dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.

Love or friendship is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or services: Hatred, the contrary.

2. In these two sets of passions, there is an obvious distinction to be made between the object of the passion and its cause. The object of pride and humility is self: The cause of the passion is some excellence in the former case; some fault in the latter. The object of love and hatred is some other person: The causes, in like manner, are either excellencies or faults.

With regard to all these passions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for instance, raises pride; and it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction.

Now, as the causes of these passions are very numerous and various, though their object be uniform and simple; it may be a subject of curiosity to consider, what that circumstance is, in which all these various causes agree: Or in other words, what is the real efficient cause of the passion. We shall begin with pride and humility.

3. In order to explain the causes of these passions, we must reflect on certain principles, which, though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The first of these is the association of ideas, or that principle by which we make an easy transition from one idea to another. However uncertain and changeable our thoughts may

be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. They usually pass with regularity, from one object to what resembles it, is contiguous to it, or produced by it. When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction.

The second property, which I shall observe in the human mind, is, a like association of impressions or emotions. All resembling iinpressions are connected together; and no sooner one arises, than the rest naturally follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again. In like manner, our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, courage, pride, and other resembling

affections.

In the third place, it is observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made, where they both concur in the same object. Thus, a man, who, by an injury received from another, is very much discomposed and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of hatred, discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover these subjects in or near the person who was the object of his first emotion. Those principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those which operate on the passions; and both, uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse.

Upon this occasion I may cite a passage from an ele

* See Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect. III.

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gant writer, who expresses himself in the following manner: As the fancy delights in every thing that "is great, strange, or beautiful, and is still the more "pleased the more it finds of these perfections in the "same object, so it is capable of receiving new satis"faction by the assistance of another sense. Thus, any continual sound, as the music of birds, or a fall "of waters, awakens every moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the se "veral beauties of the place that lie before him. Thus, if there arises a fragrancy of smells or per"fumes, they heighten the pleasure of the imagina❝tion, and make even the colours and verdure of the landscape appear more agreeable; for the ideas of "both senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together than where they enter the mind separately: As the different colours of a picture, when

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they are well disposed, set off one another, and "receive an additional beauty from the advantage of "the situation.". In these phænomena we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual assistance these associations lend to each other.

4. It seems to me, that both these species of relation have place in producing Pride or Humility, and are the real, efficient causes of the passion.

With regard to the first relation, that of ideas, there can be no question. Whatever we are proud of must, in some manner, belong to us. It is always our knowledge, our sense, beauty, possessions, family, on which we value ourselves. Self, which is the object of the passion, must still be related to that quality or circumstance which causes the passion. There must be * ADDISON, Spectator, No. 412.

a connection between them: an easy transition of the imagination or a facility of the conception in passing from one to the other. Where this connection is wanting, no object can either excite pride or humility; and the more you weaken the connection, the more you weaken the passion.

5. The only subject of inquiry is, whether there be a like relation of impressions or sentiments wherever pride or humility is felt; whether the circumstance, which causes the passion, previously excites a sentiment similar to the passion; and whether there be an only transfusion of the one into the other.

The feeling or sentiment of pride is agreeable; of humility, painful. An agreeable sensation is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to the latter. And if we find, after examination, that every object which produces pride, produces also a separate pleasure; and every object which causes humility, excites in like manner a separate uneasiness; we must alllow, in that case, that the present theory is fully proved and ascertained. The double relation of ideas and sentiments will be acknowledged incontestible.

6. To begin with personal merit and demerit, the most obvious causes of these passions; it would be entirely foreign to our present purpose to examine the foundation of moral distinctions. It is sufficient to observe, that the foregoing theory concerning the origin of the passions, may be defended on any hypothesis. The most probable system, which has been advanced to explain the difference between vice and virtue, is, that either from a primary constitution of nature, or from a sense of public or private interest, certain characters, upon the very view and contemplation, produce uneasiness; and others, in like manner, excite pleasure.

The uneasiness and satisfaction, produced in the spectator, are essential to vice and virtue. To approve of a character, is to feel delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it, is to be sensible of an uneasiness. The pain and pleasure, therefore, being, in a manner, the primary source of blame or praise, must also be the causes of all their effects; and consequently, the causes of pride and humility, which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction.

But supposing this theory of morals should not be received; it is still evident that pain and pleasure, if not the sources of moral distinctions, are at least inseparable from them. A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in the survey; and when presented to us, though only in a poem or fable, never fails to charm and delight us. On the other hand, cruelty and treachery displease from their very nature, nor is it possible ever to reconcile us to these qualities, either in ourselves or others. Virtue, therefore, produces always a pleasure distinct from the pride or selfsatisfaction which attends it: Vice, an uneasiness separate from the humility or remorse.

But a high or low conceit of ourselves arises not from those qualities alone of the mind, which, according to common systems of ethics, have been defined parts of moral duty; but from any other which have a connection with pleasure or uneasiness. Nothing flatters our vanity more than the talent of pleasing by our wit, good-humour, or any other accomplishment; and nothing gives us a more sensible mortification, than a disappointment in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever been able to tell precisely, what wit is, and to show why such a system of thought must be received under that denomination, and such another rejected.