a regular and an irregular force. When Madrid was evacuated, and the provinces purged of the French, every province felt the necessity of advancing its troops, and they had consequently heen advanced and consolidated in the centre of the kingdom. His majesty's ministers had, therefore, no option the option had been made by Spain. They had chosen the mode of regular warfare, and it would have ill-befitted the character of Great Britain to have shrunk from the contest, and to have said to the Spaniards: "We will give you money, we will give you stores, but we will not hazard our blood in your defence." The speech of the right honour

able gentleman was rather of a prudent cast, and not in that animated style, in which another. right honourable gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) had, in the last session, represented the aiding Spain as paramount to all other duties. The right honourable gentlemen who spoke this night, seemed to think it was very improper and imprudent for a British army to enter Spain, without having some cautionary towns and forts surrender. ed to us, to secure our retreat in case of calamity. Mr. C. for his. part, knew of no town of that sort which could be surrendered, except Cadiz; for as to Ferrol, it was not a town capable of answering the object proposed, nor of protecting the embarkation of an army. Now, as it was evident, that if we were to make any operations at all, they must be in the north of Spain, he could not conceive that a proposal would be well. received in that country, for surrendering a town quite without the line of our military operations. If we had made such a proposal to that generous and high-spirited: nation, he could not suppose that we could have thrown a greater apple of discord to disturb the harmony of cordial co-operation.

As

As to another disposition of the forces which had been mentioned, that of sending Sir Arthur Wellesley's force of 9000 men to the Pyrenees, to cut off the communication between the 60,000 French troops who were in Spain, and the rest of the 500,000 disposable troops, of which the right honourable gentleman stated the enemy's army to consist, the bare statement of such a plan must convince the house of its absurdity. With regard to the idea which had been thrown out, of the propriety of directing our forces to Spain in the first instance, instead of Portugal, he must say, there never was a fallacy more absurd than the idea of occupying the passes of the Pyrennees, and cutting off entirely the communication between two armies infinitely superior. This fallacy seemed to arise from the idea that an army, when once landed, could put itself on march the next morning, to attack the enemy. There were some persons who appeared to think, that an army once landed could act as speedily as a ship when it has left the port. The difference, however, was very great: the ship had nothing to do but to go with the wind, and meet the enemy; whereas an army when landed had much difficulty in collecting provisions, and the means of transporting their necessary baggage. If the present administration were, however, to have waited till every thing was ready for the reception of our armies, they must have stood as still as the last vigorous administration, who actually did nothing while in office. He would venture to say, from the me

lancholy experience of the fate of General Blake's army, that if a British army had landed at St. Andero, and scrambled as far as General Blake advanced, none of them would ever have come back. He was convinced that there was not a single military man who would support the idea of a campaign in the Pyrennees, for a British army. The right honourable gentleman had stated, that the expedition which had achieved the deliverance of Portugal had · been sent to sea, to seek its fortunes, without any particular direction from government. The fact, however, was directly the reverse, because, most unquestionably, the expedition under Sir Arthur Wellesley did sail with a most precise and determinate object. It had been ordered to go immediately to the Tagus, without stopping at Corunna. This direction was given in consequence of precise information from Sir C. Cotton, (which, however, afterwards turned out to be unfounded,) that there were no more than 3000 French troops in Lisbon and the other forts upon the Tagus, and that Sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition would be sufficient to dislodge them. The expedition then had been sent out with a precise object, and with precise instructions, but it would hardly be contended, that government should have tied up the hands and the discretion of such a meritorious officer as Sir Arthur Wellesley so completely as to say, that he must on no occasion take advantage of any favourable circumstances which might occur in the varying and fleeting fortune of the war, without

without waiting until he had made a direct communication to government upon the subject, and had received their answer. It appeared to him, that floating armies, under the command of trust-worthy officers, might be of great service, even when acting according to the circumstances of the times, without any particular directions from government; and he was confident, that in this manner the corps of General Spencer had been of considerable service in marching from Seville to Ayamonte, and stopping a portion of Junot's army that was coming to the relief of Dupont.-As to the attacks which had been made upon him for not having sent sufficient cavalry with the expedition, he was ready to strengthen the right honourable gentleman's argument, and to admit, that it was only by accident that any cavalry at all had been attached to it. It was not supposed that cavalry was a proper description of force to send with those floating expeditions, which might be a long time at sea before they found a favourable op portunity for landing. Some of the cavalry, however, which were in Portugal, had happened to come from the Mediterranean. He should always protest against the Lotion, that we were never to engage an enemy, unless we were equal or superior to him in cavalry. He would ask the House, would they wish to blot out from the page of our history, those brilliant victories which we had gained when much inferior in ca

