wise but oracular, I am at a loss to know what the difference is between British justice, and that justice which, in every variation of time or place, is immutable. Feeling the profoundest respect in every case, in which his Majesty appears to act, I still must say, that his advisers put into his mouth upon that occasion, an answer as little congenial to the spirit of the British Constitution, as it was ill suited to the dignity of the throne. Ministers may talk with flippancy themselves, they may pun and epigrammatise, they may sneer, or they may snoutch, but when unfortunately the king of this country feels it his duty to hint his displeasure to his people, or convey to them a rebuke for their conduct, there ought to be a dignity and decorum observed in the language of reproof from the throne, which would make displeasure more severely be felt by those for whom it was intended. But, Sir, I can easily conceive that ministers might have been a little irascible on receiving that remonstrance, because, notwithstanding the usual complacency of the City of London to their measures, it had within the last year on two important occasions opposed them, first on the Reversion Bill, and latterly on this disgraceful Convention.

The most material considerations, however, are the employment of the British force in Spain, the dilatoriness of those directing it, and their total want of capacity. If it were wise at all to send a British army into Spain, that opportunity has been lost, which appears to have been the only favour able one that presented itself. In giving assistance to the Spaniards,

there were, as I before stated, two modes of proceeding. What the opinions of the Spaniards themselves are I profess myself totally ignorant. The fact is, that this ignorance does not proceed from any want of diligence on my part in making inquiries; but for want of any authentic source from which information could be procured. Did the Spaniards make application for a regular force to be sent into their country, or for money, arms, ammunition, clothing, and all other necessaries to enable them to prosecute the war against such armies as France had the power of pouring into their country? I ask this question, because if Spain with such assistance could not carry the point of keeping out any fresh reinforcements, there was little probability of preventing that country from being over-run. In investigating this matter we should have considered what was the amount of the disposable force of France. To guide us in regard to this point, we have a recent document to refer to for information. In papers which were laid before Parliament in the beginning of the year 1806, just after the failure of the third coalition, their appears a memoir from the court of Vienna to that of St. Petersburgh, stating the amount of force which France could probably bring against the allied Powers. From this document it appears that the French force was then estimated at 500,000 men, exclusive of the imperial guards, which consisted of 15,000 men. This was the opinion of the court of Vienna before France had over-run Germany and Poland, and some other countries of Europe, and previously to her con

nection

nection with Russia. The disposable force of France must, therefore, have been since considerably increased; and it was consequently most material for this country, before it adopted any measure whatever, to consider well the propriety of employing her troops in Spain, where there was a likelihood of such immense numbers being brought againt them. Never, I believe, was sympathy so strong, as that evinced in England in favour of the Spanish cause. Yet, though such had been the enthusiasm of the nation at large, and however ardent the people might be in lending assistance to support such a glorious struggle, it was the duty of those, who were intrusted with the management of the national force, to consider in every point of view the propriety or impropriety of complying with the popular feeling. That was perhaps the feeling of the moment, but ministers were bound to conBut for the permanent interests of the public, and it was therefore their duty to investigate and ascertain by every possible mode, whether they ought to risk an English army at all in Spain, or confine their assistance to the supplies I have mentioned. I do not wish to impute blame to them for having sent a British force to Spain, if the Spaniards themselves applied for it, and if it was the opinion of competent judges, that there was a probability of enabling them thereby to keep the field against their powerful enemy. We have instances in our history of our having been before in a similar situation and under similar circumstances. The independence of the United Provinces was effect

ed principally by the assistance of England. Queen Elizabeth, for her own safety against the designs of Spain, assisted those who revolted against its tyranny and oppression; and I wish that ministers had adverted, in the present instance, to the conduct of that wise princess, and her wise administration. None of the present ministry can think themselves disgraced by a comparison with Lord Burleigh; and yet we find that Queen Elizabeth, pressed as she was by the power, the rancour, the persevering hostility of Spain, did not hazard the whole force of her domirions, nor proceed to send any number of troops abroad, without some assurance of safety in case of disaster. She, by the advice of her ministers, took care to possess what were called cautionary towns, and thereby assured herself of a retreat, and gained a safe point whither to send reinforcements, as well as a security that the United Provinces should not abandon her in the contest in which they were engaged. I know not what has taken place between the English and Spanish governments upon that subject; but, I perceive, that in his Majesty's late declaration it is stated, that certain obligations exist which are considered equally binding as the most solemn treaty. From what I yet know of the matter, I cannot agree in the propriety of any such sentiment: I'should not, however, think of abandoning them in the hour of misfortune; but I cannot admit, that we should consider our present obligations in the light of a solemn treaty: for what is the nature of such an engagement? It is entered into in a moment of hurry and precipita

tion; it has not been laid before us, and therefore is, as yet, unauthorized by Parliament; and, consequently, you may approve or disapprove, you may grant or refuse the supplies for carrying it into effect. Upon the whole, therefore, I know not how an engagement of this sort is to be considered as equally binding as the most solemn treaty. But we now understand, that a formal treaty has been negociated, which it is intended to lay before the house, and until that be done I cannot decide upon its merits or propriety. I dare say the house would naturally be inclined to receive, with the fondest partiality, every thing apparently tending to the advantage of the Spanish cause: but, sir, the state of our warfare, under such circumstances as I have already stated, and as his Majesty's ministers have conducted it, is truly extraordinary. If the Spaniards preferred that node of warfare, which was of a desultory na ture, instead of a continued warfare, then the British army could not have been of the least use in Spain; for a British army there must necessarily have pursued a plan wholly different from that of the Spaniards. I know not which system of warfare was proper to be adopted; but I say the two systems are completely incompatible. The Spaniards, in their own country, and pursuing a desultory mode of attack, have the power of dispersing and rallying again, as occasion night require; but this is not the case with a regular army. If you combine the two modes you must necessarily destroy the energies and efficacy of one of them. We have already

seen this exemplified in the Spaniards. We have seen their regular army defeated, and almost destroyed by the enemy; while in another quarter we have found their irregular force very successful; which shews that the two modes of fighting are perfectly inconsistent.

