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heal the Breaches, and create and nourish a good Understanding, Correspondence and Agreement, between England and Scotland ; of one who is for the real Interest of England, as well perpetual as accidental, and would have neither betray'd, overlook’d, or sold; of one who is for the Settlement of the Succesion in the Protestant Line and House of Hanover, and strict to National Oaths and Engagements, tho' under the Jacobitish Name of a Tory; than of one who either makes the Illuftrious House of Hanover bis Fejt, or the Interest of England his Property and Pretence, and endeavours by all the popular Colours to cover the Advisers of those Counsels that may prove dangerous to both Kingdoms, tho' under the false Character of a staunch Whig.

The first Thing I shall mention is the Matter of Trade, which seems to be the tender Point between the two Nations: And if the general Calcule be true, viz. that we have lost about two Thousand Ships since the present War, aboard each of which, by a Medium, we may reckon ten Men made Prisoners, half of whom (by most credible Information) generally enter themselves in the French Service ; according to which Compute the French

have near Ten Thousand of our ablest Seamen at present in their Pay, the · Boys and old Men being those that are actually sent us Home in Exchange ; there could not be a greater Service and Security to England, than to let the Scots into such a Part of Trade, as may be no Way prejudicial to the other Parts, and be a constant Nursery of numerous and able Seamen, to be ready for Service on all Exigencies. : 'Tis well known what Advantages that Nation has for Fishing; and if there was a Joint Stock of both Kingdoms, establish'd by both Parliaments for this single Branch of Trade, it would be a consolidating Project, and might have as powerful an Influence to bring that Nation to a better Temper, as any other Method. i .. · Especially if in that Establishment, the Wisdom of the Nation would think it reasonable to give the Scots a Consideration for the great Lofses they sustain'd at Darien; wherein, by some Mens Advice, there was more Compliment paid to a Spanish Monarch, and Regard had to the Interest of a Neighbouring State, than either to Parliamentary Engagement, or Personal Duty: It might prove a very effectual Way of defeating some Mens Designs, and settling the Hanover Succession there, as we have done here. For I have always thought Induction à much stronger Argument to convince Men than a formal Syllogism, and that Men are more easily perswaded of a general Truth drawn from sen. fible, advantageous Particulars, than by a Demonstration grounded either on Principle or Maxim.

But since I have mentioned a Neighbouring State, let us a little consider what great Advantages the Dutch have over us with respect to our Trade, our Quotas and our Coin, either from our Ignorance, or their Influence and Designs upon us. .

First, as to Trade : No Man, I think, who knows any Thing of the Course of it, but must be of Opinion, that the prohibiting the importation of French Goods, whilst our Neighbours the Dutch have the Liberty of Commerce P 2


with the in from Hits being run thering the Practice

with that Nation, is as prejudicial to us as profitable to them : For 'tis most evident, that it were better for England to have Wines, Brandies, &c. immediately from France, in Exchange of our Home-Manufacture, than to have them, under the Notion of a Prohibition, by Second-hand, from the Dutch; by which Means they have not only the Advantage of settling and maintaining a present Trade with France, and thereby an Opportunity of beating us out of it for the future ; but also make us pay ready Money and higher Rates for those Commodities, which otherwise we might have much cheaper, and with more Advantage. A particular Instance hereof is the French Brandy brought in from Holland, paying the Duty but of Dutch Goods, with a Dutch Attestation of its being run there immediately from the Stills into the Casks, in which it is imported; it being the Practice of the Merchants there to put the French Brandy into their Stills, and immediately turn the Cock, and run it into the Cask ; by which Practice the Laws are eluded, and England imposed upon. Besides this, the great. Duties that are Jay'd upon imported Goods, are as advantageous to the Dutch, as burthenfome to our English Merchants; for by this Method our Trade is very much driven from us, and the Dutcb have the Advantage of the Freight, the Commission, the Cuftoms, the petty Charges, and the Credit of a great Part of it.

Every Man knows, that Trade is the true. Intereft both of England and Holland ; and of all the Branches of it, there is none the Dutch more covet to monopolize than that Part which is left to us of the East India Trade: And if they could but engross the Pepper alone (as they have done the Nutmeg, Cinamon and Mace) they might put their own Price upon it, which, according to the Rate it went last War, would yield them many Millions. And here I could easily convince you, how constant a Regard the Dutch have to the Intereft of their Trade, if I would mention the private Article of the Partition Treaty between them and the French King; and in how probable Circumstances they are of obtaining again what by the said Article was covenanted; but these Things being, in my opinion, not so seasonable to be 'made more publick than they are, I shall only wish England may never be excluded any Branch of ber Trade by any private Article for the future. .

