9. Local authorities under this Act may, for the purposes of the Section 9. Act, severally appoint or employ inspectors of nuisances, and make such payments as they see fit for the remuneration and such inspectors. of expenses Appointment of inspectors of nuisances. DISEASES PREVENTION. 10. Sections two and three of "The Diseases Prevention Act, 1855," and every other enactment constituting a local authority for the execution of the same Act, or providing for the expenses of the execution thereof, except those contained in the eighteenth and nineteenth of Victoria, chapter one hundred and twenty, the Metropolis Local Management Act, shall be repealed. 11. Provided that as regards the metropolis the vestries and district boards under the Act of the session holden in the eighteenth and nineteenth years of Her Majesty, chapter one hundred and twenty, within their respective parishes and districts, shall continue to be the local authorities for the execution of the said "Diseases Prevention Act, 1855," and their charges and expenses shall be defrayed as if this Act had not been passed. 12. It shall be lawful for the local authority for executing the said "Diseases Prevention Act" to provide and maintain a carriage or carriages suitable for the conveyance of persons suffering under any contagious or infectious disease, and to convey such sick and diseased persons as may be residing within such locality to any hospital or other place of destination, and the expenses thereof shall be deemed to be an expense incurred in executing the said Act. 13. Upon complaint before a justice of the peace by any inhabitant of any parish or place of the existence of any nuisance on any private premises in the same parish or place, such justice shall issue a summons requiring the person by whose act, default, permission, or sufferance the nuisance arises, or if such person cannot be found or ascertained, the owner or occupier of the premises on which the nuiance arises, to appear before two justices in petty sessions assembled at their usual place of meeting, who shall proceed to inquire into the said complaint, and act in relation thereto as in cases where complaint is made by a local authority under section twelve of the said Nuisances Removal Act, and as if the person making the complaint were such local authority: Provided always, that it shall be lawful for the said justices, if they see fit, to adjourn the hearing or further hearing of such summons for an examination of the premises where the nuisance is alleged to exist, and to require the admission or authorise the entry into such premises of any constable or other person or persons, and thereupon the person or persons authorised by the order of the justices may enter and act as the local authority might under a like order (d) When the complaint is made by an inhabitant under this section the notice directed by the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 90, s.21, in proceeding by a local authority is not requisite; Cocker v. Cardwell, 33 J. P. 758; L. R. 5 Q. B. 15; 39 L. J. M. C. 28; 21 L. T. (N.S.) 457; 18 W. R. 212. The right of complaint hereby given is extended to nuisances in any parish or place, whether in private or public premises, and may be exercised by any inhabitant in such parish or place, or by any owner of premises situated therein, or by any other person aggrieved or injuriously affected thereby. Sections 2 repealed. Local authorities may provide carriages for conveyance of infected persons. Justices, on the application of householders, may order the removal of nuisances.(d) Section 13. made by any justice under section eleven of the said Act: Provided also, that the costs in the case of every such application shall be in the discretion of the justices, and payment thereof may be ordered and enforced as in other cases of summary adjudication by justices: any order made by justices under this enactment shall be attended with the like penalties and consequences for disobedience thereof and subject to the like appeal as any order made under section twelve of the said Nuisances Removal Act, and the justices making such order may thereby authorise any constaple or other person or persons to do all acts for removing or abating the nuisance condemned or prohibited, and for executing snch order, in like manner as a local authority obtaining the like order might do under the said Act, and to charge the costs to the person on whom the order is made, as is provided in the case where a like order is obtained and executed by such local authority. Interpretation of terms. 15. (a) The several words used in this Act shall be construed in the same manner as is declared with reference to the same words in the above-cited Act, termed "The Nuisances Removal Act for England, (a) Section 14 did not apply to the metropolis, and section 16 is repealed by 29 & 30 Vict. c. 41, s. 1. By section 2 of that Act it is enacted, that no justice of the peace shall be deemed incapable of acting in cases under the Nuisances Removal Act or the Act of the 29 & 30 Vict. c. 77, by reason of his being a member of any body declared to be the authority to execute the said Act, or by reason of his being a contributor or liable to contribute to any rate or fund, out of which it is thereby provided that all charges and expenses incurred in executing the said Act, and not recovered as therein provided, shall be defrayed. On the general question of what disqualifies a justice from acting, reference may be made to the following cases:-In R. v. Meyer and Others, 1 Q. B. D. 173; 34 L. T. (N.S.) 247; 24 W. R. 392; 