I. Or the different Species of Philosophy

II. Of the Origin of Ideas

III. Of the Association of Ideas

IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the

Understanding

V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts

VII. Of the Idea of Necessary Connection

VI. Of Probability

VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity

IX. Of the Reason of Animals

X. Of Miracles

XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State

XII. Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy

A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS

AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES

OF MORALS.

PAGE

1

13

19

21

38

53

57

76

102

106

130

148

166

APPENDIX.

SECTION

I. Concerning moral Sentiment

II. Of Self-love

III. Some farther Considerations with regard to Justice

IV. Of some verbal Disputes

A DIALOGUE

The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION

I. That Polytheism was the primary Religion of Men

II. Origin of Polytheism

III. The same subject continued

IV. Deities not considered as Creators or Formers of the

V. Various Forms of Polytheism: Allegory, Hero-Worship 401

VI. Origin of Theism from Polytheism

VII. Confirmation of this Doctrine

VIII. Flux and Reflux of Polytheism and Theism

IX. Comparison of these Religions with Regard to Persecu-

tion and Toleration

-

X. With Regard to Courage or Abasement

XI. With Regard to Reason or Absurdity

XII. With Regard to Doubt or Conviction

-

405

-

411

-

413

415

437

XIII. Impious Conceptions of the Divine Nature in popular

Religions of both Kinds

XIV. Bad Influence of popular Religions on Morality

XV. General Corollary

DIALOGUES concerning NATURAL RELIGION.

PAMPHILUS to HERMIPPUS

451

AN

INQUIRY

CONCERNING

HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

SECTION I.

OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

MORAL philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action, and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and, alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference

between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and, so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable, rather than an active being; and endeavour to form his understanding, more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a réproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of those distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are, deterred by no difficulties; but, proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their inquiries to principles more general, and rest notsatisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract. and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim. at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some, hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

It is certain, that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by.