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heal the Breaches, and create and nourish a good Understanding, Correfpondence and Agreement, between England and Scotland; of one who is for the real Intereft of England, as well perpetual as accidental, and would have neither betray'd, overlook'd, or fold; of one who is for the Settlement of the Succeffion in the Proteftant Line and House of Hanover, and strict to National Oaths and Engagements, tho' under the Jacobitifh Name of a Tory; than of one who either makes the Illuftrious House of Hanover his feft, or the Intereft of England his Property and Pretence, and endeavours by all the popular Colours to cover the Advifers of thofe Counfels that may prove dangerous to both Kingdoms, tho' under the falfe Character of a staunch Whig.

The first Thing I fhall mention is the Matter of Trade, which feems to be the tender Point between the two Nations: And if the general Calcule be true, viz. that we have loft about two Thousand Ships fince the present War, aboard each of which, by a Medium, we may reckon ten Men made Prisoners, half of whom (by most credible Information) generally enter themselves in the French Service; according to which Compute the French have near Ten Thousand of our ableft Seamen at present in their Pay, the Boys and old Men being those that are actually fent us Home in Exchange; there could not be a greater Service and Security to England, than to let the Scots into fuch a Part of Trade, as may be no Way prejudicial to the other Parts, and be a conftant Nursery of numerous and able Seamen, to be ready for Service on all Exigencies.

'Tis well known what Advantages that Nation has for Fishing; and if there was a Joint Stock of both Kingdoms, establish'd by both Parliaments for this fingle Branch of Trade, it would be a confolidating Project, and might have as powerful an Influence to bring that Nation to a better Temper, as any other Method..

Especially if in that Establishment, the Wisdom of the Nation would think it reasonable to give the Scots a Confideration for the great Loffes they fuftain'd at Darien; wherein, by fome Mens Advice, there was more Compliment paid to a Spanish Monarch, and Regard had to the Interest of a Neighbouring State, than either to Parliamentary Engagement, or Perfonal Duty: It might prove a very effectual Way of defeating fome Mens Defigns, and fettling the Hanover Succeffion there, as we have done here. For I have always thought Induction a much stronger Argument to convince Men than a formal Syllogifm, and that Men are more eafily perfwaded of a general Truth drawn from fenfible, advantageous Particulars, than by a Demonftration grounded either on Principle or Maxim.

But fince I have mentioned a Neighbouring State, let us a little confider what great Advantages the Dutch have over us with respect to our Trade, our Quotas and our Coin, either from our Ignorance, or their Influence and Designs upon us.

First, as to Trade: No Man, I think, who knows any Thing of the Course of it, but must be of Opinion, that the prohibiting the Importation of French Goods, whilft our Neighbours the Dutch have the Liberty of Commerce

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with that Nation, is as prejudicial to us as profitable to them: For 'tis moft evident, that it were better for England to have Wines, Brandies, &c. immediately from France, in Exchange of our Home-Manufacture, than to have them, under the Notion of a Prohibition, by Second-hand, from the Dutch; by which Means they have not only the Advantage of fettling and maintaining a prefent Trade with France, and thereby an Opportunity of beating us out of it for the future; but also make us pay ready Money and higher Rates for thofe Commodities, which otherwife we might have much cheaper, and with more Advantage. A particular Inftance hereof is the French Brandy brought in from Holland, paying the Duty but of Dutch Goods, with a Dutch Atteftation of its being run there immediately from the Stills into the Casks, in which it is imported; it being the Practice of the Merchants there to put the French Brandy into their Stills, and immediately turn the Cock, and run it into the Cask; by which Practice the Laws are eluded, and England imposed upon. Befides this, the great Duties that are lay'd upon imported Goods, are as advantageous to the Dutch, as burthenfome to our English Merchants; for by this Method our Trade is very much driven from us, and the Dutch have the Advantage of the Freight, the Commiffion, the Cuftoms, the petty Charges, and the Credit of a great

Part of it.

