nerally have been to engross the Places and Profits of the Government into their own Hands, to raife vaft Eftates to themfelves by purloining all they can from the Publick, and to establish fuch an Intercft as may always fupport them from being call'd to account for their Mifmanagements.

I can think of no Way that is more likely to create a right Understanding between us, than by an impartial Enquiry into the original Caufe and Spring of our deftructive Feuds and Divifions, which is primarily the affecting a greater Power than our Conftitution admits on the Part of the Crown; and the endeavouring to maintain the ancient Rights and Privileges of the Nation, on the Part of the People: But there is a fecond Cause, hitherto lefs obferved by the Writers on this Subject, which has, as it were by a natural Courfe, led us into these Contests; and that is, the mighty Alteration that has happen'd in the Property of the Lands, and confequently in the constituent Strength and Power of the Government, fince the Reign of King Henry the Seventh.

For, as in ancient Times the Peers of this Kingdom were poffefs'd of vast Tracts of Land (fome of them perhaps equal to whole Counties) they had, by Virtue of their Tenures, the Power of Sheriffs in the Civil Administration, and the Power of Lord Lieutenant in the Military, whereby they did for many Ages hold the Ballance of the Government, and were able to defend their own and the People's Rights, and check the exorbitant Power of fuch of our Kings as have at any Time attempted to ufurp upon them. A very large Proportion alfo of the Lands of the Nation was, in thofe Times, annex'd to the Crown, together with all the Military Services dependent thereon; and then the Poffeffions of the Abbies and Monafteries made likewife another confiderable Tenure of Lands.

But we have seen, that in the Courfe of one Century, fince the forementioned Reign, this vaft Allotment of Property (which perhap amounted to no lefs than three Quarter Parts of the whole Lands of the Kingdom) was quite alienated and fold off from the former powerful Poffeffors, and divided into the Hands of a numerous Gentry and Commonalty, who (for the moft Part) by making their Purchases in fmaller Portions, and by the Subdivifions that have been fince made, neglected the Military Services that were annexed to the 1 enures; (which have been fince quite abolish'd) and by this Means the mediate Power, which the former great Proprietors of Lands exercifed over at leaft feven Eight Parts of the Militia of the Kingdom, coming to fill, the Crown took to the immediate Administration of the whole; which great Affumption of Power seems likely to have been the prevailing Argument with the falfe Politicians of King Charles the Firit's Time, to put that Prince (contrary to the Goodness of his own natural Inclination) on fome arbitrary Methods of Government, upon a Prefumption, that now the Strength of the Lords was broken, there was no Power left in the Kingdom able to difpute or oppose the Royal Will and Pleasure in any Thing; and the Parliament of 41 were doubtless very apprehensive of the Danger that threatened the Conftitution from this Increase of Power on the Crown Side, and therefore endeavour'd to have the Militia fettled by Act of Parliament, in fuch a Way that it might not be made ufe of to deftroy the Peo

ple's

ple's Liberties; and the King's utterly refusing to confent to this, feems to be the principal Point that occafion'd that fatal War between him and his Parliament.

If that King had found himself in the Poffeffion of all the ancient Crown Lands, together with the Military Strength annex'd to them, he might have been enabled to raise and maintain fuch an Army out of his own Lands, as would have been strong enough to fubjugate the Nation; because the ballancing Power which had been fix'd in the Peers was utterly broken, and the People had now no.vifible Standard to refort to for the Defence of their Liberties: But as the natural Power, inherent to the Lands, was now alfo fallen away from the Crown, it foon became visible, that the effectual Strength of a limited Monarchy is infeparably united to the Property of the Lands and Riches of the Nation; for tho' the King, with the Affiftance of such of the Nobility and Gentry, as voluntarily join'd with him (many of them rather with an Intent to affift him to come to good Terms, than really to enable him to vanquish the Parliament, and withal their own Liberties) carried on the War with fome Vigour at firft; yet having no Fund of his own, either of Treasure or Strength, the fingle Authority of his Prerogative proved but an artificial and precarious Power, unable long to hold out against the real and natural Power of Property, which was now fo largely vefted in the People, that when they had found the Way to put their Affairs into a Method, and came to feel their own Strength, they were able to bear down all before them; though it is probable that this Maxim in Politicks had never been confider'd by the King's Advisers, till they came to be convinced by this unhappy Experiment.

'Tis at this Period then that I would place the Beginning of those unhappy Divifions, which, from the fame original Cause, and by the fame evil Arts and factious Difpofition, though diftinguifh'd by different Names of mutual Reproach and different Circumstances, hath continued even to this Time miferably to dif tract the publick Affairs, and obftruct the Tranquillity of our dear Country.