40 J. P 645, the facts were as follows: H., the owner of a farm in the parish of Edmonton, bounded by the river Lee, entered into an agreement with the Enfield Local Board of Health, under which H. received the sewage of the Enfield district, and disposed of it over his farm. After a few months disagreements arose, and the Enfield Board took legal proceedings against H. to enforce the agreement. While these were still pending, H., after notice given to the board, diverted the sewage from his farm, through a pipe, into the old open channel or watercourse in the parish of Edmonton, through which the sewage had been used to flow into the river Lee. On this the Edmonton Local Board of Health threatened proceedings against the Enfield Board for the nuisance; and the Lee Conservancy took out summonses under their Act against H. for having opened the pipe into the channel, &c., and for continuing the use of it. On the summonses coming on for hearing, M., who was the chairman of the Enfield Local Board, and had taken an active part in its proceedings, sat with three other justices on the bench. H. objected to M. sitting as a justice, but he remained, and H. was convicted in penalties. A rule for a certiorari was then obtained for the purpose of quashing the convictions on the ground that M. was an interested justice. On showing cause M. made affidavit that, though he sat on the bench, he took no part until the other justices had unanimously determined to convict H., when he, M., proposed a mitigation of the penalties, and that he did not sign the conviction. Held, that M. had such an interest as might give him a real bias in the matter, consequently he ought not to have sat as a justice, and it was immaterial what part he really took in the matter; and the Court made the rule absolute with costs against M. In R. v. Milledge and Others, 4 Q. B. D. 332; 48 L. J. M. C. 139; 40 L. T. (N.S.) 748; 27 W. R. 659; 43 J. P. 606, complaint having been made 1855," and all the provisions therein, and in the "Diseases Prevention Act, 1855," contained, shall respectively be applicable to this Act, except so far as they shall be hereby repealed, or be inconsistent with anything herein provided. Section 15. to the Local Government Board of a nuisance upon premises belonging to B., in the borough of W., the board communicated with the town council of W., who were the urban sanitary anthority under the Public Health Act, 1875, and required them to abate the nuisance. The council having made inquiries, passed a resolution that steps should be taken for the removal of the nuisance, and took out a summons against B. At the hearing, an order for the abatement of the nuisance was made. Two justices who were present were members of the town council when the resolution was passed. Held, that the councillors who were justices had such an interest as might give them a bias in the matter, that consequently they ought not to have sat as justices upon the hearing of the summons, and that a rule for a certiorari to quash the order must be made absolute. But where three justices who were members of the town council of a borough, and as such had taken an active part in the making of an order under the Dogs Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 56), sat to hear a complaint of non-observance of the order, it was held that they had no such interest in the subject-matter as to oust their jurisdiction; R. v. JJ. Huntingdon, 4 Q. B. D. 522; 43 J. P. 767; and see, to the same effect, Harring v. Stockton, 31 J. P. 420. By a local Act for the improvement of a borough, the corporation was made the authority for the execution of the Act, with power to direct prosecutions for this purpose. An information for an offence under the Act having been preferred by an officer on behalf of the corporation, a summons was issued upon it by a justice, who was also an alderman and member of the corporation, but came on for hearing before justices none of whom were connected with the corporation. Held, notwithstanding, that such justices could not proceed with the hearing of the summons, for it had been issued by one who was virtually prosecutor; R. v. Gibbon, 6 Q. B. D. 168; 29 W. Ř. 442. But this decision was disapproved of in R. v. Handsley and Others, 8 Q. B. D. 383; 51 L. J. M. C. 137; 30 W. R. 368; 46 J. P. 119. Where an officer of a corporation appointed to collect the borough rate obtained a summons against a ratepayer in arrear, in so doing he acted in the discharge of his duty, but on his own responsibility, and without consulting the town council. At the hearing the justices dismissed the summons on the ground that one of the sitting magistrates being a town councillor was thereby disqualified from adjudicating upon the summons. On motion for a mandamus to the justices to hear and adjudicate on the summons, it was held that there was no ground for supposing either substantial interest or likelihood of bias, and consequently no disqualification. But a justice who, being a member of a town council, was present when a prosecution for the sale of unsound food was resolved upon, cannot afterwards sit and adjudicate on the summons; R. v. Lee, 9 Q. B. D. 394. AN ACT TO AMEND THE NUISANCES REMOVAL ACT FOR P.H. (L) Act 1891. Section 26 of recited Act repealed. Power to medical officer of health or inspector 26 & 27 VICT. CAP. 117. 28TH JULY, 1863. WHEREAS the provisions of "The Nuisances Removal Act for England, 1855," with regard to the inspection and seizure of diseased and unwholesome meat, are defective; and it is therefore expedient that the same should be repealed, and that other and more effectual provisions in that behalf should be substituted therefor: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: 1. From and after the passing of this Act, the twenty-sixth section of the said Act is repealed. 