valry? At the glorious battle of Alexandria, Sir Ralph Abercrombie had but 150 dragoons, and the French had 2,400 cavalry; and at the battle of Maida, Sir John Stuart had no cavalry at all. In the expedition to Portugal, the government had made sufficient provision even of cavalry. Our army would have been superior to the enemy in this respect, if the cavalry which was in Mondego Bay on the 20th (the day before the battle) had landed. The 18th dragoons were also very near. He would allow, however, that if Sir Arthur Wellesley had had the cavalry on that day, upon which he routed the French, the result of that victory would have been still more glorious.

Various strictures were made on the Address, which, however, was not on the whole opposed, by Mr. Whitbread: a long reply was made by Mr. Canning: Mr. Tierney, Mr. G. H. Rose, and Mr. A. Ba ring, entered at very considerable length into our commercial disputes with America; and Mr. Alderman Combe animadverted in severe terms on the answer returned by his Majesty's ministers to the address of the City of London on the Convention of Portugal: a topic which had been also touched on, though more briedy, by all the speakers opposite to the treasury bench. The question was then put, and agreed to nem, con. when a committee was appointed to prepare and draw up the Ad dress.

CHAP.

the hourly expectation of the artival of the re-inforcements under Sir John Moore, which would render the attainment of the object in view certain, Sir H. Burrard chose to stop, rather than to make a movement which, under the existing circumstances, was undoubtedly hazardous. Sir H. Burrard had the command of the army. He was present for a great part of the time in the hottest of the engagement, and had a duty to perform of which he could not divest himself. The responsibility rested with him, and he controlled (judiciously in Lord M.'s opinion) the opinion of Sir A. Wellesley respecting the advance to Torres Vedras. Sir H. Burrard must therefore be considered as acting the whole of the day, and ought not to be left out of the motion for thanks.

The earl of Grosvenor wished this question had not been brought forward till the papers respecting the expedition had been laid on the table.-Lord Harrowby contended that Sir H. Burrard had with great magnanimity allowed, in his own dispatches, the actual command, during the battle, to remain with Sir Arthur Wellesley. To include Sir H. Burrard in the vote of thanks, would be giving an opinion on subsequent circumstances, respecting which no information was before the house.-Viscount Sidmouth did not feel that a vote of thanks to Sir A. W. would attach the least discredit to the character of Sir H. Burrard. He recommended to the noble baron to withdraw his amendment. So also did Lord Auckland.-Lord Mulgrave said, that it was the

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glory of Sir H. Burrard to have duly admired and done justice to the services of Sir A.Wellesley. In the conduct of Sir A.Wellesley his lordship saw every thing that was dignified and transcendent. The victory of Vimiera, Lord M. maintained, would not be found wanting in the scale, when compared with any, the most brilliant achievement in the whole range of military history, ancient or modern.-Lord Erskine, having premised that he was altogether unacquainted with Sir H. Burrard or his family, maintained that Sir H. B. having been in the chief command on the 21st of August, was entitled to the admiration of his country, and the thanks of their lordships, for having embraced those plans which he found his predecessor in pursuit of. What objection would there be to passing a vote of thanks to H. Burrard? Would any noble lord state, that the gallant general himself had signified an indifference to their approbation? Money, he believed, was an object of desire with most men. He was free to confess that it was so to himself. He was sure that soldiers and sailors loved to acquire it. He had himself spent the earlier part of his days in the service. But he knew a soldier's heart. He knew that soldiers and sailors have also a most ardent desire of praise. Impressed with these sentiments, he felt himself bound to support the proposed amendment.

The question being put on the amendment of Lord Moira, it was negatived without a division, and only one or two dissentient voices. The original motion was then put, and unanimously agreed to.-The same subject was, January the E

25th,