APPENDIX III.

Of SOME VERBAL DISPUTE S.

NOTHING is more ufual than for philofophers to

encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in difputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controverfies of the deepest importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, fo frivolous and endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of our prefent enquiry; and propofed fimply to collect, on the one hand, a lift of those mental qualities, which are the object of love or efteem, and form a part of perfonal merit, and on the other hand, a catalogue of those qualities, which are the object of cenfure or reproach, and which detract from the character of the perfon, poffeffed of them; fubjoining some reflections concerning the origin of these sentiments of praise or blame. On all occafions, where there might arise the least hesitation, I avoided the terms, virtue and vice; because some of thofe qualities, which I claffed among the objects of praise, receive, in the Englifh language, the appellation of talents, rather than of virtues; as fome of the blameable or cenfurable qualities are often called defects rather than vices: It may now, perhaps, be expected, that, before we conclude this moral enquiry, we should separate exactly the one from the other; fhould mark the precife boundaries of virtues and talents, vices and defects; and fhould explain the

reafon

reafon and origin of that distinction. But in order to excufe myself from this undertaking, which would, at laft, only prove a grammatical enquiry, I fhall fubjoin the four following reflections, which fhall contain all that I intend to say on the present subject.

First. I do not find, that in the English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtue and talents, vices and defects, or that a precife definition can be given of the one as contradiftinguished from the other. Were we to fay, for inftance, that the efteemable qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled to the appellation of virtues; we should foon recollect the qualities of courage, equanimity, patience, felf-command; with many others, which almost every language claffes under this appellation, though they depend little or not at all on our choice. Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which prompt us to ac our part in fociety, are entitled to that honourable diftinction; it muft immediately occur, that these are indeed the most valuable qualities, and are commonly denominated the facial virtues; but that this very epithet fuppofes, that there are alfo virtues of another fpecies. Should we lay hold of the diftinction between intellectual and moral endowments, and affirm the last alone to be the real and genuine virtues, because they alone lead to action; we fhould find, that many of those qualities, ufually called intellectual virtues, such as prudence, penetration, discernment, difcretion, had alfo a confiderable influence on conduct. The diftinction between the heart and the head may also be adopted; The qualities of the firft may be defined fuch as in their immediate exertion are accompanied with a feeling or fentiment; and these alone may be called the genuine virtues But induftry, frugality, temperance, fecrecy, perfeverance, and many other laudable powers or habits, generally

generally styled virtues, are exerted without any immediate fentiment in the perfon poffeffed of them; and are only known to him by their effects. It is fortunate, amidst all this feeming perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot poffibly be of any importance. A moral, philofophical discourse needs not enter into all these caprices of language, which are fo variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the fame dialect. But on the whole, it feems to me, that, tho' it is always allowed, that there are virtues of many dif ferent kinds, yet, when a man is called virtuous, or is denominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his focial qualities, which are, indeed, the most valuable. It is, at the fame time, certain, that any remarkable defect in courage, temperance, economy, industry, underftanding, dignity of mind, would bereave even a very good natured, honest man of this honourable appellation, Who did ever fay, except by way of irony, that fuch a one was a man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead?

But, fecondly, it is no wonder, that languages fhould not be very precife in marking the boundaries between virtue and talents, vices and defects; fince there is fo little diftinction made in our internal eftimation of them. It seems certain, that the fentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character; it seems certain, I say, that this fentiment, which, though the most common of all others, has no proper name in our language *, arises from

The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this fentiment feems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it. The FRENCH exprefs this fentiment by the term, amour propre, but as they also exprefs felf-love as well as vanity, by the fame term, there arifes thence a great confufion in ROCHEFOUCAULT, and many of their moral writers.

the

the endowments of courage and capacity, industry and ingenuity, as well as from any other mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is not deeply mortified with reflecting on his own folly and diffoluteness, and feels not a fecret fting or compunction, whenever his memory prefents any paft occurrence, where he behaved with ftupidity or ill-manners? No time can efface the cruel ideas of a man's own foolish conduct, or of affronts, which cowardice or impudence has brought upon him. They still haunt his folitary hours, damp his most aspiring thoughts, and fhow him, even to himself, in the most contemptible and moft odious colours imaginable.

What is there too we are more anxious to conceal from others than fuch blunders, infirmities, and meanneffes, or more dread to have exposed by raillery and fatyre? And is not the chief object of vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breeding, our eloquence or address, our taste or ability? These we difplay with care, if not with oftentation; and commonly fhow more ambition of excelling in them, than even in the focial virtues themselves, which are, in reality, of fuch fuperior excellence. Good-nature and honefty, especially the latter, are fo indispenfibly required, that, though the greatest cenfure attends any violation of these duties, no eminent praise follows fuch common inftances of them, as feem effential to the fupport of human fociety. And hence the reafon, in my opinion, why, though men often extol fo liberally the qualities of their heart, they are shy of commending the endowments of their head: Because the latter virtues being fuppofed more rare and extraordinary, are observed to be the more ufual objects of pride and felf-conceit; and when boafted of, beget a strong fufpicion of these fentiments.

'Tis hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's character moft by calling him a knave or a coward, and whether

a beaftly glutton or drunkard be not as odious and contemptible, as a selfish, ungenerous mifer. Give me my choice; and I would rather, for my own happiness and self-enjoyment, have a friendly, humane heart than poffefs all the other virtues of DEMOSTHENES and PHILIP united: But I would rather pass with the world for one endowed with extenfive genius and intrepid courage, and 'fhould thence expect ftronger inftances of general applause and admiration. The figure which a man makes in life, the reception which he meets with in company, the esteem paid him by his acquaintance; all these advantages depend as much upon his good sense and judgment, as upon any other part of his character. Had a man the best intentions in the world, and were the fartheft removed from all injuftice and violence, he would never be able to make himself be much regarded, without a moderate fhare, at least, of parts and underftanding.

What is it then we can here difpute about? If fenfe and courage, temperance and industry, wisdom and knowledge confeffedly form a confiderable part of perfonal merit: If a man poffeffed of these qualities is both better fatisfied with himself, and better entitled to the good-will, esteem, and fervices of others, than one entirely devoid of them; if, in short, the fentiments be fimilar, which arife from these endowments and from the focial virtues; is there any reason for being fo extremely fcrupulous about a word, or difputing whether they are entitled to the denomination of virtue? It may, indeed, be pretended, that the fentiment of approbation, which thofe accomplishments produce, befides its being inferior, is alfo fomewhat different from that, which attends the virtues of justice and humanity. But this feems not a fufficient reafon for ranking them entirely under different claffes and appellations. The character of CÆSAR VOL. II.

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