out that spirit amongst themselves no army that we could send would be of any avail. They adopted a system, which was published in the early part of the summer, under the title of Precautions,' and which contained a most excellent plan of defence adapted to the peculiarities of the country, and calculated to harrass and annoy an invading army, and to wear them down by a continued system of partial attack, without incurring the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with regular and veteran troops. This system was the best which could be adopted by that country, under its then circumstances, and might have produced a great effect upon the enemy, whose troops would have been continually harassed and fatigued, whilst the Spaniards, taking advantage of the peculiarities of their country, would have incurred little immediate risk, and would have gained a knowledge and attained a discipline which might have subsequently qualified them to contend in the field with the regular troops of France. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending into the interior of the country a British army: it then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; our army would, of course, proceed in the manner and according to the usual routine of a regular army; and thus the Spaniards were forced on to engage in pitched battles, at a period when they were not competent, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority of troops brought into the field by France, can only retreat. In this way, my lords, I

contend that the sending a British army into the interior of Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the patriots in that country.

In what manner have they afforded the aid of which they now so much boast? Setting aside for a moment the consideration of the general question of the policy or impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain, it may be said, that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have contributed to obtain a great temporary advantage, which, whatever effect it might have had upon the ultimate fate of the war, would at least have enabled the Spaniards to arrange their defence, and to mature their preparations. It may be said that there was a period of the contest when the French having been driven from Madrid, and forced to take refuge in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees, a British force, sent there at that particular crisis, might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees, and placed in the hands of the Spaniards the keys of their country, which they might then have been enabled to defend under infinitely more advantageous circumstances than they had since been placed in. It might be said, that this case did, from peculiar circumstances, actually occur. Allowing it to be so, how was it taken advantage of? One might have supposed, that, to make the proper use of such an advantageous conjuncture of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched, in the shortest time, to the spot where their services were most wanted. But, instead of the

nearest

though no notice was taken of it either in the speech or in the address; he meant the present state of our relations with the United States of America-So also did many of the speakers, in opposition to ministry, in both Houses, on various occasions. But into their discussions on this subject, on such occasions, when the subject was not formally before the Houses, it would be both endless and idle to enter. It is remarkable that the debates were more than ordinarily keen, on the side of opposition, when the subject related either to America or to Ireland.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that with regard to the affairs of Spain, the address only proposed to give his Majesty a general assurance of support in maintaining the cause of the Spaniards as long as that nation proved true to themselves. In what way this support had been given, or how it was in future to be administered, would be a subject of distinct and detailed consideration: nor would the House, by now agreeing to the address, pledge themselves to approve of those particular engagements which had been contracted. All that they were now called upon to do, was, to record a public avowal of their determination not to desert that cause which the government and the country had espoused, and in which it was, in consequence of reverses, even become a more sacred duty to persevere. Those who inferred that the cause was desperate, from those disasters which had already happened, reasoned upon a most imperfect view of the relative situation of the parties engaged in the contest. And he entreated those who were in

clined to despond, to consult the records of history, and to review those instances of nations who had been compelled to struggle for their independence in circumstances similar to those in which the Spaniards were now placed. There it would be found that nations, after maintaining struggles for ten or twenty years, in the course of which they had been almost uniformly worsted in battle, had eventually succeeded, in spite of the triumphs of their adversaries, in securing the object for which they contended. It was difficult to conceive any situation which would better warrant hopes of ultimate success, than that of Spain at this day. It appeared a little extraordinary to Lord Liverpool, that Lord Grenville should have objected to the policy of the expedition to Portugal, which was almost the only point of the coast which was, at the time, in the possession of the enemy. A large force had been prepared with unexampled expedition, and in its application ministers had taken the advice, not only of military men of high reputation, but had consulted the Spaniards themselves, who, both in the north and south, had recommended the reduction of General Junot's army, as the most acceptable service, that it was in our power to perform. The consideration due to an ancient and faithful ally, he admitted to have had considerable influence with his Majesty's ministers, in undertaking the deliverance of Portugal. He requested also the noble lord to bear in mind, that at the time when our expedition sailed, and which he seemed to think might have acted with greater advantage in the

north

Borth of Spain, the passage from Paris to Madrid was as open as it is now; and that the French army was in possession, not only of the passes of the Pyrennees, but of a large district in the South of Spain.In consequence of the evacuation of Portugal, the Spaniards had been delivered from a large force which, by acting in their rear, might have embarrassed and impeded all their future operations. Lord Liverpool also defended the qquipment of the expedition to Portugal, which, in every respect, and specifically in the proportion of cavalry and artillery with which it was accompanied, was perfectly competent to execute the service en which it was sent. Neither, he contended, had there been one moment's unnecessary delay in the march of our army from Portugal. If it did not proceed to Spain immediately after the conclusion of the convention, it was because no central government had then been established, and it was impossible to arrange any plan of operations with the provincial Juntas.