It is neither in my Inclination or Purpose, to vindicate any of those many ill Things that were acted in the Profecution of that Civil War; but fince my Lord Clarendon himself fairly acknowledges, That that Prince was milled into many Mistakes in the Conduct of his Government, we may modeftly say, that it was the proper Bufinefs of the Parliament to infift upon a thorough Reformation of all that had been done amifs, and to obtain fuch Laws as might effectually fecure the Liberties and Properties of the People from the like Invafions for the future: If the King, at firft, adhered to the Advice of those who diffuaded him from giving fuch Satisfaction to his Parliament as he would have yielded to at laft; and if he was perfuaded to decide the Dispute by the Sword, and to begin it by difplaying his Standard of War against his People; what could then remain for them to chufe, but either to give up for ever all their Rights and Liberties, and to fubmit themselves and their Pofterity to be govern'd by the Will and Pleasure of all their future Kings; or to refolve to defend their ancient Laws and Privileges to the utmoft, and to oppofe Force with Force?

There is, doubtlefs, a true Diftinction to be made between a Rebellion and a Civil War; the firft is notorious, when Subjects take up Arms against lawful Governors

Governors lawfully governing; but when a Prince violates the establish'd Laws of the Nation, raifes Taxes by his own Authority, contrary to the known Rules of the Constitution, invades the Liberties of his Subjects by illegal Imprisonments, unjust Prosecutions, and other grievous Oppreffions, and perfifts in fuch arbitrary Acts of Government for a Courfe of Years; if a People can find no other Means to preferve their most valuable Interests, but by having Recourfe to the laft Remedy, and fhall take up Arms to compel fuch a Prince to restore their Rights, and reform his ill Government; 'tis evident, from the Hiftories of the Civil Wars of France and other Countries, that grave and impartial Hiftorians have not thought fit to treat this Way of oppofing the unlawful Ufurpation of Princes with the odious Name of Rebellion; and it is obferved, that our Parliaments have had the Caution, that in the Acts paffed after the Restoration, in relation to the preceding War between the King and Parliament, they would never give it the Name of a Rebellion, doubtless out of the Confideration that it behoved them to keep up the Sanction of the Parliamentary Authority, and that that War was authorized by a legal Parliament, who had a Right to vindicate the Liberty of the Nation.

The Names of Reproach, which pafs'd in thofe Times, were Cavalier for those who sided with the King, and Roundheads for fuch as took Part with the Parliament: Now if the Intention of the latter were no other than to bring the evil Counsellors to condign Punishment, to prevail with the King to comply in a juft Settlement of their civil and religious Liberties, and then to restore him to the Regal State under fuch Limitations as might fecure them from any future Invafions of their Rights and Privileges (and this, I believe was the general Design of those who took up Arms at firft) I fee no Reason why those Roundbeads fhould lie under a harder Cenfure for what they acted at that Time, than may be imputed to ourselves for what we have done in the late happy Revolution, for the rescuing our Laws and Religion from the Violations of the late King James.

Hitherto you will fay I have argued like a Whig, but I fhall foon fhew you that I am not inclined to be partial. When this very reforming Party had reduced the Forces of the King, and it was in their Power to have put a good End to the War, they fell into Factions and Divifions among themselves, and many of those that had eminently diftinguish'd themselves, and gain'd the Applaufe of the People, entered into Defigns to advance their own Grandeur; the great Officers of the Army form'd Cabals in the House of Commons, who by their Strength and Intereft violated the Rights of Parliament, by imprisoning feveral of their Fellow Members without juft Caufe, and excluded fuch as oppofed their finifter Defigns, without filling the House with new Elections; fo that they became no true Reprefentative of the People, and carried on all their extravagant Actions afterwards by a small Number of their own Faction: In short, when the King was at last brought to yield to fuch Terms as might have fettled the Nation in Peace,they rejected all Manner of Accommodation with him, hurried him to the Block, ufurp'd the regal Power, kept up the Army to fupport their own Tyranny, opprefs'd the People with illegal Exactions, and ruled the Three Nations by the Sword; and if those who ftile the Whole a Rebellion

had

had but diftinguish'd between the Commencement of the Civil War, and the Time when these Actions were perpetrated, I fhould be content to allow them that Term, or even a worse if they could invent it.

And thus, after our Fathers had spent their Blood and Treasure to rescue their ancient Rights and Privileges from the Invafions of a mifguided but legal King, they were cheated out of all by the Chiefs of their own Side, who made it evident to the World, that their hypocritical Zeal for Religion, and their fpecious Pretences for Civil Liberty, were made ufe of as Artifices to delude the fimple People, and make them their willing Tools whereby to accomplish their own ambitious Designs; and I have the rather gone fo far backwards to bring in this Inftance of the Deceits of these Men, because it is my Intent to fhew that from the Beginning of our Contests to this very Time, the Zeal and Affections of the People have always been kept up by both Parties with fair and fpecious Pretenfions of Publick Good, till the Heads and Leaders of either Side could get themfelves into the Saddle, and then they have driven on their own Interests, and left the poor People to fhift for themselves, till they fhould have further Occafion to make use of their Credulity.

