SECTION I

Of the DIFFERENT SPECIES of PHI

LOSOPHY.

MORAL

'ORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, inftruction, and reformation of mankind. The one confiders man chiefly, as born for action; and as influenced in his actions by taste and fentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to poffefs, according to the light in which they present themselves. Virtue, of all objects, is the most valuable and lovely ; and accordingly this species of philofophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and fuch as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They felect the moft ftriking obfervations and inftances from common life; place oppofite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our fteps in these paths by the foundest precepts and moft illuftrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, B 2 they

they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other fpecies of philofophers treat man rather as a reasonable than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard mankind as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow fcrutiny examine human nature, in order to find thofe principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our fentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond controverfy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism, and should for ever talk of truth and falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the fource of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular inftances to general principles, they ftill push on their inquiries to principles more general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Tho' their fpeculations feem abftract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they please themfelves with the approbation of the learned and the wife; and think themselves fufficiently compenfated for the labours of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the inftruction of pofterity.

'Tis certain, that the eafy and obvious philofophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference to the accurate and abftrufe; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and

brings them nearer that model of perfection which it defcribes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into bufinefs and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles eafily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our fentiments, the agitations of our paffions, the vehemence of our affections, diffipate all its conclufions, and reduce the profound philofopher to a mere plebeian.

This alfo must be confeffed, that the moft durable, as well as jufteft fame has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reafoners feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to fupport their renown with more equitable posterity. 'Tis easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his fubtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his confequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclufion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philofopher who proposes cnly to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he commits a mistake, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and fecures himfelf from any dangerous illufions. The fame of CICERO flourishes at prefent; but that of ARISTOTLE is utterly decayed. La BRUYERE paffes the feas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of MALEBRANCHE is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And ADDISON, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when LOCKE shall be entirely forgotten.