2. The medical officer of health or inspector of nuisances may at all reasonable times(b) inspect and examine any animal,(c) carcase, meat, poultry, game, flesh, fish, fruit, vegetables, corn, bread, or flour(d) exposed for sale, or deposited in any place for the purpose of sale (a) This Act is repealed by the Public Health Act, 1875, Schedule 5, Part I., except so far as relates to the metropolis. See note to title of Nuisances Removal Act, 1855, ante. (b) By 37 & 38 Vict. c. 89, s. 55, a justice may grant a warrant to search for unsound food to any medical officer of health, inspector, or other officer of a nuisance authority in the metropolis on oath made by him that he has reasonable ground to believe that such unsound food, intended for sale for the food of man, is kept or concealed on any premises. As to what is a "reasonable time," see the case of Small v. Bickley, 32 L. T. (N.S.) 726; 40 J. P. 119, referred to in note to section 3, post. (c) In the case of Moody v. Leach, 44 J. P. 459, it was held by the Recorder of Southampton that the word "animal" in section 116 of the Public Health Act, 1875, which is similar to the present section, included a live animal. (d) By the Sanitary Law Amendment Act, 1874, extended to "milk," in the same manner as if that word had been introduced after the word "flour," wherever that word occurs in this section. or of preparation for sale, and intended for the food of man, the proof Section 2. that the same was not exposed or deposited for such purpose or pur- of nuisances poses, or was not intended for the food of man, resting with the party to inspect any charged; and in case any such animal, carcase, meat, poultry, game, animal, &c. flesh, fish, fruit, vegetables, corn, bread,(e) or flour appear to him to be diseased or unsound, or unwholesome, or unfit for the food of man, it shall be lawful for such medical officer of health or inspector of nuisances to seize, take, and carry away the same, or direct the same to be seized, taken, or carried away by any officer, servant, or assistant, in order to have the same dealt with by a justice; and if it shall appear to the justice that any such animal, or any of the said articles, is diseased, or unsound or unwholesome, or unfit for the food of man,(ƒ) he shall order(g) the same to be destroyed,(h) or so disposed of as to prevent such animal or articles from being exposed for sale or used for such food; and the person to whom such animal, carcase, meat, poultry, game, flesh, fish, fruit, vegetables, corn, bread, or flour belongs or did belong at the time of sale or of exposure for sale, or in whose possession or on whose premises the same is found, shall, upon conviction, be liable to a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds for every animal,(i) carcase, or fish, or piece of meat, flesh, or fish, or any poultry or game, or for the parcel of fruit, vegetables, corn, bread, or (e) Where two carcases of cows unfit for food were found in a yard at the back of a butcher's house, with a slaughter-house on one side of the yard, the yard was held to be "a place" within this provision; and the word place" in section 3 is not to be limited to places ejusdem generis with "slaughter-house, shop, building, or market;" Young v. Grattridge, 38 L. J. M. C. 67; L. R. 4 Q. B. 166; 33 J. P. 260; and see Daly v. Webb, 4 W. R. C. L. 309, where diseased meat placed on a cart and passing through the streets of Dublin on the way to a manufactory of preserved meat was held to be rightly seized under this section. In the case of Vinter v. Hind, 10 Q. B. D. 63; 48 L. T. (N.S.) 359; 31 W. R. 198; 47 J. P. 373, under section 116 of the Public Health Act, 1875, the respondent, a butcher, exposed for sale part of a cow which had died of disease, and sold the meat to a customer, who took it home for food, and some days afterwards at the request of the appellant, an inspector of nuisances, handed it over to him, and it was condemned by a justice as unfit for the food of man, held, that the meat was not "so seized" and condemned as prescribed by the aforesaid section, and, therefore, the respondent was not liable as the person to whom the same "did belong at the time of the exposure for sale." (f) To sell or expose for sale things unfit for human food is a nuisance at common law; Shillitov. Thompson, 1 Q. B. D. 12; 45 L. J. M. C. 18; 33 L. T. (N.S.) 506; 24 W. R. 57; 39 J. P. 773. (g) It is not necessary that the owner of the goods seized should have notice of the seizure, neither is it necessary for the justice to summon the owner before him before he condemns the goods; White v. Redfern, 5 Q. B. D. 15; 49 L. J. M. C. 19; 41 L. T. (N.S.) 524; 28 W. R. 168; 44 J. P. 87. But in Waye v. Thompson, 15 Q. B. D. 342; 54 L. J. M. C. 140; 53 L. T. (N.S.) 358; 33 W. R. 733; 49 J. P. 693, it was held that where the meat had been condemned under section 116 of the Public Health Act, 1875, and the owner was being proceeded against under section 117, evidence might be given by him as to the state of the meat at the time of the condemnation. (h) The condemnation shall be within a reasonable time of the seizure, but not necessarily on the same day; Burton v. Bradley, 50 J. P. 212. (i) Each separate exposure of a piece of bad meat is a separate offence, for which a penalty and costs may be imposed; Re Hartly, 31 L. J. M. C. 332; 26 J. P. 438. |