To proceed then with my Obfervations in what Manner the Frame of our Government is varied from the ancient Conftitution, and to fhew what mifchievous Inconveniencies have been introduced thereby; as I have already noted, that the ancient Poffeffions allotted for the Support of the Dignity of the Crown were alienated, fo now after the Restoration (moftly) there was a Neceffity to find out fome other Ways of raifing Money to enlarge the fmall Revenue that remain'd, fo as it might enable the King to live honourably, and to maintain the Charge of the Civil and Military Lifts: The Customs on Merchandize were much advanced, great Duties of Excife, together with that of Hearth Money, were given, and these new Ways of taxing the People required a Multitude of Officers for the Collection, and many profitable Places for Men of Quality, all in the Gift of the Crown, and confequently a Means of engaging Abundance of Creatures and Dependants upon it.

It may be afferted for a Truth (though it has been contefted by fome) that the Reprefentatives of the People (or House of Commons) did in ours, and in all right Gothic Governments, make a conftituent Part of the Affembly of the States (or Parliament) though it be certain that in old Times they bore a much leffer Figure than now, and were much at the Devotion of the great Lords; but as their Power decreased, that of the Commons grew, and (as is faid before) their larger Share of Property has naturally devolved the Ballance of the Government upon them, and their Authority is much increafed fince the Crown is brought to have fo great a Dependance upon them for its Support; but as the Commons were formerly wont to be elected, and to fit and vote with Freedom, having nothing more in View than to ferve their Country faithfully, now our Kings came to apply their utmost Endeavours to influence Elections, and then to gain as many Members as they could into their Interefts, by giving them Honours, profitable Places, and Penfions: So that our Parliaments have fince come to be divided into the Court and Country Factions, by which Means the Crown has acquired a new Sort of Power, that has fometimes proved more dan

gerous

gerous to our Conftitution than its former Power, which (as I have fhewn) was founded upon Property,because a sufficient Ballance was provided to check the Excefs of that; whereas this introduces a Corruption into our very Conftitution, and it appears a Matter of the utmost Difficulty to provide a fufficient Remedy against it. I must not omit alfo to obferve, that in the Times of Popery the great Preferments of the Church depending upon the Pope, the Clergy were then as zealous as the Temporalty in defending the Liberties of the People against the Ufurpations of the Crown; but when, in the Reign of Henry the VIIIth, the Parliament abolish'd this Foreign Jurifdiction, and placed the Power of confering the Dignities of the Church in the King, this laid the Foundation for Men of afpiring Tempers, fince the Reformation, to ftrain their Inventions to form fuch Schemes of Divinity as might render them acceptable to the Court, and become a Means to advance them to Deanaries and Bishopricks; and thus they came to wreft the holy Scriptures, and to pervert the pure and uncontroverted Doctrines of Chriftianity, to maintain Falfities and Abfurdities, to flatter Princes with an Opinion that God had placed them in a Sphere above all human Laws, and that they were accountable to him alone for their Male-Administrations; to teach the People that they are bound by the Precepts of the Gospel to pay an unlimited paffive Obedience to Princes in all poffibie Cafes, and that themselves may not want a fair Share in these Heavenly Privileges, they would make us believe that they are Jure Divino God's peculiar Heritage in a diftinct Superiority to the Layety, and that their Order is exempted from any Dependency upon the State, &c. But Ifhall leave the Examination of thefe Opinions to another Place, my Intent at present being only to fhew, that as the Clergy are difperfed over the whole Kingdom, and have great Influence upon the People, they have deluded Multitudes of unthinking Men into thefe falfe Notions of Government, and almost persuaded them out of their own Birth-right; and have ruin'd more than one King by misleading them into the actual Practice of arbitrary Rule, from a Confidence that thefe Principles would fupport them in it: And in this mannner they are become, another additional Power to the Crown with a Mischief, for it has operated but like a Sword in the Hands of a Madman, to his own Destruction.

By what has been faid then you will fee that the effential Powers of our Conftitution are very much changed, and it is from thence that the first Occafion of all our National Contentions fpring; while on the one hand the Crown is ftruggling to fupply the Lofs of it's natural Strength by arbitrary or artificial Innovations; and the People on the other hand are contending to preferve their ancient Rights and Privileges; when in the mean Time both are made a Prey to the Ambition and Avarice of felf-feeking Men : And we must always expect to be subject to the Breakings out of this old Sore, until some good Patriots fhall be fo happy as to find out fuch a Temperament as may make the Crown eafy and the People fecure; wherein, as it will always be the true Intereft of the latter to keep to the ancient Conftitution as near as poffible in preferving the Luftre and Salutary Authority of the Crown, fo on the other Side, it will be more for the Eafe and Safety of the Prince to foften any fuch Powers of the Prerogative, as may tend to keep up Fears and Jealoufies in the Subjects, and which indeed are more apt to be made use of by Fa

vourites