As to our Quota's, 'tis evident, the Money exported hence for the Subsistance, Cloathing, Ammunition, &c. of our Land Forces there, enriches them proportionably to what we are impoverish'd thereby : And it seems but reasonable, that since the Dangers England is exposd to are by Sea, as those of Holland are by Land, we should have so much Care of ourselves, as to have our Security in our own Hands as much as poffible, and be at less Charge in raising and maintaining Land Forces to defend and enlarge the Dutch Barrier, tho' we should be put to greater Expence in the Defence of our own, by which our Quota of Charges in the present War would be still the same to us, but the Advantage much greater, by securing ourselves at Home, by encreasing our Trade, Seamen, Navigation, Coin and Wealth, by maintaining our Dominion of the Seas, and making ourselves Masters of the

principal with us in this man lime of Warto

We have Ships

principal Places of Strength and Importance in America, as the Ifthmus of Darien, Carthagena, Portobello, Panama, and the Havanna, which, by our League with the House of Austria, we may keep, and thereby open a direct Trade thither with our Home-Manufacture for Exchange of Silver, instead of having it at Second-hand by the Way of Spain, Let none here object che Difficulty of finding Men for such a Project, considering the great Number our Grand Fleet will take up in Time of War; for the Scots would most willingly join with us in this great Dehgn, and furnish more Men than we have Ships to put them into, which would so unite both Nations in one and the same Interest, that I can attribute it to nothing but the Power of a Foreign Interest (this being the Thing of all others the Dutcb molt dread) such a Project has not been attempted, as the taking of those Places has been advised before now,

But 'tis very amazing, if, under all these Difficulties with which wę struggle, and the vast Expence we are at in maintaining so'great à Force Abroad, any one should scruple to fatisfy the Nation, Whether or no the Dutch make good-their poor Quota of three Ships to our five; which one would think there should be no Question of: And yet, if we may believe what we hear from Abroad, ten Ships to our tbirty is all they are to provide this Year. How this is brought to pass I shall not fay, but have always thought it as reasonable, that the Measures and Quotas of our Operations and force by Sea should be regulated between Holland and us here, as that the Scheme of the Land Forces should be concerted at the Hague, and that they should rather send an Agent hither, than that the Queen should be forc'd to send one of her Admiralty thither to adjust our Maritime Affairs with them; tho'. I doubt not but they are very thankful to fame Persons for this Compliment, and find their own Account too in being so. But unless some immediate Care be taken of this Matter, the Time of the Year will too far advance to make any Alteration pollible. ; ; • There is one Argument more, which I think I need but name, to convince any Man, that loves the Welfare of England, how reasonable it is we should both be very exact, and very positive in this Matter ; I mean the almost in. credible Lolles we have sustain'd by Sea, since this War broke out; which are not only great in themselves, but irreparable to us : Towns may be re-taken, Provinces may be conquered or yeilded up, but our Merchants Losses will never be repay'd, our Ships will never be restored, nor our Seamen ever recovered. And tho' our Losses by Sea amount, I believe, to more than what the whole Confederacy by Sea or Land has suffered ; yet, left the mentioning them should be more criminal than the Neglect by which they are occasioned, or seem an Attempt to lefsen fome Mens bigh Reputation and otber Mens' great Favour, I shall not enlarge further on this Head, but hope the Nation will take it into their Çonsideration. '

The last Thing is the Matter of Coin'; with regard to which, in how melancholy Circumstances we are, you may easily judge, if you consider (to omit other Particulars) only the vast Sunis that necessarily go out of England


in Specie every Year, to subfift, &c. our Forces abroad, and that all the Silver Money which goes into Holland, is there melted down, left otherwise it should find its Way Home: And besides this, the Dutch are so very covetous of our Silver, that they actually give at present 56Stivers for every English Crown Piece, tho' the Exchange is only 525; by which Means such Quantities of our Coin are clandestinely carried thither, that we already find a sensible Want of it ::Which Course, if it be not speedily prevented, will leave us very little in a short Time ; for notwithstanding the Foreign Expence of our Treasure is very great, the West-Indies bring us in but little Supply.

I have been the larger on this Head, to convince you how much it is our Interest to strengthen ourselves as far as possible, by bringing in the Scotch Nation to a Union with us in the Fishing Trade ; for Want of which, the Advantages the Dutch make by that Trade are too many here to be enumerated.

