SECTION VIII.

Of LIBERTY and NECESSITY.

PART I.

T might reasonably be expected, in queftions, which have been canvaffed and difputed with great eagerness fince the firft origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at leaft, fhould have been agreed upon among the difputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how eafy may it feem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these defi▾ nitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future fcrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we fhall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclufion. From that circumstance alone, that a controverfy has been long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the foul are fuppofed to be natu rally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reafon or difpute together; it were impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; especially when they communicate their

views, and each party turn themselves on all fides, in search of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. 'Tis true; if men attempt the difcuffion of questions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contefts, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the queftion regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed queftion concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable, a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find all mankind, both learned and ignorant, to have been always of the fame opinion with regard to that subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvaffed, on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiftry, that 'tis no wonder if a fenfible reader indulge his ease fo far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuch a question, from which he can expect neither inftruction nor entertainment. But the ftate of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promifes at least some decifion of the controverfy, and will not much disturb his case, by any intricate or obfcure reasoning.

I hope, therefore, to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of neceffity and of liberty, according to any reasonable fenfe, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy

has

has hitherto turned merely upon words.

We shall be

gin with examining the doctrine of neceffity.

'Tis univerfally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every natural effect is fo precifely determined by the energy of its caufe, that no other effect, in fuch particular circumftances, could poffibly have refulted from the operation of that caufe. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with such exactnefs, that a living creature may as foon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as motion in any other degree or direction, than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just and precife idea of necessity, we must confider, whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies.

It feems evident, that, if all the fcenes of nature were shifted continually in fuch a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before, we should never, in that cafe, have attained the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The relation of caufe and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowlege of any real existence could poffibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes entirely from that uniformity, obfervable in the operations of nature; where fimilar objects are conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. Thefe two circumftances form

the

lege an uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewife the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of bufinefs and company, in order to inftruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowlege of mens inclinations and motives, from their actions, expreffions, and even geftures; and again, descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowlege of their motives and inclinations. The general obferva→ tions, treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the fpecious colouring of a cause. And tho' virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect difinterestedness, so often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; feldom in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomolous, it were impoffible to collect any general obfervations concerning mankind; and no experience, however accurately digefted by reflection, would ever ferve to any purpose. Why is the aged husband-man more skilful in his calling than the young beginner, but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain, and earth, towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules, by which this operation is governed and directed?

We must not, however, expect, that this uniformity of human actions fhould be carried to fuch a length, as that all men in the fame circumstances, fhould always act precisely in the fame manner, without any allowance for

the

the diverfity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity, in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from obferving the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.

Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the human mind from its infancy, and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? 'Tis from thence we become acquainted with the different characters, which nature has impreffed upon the fexes, and which the preferves with conftancy and regularity. Are the actions of the fame perfon much diverfified in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general obfervations concerning the gradual change of our fentiments and inclinations, and the different. maxims, which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual, have an uniformity in their influence, otherwife our acquaintance with the perfons, and our obfervation of their conduct could never teach us their difpofitions, nor ferve to direct our behaviour with regard to them.

I grant it poffible to find fome actions, which feem to have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct, which have ever been established for the government of men. But if we would willingly know, what judgment should be formed of fuch irregular and extraordinary actions; we may confider the fentiments that are commonly entertained with regard to thofe irregular events, which appear in the courfe of nature, and the operations of exVOL. II. ternal

H