Now, sir, let us see what has been the vigour of ministers upon this occasion. By vigour, I presume, is meant a prompt energetic use and application of the public force. Will you tell us of one instance of such promptitude and energy? I presume you cannot say it was displayed in Portugal; nor in Spain by Sir John Moore's coming into the field after the Spanish army had been defeated? It was not then useful, because it was unable to keep the field by itself. It is an extraordinary circumstance, that the Convention of Portugal is made to rest in a great degree upon the speedy applicability of the British army in Spain, and yet the general of that army, Sir Hew Dalrymple, tells you there was no preparation made for its reception in that country for some considerable time after the Convention was concluded. Can it then be said, that the object of the Convention was carried into effect, or that any time was gained by it? If such measures deserve the name of being energetic, or useful, I am at a loss to know what sort of measures would be deemed the contrary.

As to that part of the speech which relates to Sweden, I have only to observe, that this country is placed in such a situation that I do not see how we can refuse

to

to give the stipulated supply; but I cannot help lamenting, that there is not the smallest probability of any good arising from Sweden continuing to persevere. We are told that the King of Sweden deserves our support the more, because he refused the overtures made to him from Erfurth, relative to excluding the Spaniards from the negociation. Perhaps he deserves the applause of mankind for his bravery and perseverance; but what good, I may ask, can he thereby render to Spain or England? When this vote of supply was proposed last year, I ventured to say, that the most prudent use Sweden could make of the money, was to procure a peace for herself, as it was totally impossible for her to resist her enemies, or be of the least advantage to her allies. Nothing can be more hurtful to us in the eyes of the world than endeavouring to involve the smaller countries in Europe in hostilities with France. The immense superiority of our naval power, our commerce, and prodigious wealth, enable us to look to a long continuance of war, perhaps with safety; but what is that to the powers of the Continent? Their resources are not great; they have no means of offence against France; and what advantage can we derive from the misfortunes of other countries? Instead of being the arbiters and protectors of the Continent, we should, by so doing, be holding up ourselves as the cause of the ruin of other nations."

Mr. Ponsonby having said thus much of what came under the

notice of the house in the speech, proceeded to make some observations on what the speech omitted to state, namely, what related to the United States of America ;~~ but he had no desire to disturb the unanimity of the house on the present occasion; though he thought it his duty to state distinctly his sentiments on the various topics to which he had adverted, and for the full discussion of which, other opportunities would arise. These topics were the disgraceful Convention of Cintra; the conduct of ministers with regard to the Spanish war; and also their conduct with respect to America.

Lord Castlereagh then rose. The declaration, he said, of Mr. Ponsonby, that he would not oppose the address, and his former declaration that the various points on which he had briefly touched, were to become the subjects of subsequent discussion, released him from the great and irksome task of entering minutely into an examination into the statements which the right hon. gentleman had ventured to make. Whatever might have been the want of vigour in his Majesty's present ministers, so much complained of by the right hon. gentleman, he believed the country would not have much more to hope for if the reins of government should fall into the hands of the right hon. gentleman and his friends, who, when they were in office, had deserted all those who were then in alliance with this country for the defence of the cause of Europe. With respect to the military force, sent early

last

last spring to co-operate with our ally the King of Sweden, as far as naval interference went, it turned out to be most critically opportune for the Marquis of Romana, who was at that time at the Isle of Funen, had distinctly stated, when subsequently in this country, that if the British had not entered the Belt on the very day on which it had, his army must have passed over to Zealand, followed by that of Bernadotte. As to what related to the military force, that was not left to the judgment of the British government alone: the force sent to Sweden was sent on the requisition, nay at the entreaty of the Swedish minister resident in this country, who said that that force might make the whole difference between the loss or the salvation of Sweden. What had been the circumstances which led to the return of the troops the house was not at that time investigating. He had no hesitation in declaring that the gallant commander of that force, stood entirely exculpated. As to the great naval exertions stated to have been made by Denmark, notwithstanding the seizure of her navy, did the right hon. gentleman mean to say that in the course of the last naval campaign in the Baltic, it would have made no difference, if, when the Russian fleet came out of Cronstadt, they had been joined by 18 Danish ships of the line? would not this country have been obliged to provide an equivalent fleet for the purpose of counteracting the naval force of the enemy, if we

had to meet 30 sail of the line instead of 12 or 13? In such a case, would the naval officers of Great Britain have stood as they do now in the Baltic, or in any part of the world?

With regard to the grand and overwhelming consideration which must at present press upon the mind of every man, he was prepared to prove, whenever the subject should be brought in a tangible shape before the house, that his Majesty's government had acted on the fullest conviction that the course pursued would be the most conducive to the success of the cause of Spain; and if that cause should not prevail, the failure would result, not from any neglect on their part, but from greater engines of destruction having been brought forward against that country, than it was in the power of Great Britain to afford means of defence.Mr. Ponsonby had described two modes in which our military assistance might have been afforded, the one merely by furnishing the Spaniards with arms and ammunition; the other, that of sending to their aid a regular military force. The right hon. gentleman had expressed a partiality for that species of warfare recommended in a List of Precautions, by what he called, the Supreme Central Junta. He certainly did recollect the paper alluded to, but it was circulated long before the Supreme Central Junta had an existence. The writer was unknown. It had no kind of authority. * And it was impossible to ascertain whe

ther