The Earl of Moira disapproved of any paragraphs in the address, but would still refrain from moving any amendment. He particularly in sted on that which referred to the armistice and convention, concluded in Portugal, and took occasion to explain the opinion which he had delivered upon it as a member of the Court of Inquiry. He concurred, indeed, with his colleagues in saying, that no further military proceeding should be had in that matter: and he had emphatically made use of the word military,' on the occasion. As far as the officers, who took a part in the transaction, were engaged, he would reVOL. LI

peat it, that they had behaved with unquestionable zeal and firmness. They might have perhaps imputed to them an error in judg ment; but, circumstanced as they were, their error was not such as fell within any infraction of the ar ticles of war; it was rather an er ror imputable to his Majesty's ministers, and to the manner in which they had prepared and sent out the expedition. The address also alluded to further aid to be afforded to Sweden. Should it not be inquired how that aid was to be applied? Was the further assistance, to be hereafter granted to Sweden, to be applied in the manner in which we had hitherto afforded that support? What, in fact, had been done for Sweden, that in the least contributed to give her any material assistance? From her adherence to our alliance, she had already lost almost half of her territory, and was now exposed to the severest fate. We were as much bound therefore to attend to Sweden as to Spain. Looking to the unfortunate peninsula, where our principal exertions were said to have been directed, what was the situation of affairs there? Did the address at all indicate the feelings of this House, or of any man in the kingdom on that weighty subject? The noble earl had said, that the Spaniards would not accept our proffered assistance. Was the fit application made to them? Where was the question asked? At the extremity of the kingdom farthest removed from the scene of danger. Supposing an enemy were to enter Scotland; would an ally, anxious for our protection, take an army to Penzance, and inquire of a council there, if he Ꭰ

could

could give the inhabitants of that remote quarter protection? But, he was warranted from the evidence before the Court of Inquiry to say, the aid was applied for, not for Gallicia, but for the Pyrenean frontiers. What was the situation of the French at that time? Buonaparte, in the plenitude of self confidence, had imprudently distributed his forces in small divisions all over the kingdom. The natives rising throughout the provinces, indignant at the perfidy of their enemy, were competent to the utter destruction of these scattered legions. What was then our duty? It was to interpose 50,000 nien between Spain and France, which would be mcreased to 150,000 by the zeal of the natives. This immense army, organized and disciplined as it would have been, blended with British regulars, would take possession of the passes, and the consequence would have been, that not a Frenchman could have entered or quitted Spain, unless he had cut his way through this prodigious force. It was not enough to drive the French out of Spain, not a subject of Napoleon should have passed the frontiers, unless exchanged as a prisoner. Then would have been the moment to have called on Austria, and to have told her, that her existence depended upon immediate hostility against France-to have informed her, that the British forces, supported by their ally, were hovering, like a dark storm, on the summits of the mountains, and would pour onward in a torrent, to spread devastation in the plains beneath, the moment she should declare her purpose. All these golden oppor

tunities had been lost by the gross mismanagement of his Majesty's ministers... Nor could he concur in the address in what respected the Convention of Cintra. The speech of the commissioners was designed to screen from accusation the real culprits. He had said, in common with his colleagues, that there was no ground for any further military inquiry; but this was not saying that there was no ground for inquiry at all.

The Earl of Buckinghamshire, while he approved of the exertions made by ministers in favour of the Spanish Patriots, could not refrain from expressing his disapprobation of the manner in which our gallant troops had been employed.— The address was agreed to; and the Earl of Liverpool gave notice that, on Monday, he should move the thanks of the House to Sir Arthur Wellesley, and the other officers and troops for the victory of Vimiera.

On the same day an address to, his Majesty, in answer to the lords commissioners speech, was moved in the House of Commons, after a number of prefatory observations on the different subjects touched on, or alluded to, in the speech by the Honourable Frederick Robinson.-This motion was seconded by Mr. S. B. Lushington. Among other remarks Mr. Lushington observed, that the faith of Great Britain, solemnly pledged to Spain and Sweden, ought to be religiously observed, and that the preservation of that faith, in all cases of difficulty and trial, was the surest tower of safety to this country, and the best hope of deliverance to the rest of the world. If we should desert the cause

of