How much it would be the Interest of both Nations to have the Scotch Crown settled upon the Protestant Line and House of Hanover, is so well known, that it needs no Proof: It belongs not to me to say by what Arts and Methods that miscarried in the latt Session of the Scotch Parliament; but surely there cannot be a more powerful Motive to perswade the Scots to come into it, than by convincing them that we our felves are in Earnest : And I may say there cannot be a greater Inducement to perswade that Nation to settle their Crown as we have done, or to secure our own Settlement in Case they should not, than if our Presumptive Heir of the Illustrious House of Hanover was always residing here, under the Care and Protection of Her Majesty. .

A few Particulars, amongst many which might be mentioned, will be sufficient, I think, to convince any unbiass’d Man of the Reason and Advantage of this Proposition. .. i

Tis certain, if the Prayers of the People and the Personal Virtue of a Prince .could make any one immortal, the Happiness and Security we at prefent enjoy under her Majesty would be perpetual ; but how great foever these Blessings are, they all hang upon the single Thread of Her Majesty's valuable Life. ,

The Queen herself was so sensible of this, that amongst other Things in her first Speech to her Parliament, she recommended the procuring a lasting Foundation of Security to England; which necessarily includes the Care of the Protestant Succession, because without it as now settled in the House of Hanover by Acts of Parliament, what other reasonable Foundation can we have of a Jasting Security to our Laws, Liberties, and Religion?

That which every good Englishman, I believe, wishes, is a long Life to her Majesty, and a Succeffor after her, that may inherit her Virtues and Piety, her Zeal for the Church, and her Care for the State; who being fashioned and formed by her own Hand to her own Mind, by a daily View of her great and princely Virtues, may at once be led both to admire and imitate ibe great Original.

Nor Nor can there be, in my Opinion, a greater Advantage and Security to the Church of England, than to have a Successor to the Crown long and personally acquainted with the Reverend Prelates, her great Ornaments and Defence ; whereby he would have a greater Opportunity of being more fully instructed in her Doctrines, and more evidently convinced of their Merit, who, in the lace dangerous Times, shew'd their Learning in their Writings, and Courage in their Steadiness to her Interest.

'Tis the Glory of our Religion, as of Truth, to be admired and loved according to the Degrees of its being known: So that it cannot be without :: fome Prejudice to a Church, that the presumptive Successor to the Crown should be at a Distance from those Persons who are best able to instruct him ; and that he should receive Things with the great Disadvantage and Uncertainty of diftant Reports, who otherwise might be an immediate Observer of Mens Principles and Actions.

It would be another Advantage to England, rather to have a Succeffor to the Crown well acquainted with our Persons, Laws, Customs and Conftitutions, with a Heart entirely English, than one, who coming over very much a Stranger to all these, is liable to the Misfortunes of a late Prince, who, by the Weakness or Flattery of his Ministry, was led into such frequent Mistakes, such false Steps, as often proved very troublesome to himself, and very grie-: vous to his people.

For the Knowledge of Men and Things comes not to any person by Infusion, but is gain'd by nice Observation and great Experience ; and yet is so absolutely necessary, that 'tis scarce possible any Government without it can be managed as it ought : For, as to the first step of Government, the Choice of a Council, that must be the mere Effect of Chance in a Prince, who. is altogether ignorant of Mens Merits and Qualifications; and the Resolutions a Prince, who is unacquainted with the Nature and Circumstances of. Affairs, takes upon the different Opinions offered, are the Effects of blind Confidence, rather than the Acts of judgment: The Orders such a Prince gives, the Alliances he ratifies, the War and Peace he makes, and all other Treaties in general, are sign'd by a Hand without Eyes; he knows not what. he does, and so Treachery always finds him unprovided, and each Minister reigns absolutely in that Part of Government wiich is assigned to him, making his Fortune out of the Publick, while all wink at one another.

But if it unfortunately happen, that such a Prince puts himself and the Government into one Hand, no Man knows what the Consequence of such a Confidence may be either to Prince or People ; for he is not born a Prince ; when he sees himself thus cloathed with delegated Majesty, he will take Pride in shewing it, by exercising both his Authority and Passions, and if he happen to be of a grasping and hungry Temper, it is yet the more dangerous to the Prince, who, it he knows it not, is generally accused of Incapacity, Remifsnefs or Neglect ; or though he does, yet may want Strength, Resolution, or Knowledge, to free himself from such a Clog, or change the Scene of his Ministry.


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