inferences, each of which feems founded on uniform experience and observation.

Were it doubtful, whether there was any fuch principle in our nature as humanity or a concern for others, yet when we fee, in numberless inftances, that, whatever has a tendency to promote the interefts of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; fince 'tis impoffible for any thing to please as means to an end, where the end is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful whether there was, implanted in our nature, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in numberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impoffible, but that every thing, which promotes the interest of society, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneafinefs. But when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the fame conclufion, must they not bestow an undifputed evidence upon it?

'Tis however hoped, that the progrefs of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the present theory, by fhowing the rife of other fentiments of efteem and regard from the fame or like principles.

SECTION VI.

OF QUALITIES USEFUL TO OURSELVES.

PARTI.

T feems evident, that where a quality or habit is sub

Ijected to our examination, if it appear, in any respect,

prejudicial to the perfon poffeffed of it, or fuch as incapacitates him for business and action, it is inftantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections. Indolence, negligence, want of order and method, obftinacy, fickleness, rafhnefs, credulity; thefe qualities were never esteemed by any one indifferent to a character; much lefs, extolled as accomplishments or virtues. The prejudice, refulting from them, immediately ftrikes our eye, and gives us the fentiment of pain and disapprobation.

No quality, 'tis allowed, is abfolutely either blameable or praise-worthy. 'Tis all according to its degree. A due medium, fay the PERIPATETICS, is the characteristic of virtue. But this medium is chiefly determined by utility. A proper celerity, for inftance, and dispatch in business, is commendable. When defective, no progrefs is ever made in the execution of any purpose: When exceffive, it engages us in precipitate and illconcerted measures and enterprizes: By fuch reasonings as thefe, we fix the proper and commendable mediocrity in all moral and prudential difquifitions; and never lose

view of the advantages, which refult from any character or habit.

Now as thefe advantages are enjoyed by the perfon poffeffed of the character, it can never be felf-love which renders the prospect of them agreeable to us, the fpectators, and prompts our efteem and approbation. Not force of imagination can convert us into another perfon, and make us fancy, that we, being that perfon, reap benefit from those valuable qualities, which belong to him. Or if it did, no celerity of imagination could immediately transport us back, into ourselves, and make us love and esteem the person, as different from us. Views and fentiments, fo oppofite to known truth, and to each other, could never have place, at the fame time, in the fame perfon. All fufpicion, therefore, of selfish regards, is here totally excluded. 'Tis a quite different prin ciple, which actuates our bofom, and interefts us in the felicity of the person whom we contemplate. Where his natural talents and acquired abilities give us the profpect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, profperous success, a steady command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertakings; we are ftruck with fuch agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arife towards him. The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, profperity, are connected with every circumftance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of fympathy and humanity *.

Let

One may venture to affirm, that there is no human creature, to whom the appearance of happiness, (where envy or revenge has no place) does not give pleasure, that of misery, uneafiness. This seems infeparable from our make and conftitution. But they are only the more generous minds, that are thence prompted to feek zealously the good of others, and to have a real paffion for their welfare. With men of narrow and ungenerous spirits, this fympathy goes not beyond a flight feeling of the imagination, which ferves

only

Let us fuppofe a perfon originally fo framed as to have, no manner of concern for his fellow-creatures, but to regard the happine's and mifery of all fenfible beings with greater indifference than even two contiguous fhades of the fame colour. Let us fuppofe, if the prosperity of nations were laid on the one hand, and their ruin on the other, and he were defired to choose; that he would stand, like the fchoolman's afs, irrefolute and undetermined, between equal motives; or rather, like the fame afs between two pieces of wood or marble, without any inclination or propensity to either fide. The consequence, I believe, must be allowed juft, that fuch a perfon, being abfolutely unconcerned, either for the public good of a community or the private utility of others, would look on every quality, however pernicious, or however beneficial, to society, or to its poffeffor, with the fame indifference as on the most common and uninteresting object.

But if, instead of this fancied monfter, we suppose a man to form a judgment or determination in the cafe, there is to him a plain foundation of preference, where every thing else is equal; and however cool his choice may be, if his heart be selfish, or if the persons interested be remote from him; there muft ftill be a choice, or diftinction between what is ufeful, and what is pernicious. Now this diftinction is the fame in all its parts, with the moral distinction, whose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after. The fame

only to excite sentiments of complacency or cenfure, and makes them apply to the object either honourable or difhonourable appellations. A griping mifer, for instance, praises extremely induftry and frugality even in others, and fets them, in his estimation, above all the other virtues. He knows the good that refults from them, and feels that species of happiness with a more lively sympathy, than any other you could represent to him; though perhaps he would not part with a fhilling to make the fortune of the induftrious man, whom he praises so highly,

VOL. II.

X

en