Every Man knows, that Trade is the true Intereft both of England and Holland; and of all the Branches of it, there is none the Dutch more covet to monopolize than that Part which is left to us of the East India Trade: And if they could but engross the Pepper alone (as they have done the Nutmeg, Cinamon and Mace) they might put their own Price upon it, which, according to the Rate it went laft War, would yield them niany Millions. And here I could eafily convince you, how conftant a Regard the Dutch have to the Intereft of their Trade, if I would mention the private Article of the Partition Treaty between them and the French King; and in how probable Circumftances they are of obtaining again what by the faid Article was covenanted; but thefe Things being, in my Opinion, not fo feasonable to be made more publick than they are, I fhall only with England may never be excluded any Branch of her Trade by any private Article for the future.

As to our Quota's, 'tis evident, the Money exported hence for the Subfiftance, Cloathing, Ammunition, &c. of our Land Forces there, enriches them proportionably to what we are impoverish'd thereby: And it feems but reafonable, that fince the Dangers England is expos'd to are by Sea, as those of Holland are by Land, we fhould have fo much Care of ourselves, as to have our Security in our own Hands as much as poffible, and be at lefs Charge in raifing and maintaining Land Forces to defend and enlarge the Dutch Barrier, tho' we fhould be put to greater Expence in the Defence of our own, by which our Quota of Charges in the prefent War would be still the fame to us, but the Advantage much greater, by fecuring ourselves at Home, by encreafing our Trade, Seamen, Navigation, Coin and Wealth, by maintaining our Dominion of the Seas, and making ourselves Mafters of the

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principal Places of Strength and Importance in America, as the Ifthmus of Darien, Carthagena, Portobello, Panama, and the Havanna, which, by our League with the House of Auftria, we may keep, and thereby open a direct Trade thither with our Home-Manufacture for Exchange of Silver, instead of having it at Second-hand by the Way of Spain. Let none here object the Difficulty of finding Men for fuch a Project, confidering the great Number our Grand Fleet will take up in Time of War; for the Scots would most willingly join with us in this great Defign, and furnish more Men than we have Ships to put them into, which would fo unite both Nations in one and the fame Intereft, that I can attribute it to nothing but the Power of a Foreign Intereft (this being the Thing of all others the Dutch moft dread) fuch a Project has not been attempted, as the taking of thofe Places has been advised before now.

But 'tis very amazing, if, under all thefe Difficulties with which we struggle, and the vaft Expence we are at in maintaining fo great a Force Abroad, any one should fcruple to fatisfy the Nation, Whether or no the Dutch make good their poor Quota of three Ships to our five; which one would think there fhould be no Question of: And yet, if we may believe what we hear from Abroad, ten Ships to our thirty is all they are to provide this Year. How this is brought to pass I fhall not fay, but have always thought it as reafonable, that the Measures and Quotas of our Operations and Force by Sea fhould be regulated between Holland and us here, as that the Scheme of the Land Forces fhould be concerted at the Hague, and that they fhould rather fend an Agent hither, than that the Queen fhould be forc'd to fend one of her Admiralty thither to adjuft our Maritime Affairs with them; tho' I doubt not but they are very thankful to fame Perfons for this Compliment, and find their own Account too in being fo. But unless fome immediate Care be taken of this Matter, the Time of the Year will too far advance to make any Alteration poffible.

There is one Argument more, which I think I need but name, to convince any Man, that loves the Welfare of England, how reafonable it is we should both be very exact, and very pofitive in this Matter; I mean the almost incredible Lofjes we have fuftain'd by Sea, fince this War broke out; which are not only great in themfelves, but irreparable to us: Towns may be re-taken, Provinces may be conquered or yeilded up, but our Merchants Loffes will never be repay'd, our Ships will never be restored, nor our Seamen ever recovered. And tho' our Loffes by Sea amount, I believe, to more than what the whole Confederacy by Sea or Land has fuffered; yet, left the mentioning them fhould be more criminal than the Neglect by which they are occafioned, or feem an Attempt to leffen fome Mens high Reputation and other Mens great Favour, I fhall not enlarge further on this Head, but hope the Nation will take it into their Confideration.

The laft Thing is the Matter of Coin; with regard to which, in how melancholy Circumftances we are, you may eafily judge, if you confider (to omit other Particulars) only the vaft Sums that neceffarily go out of England

in

in Specie every Year, to fubfift, &c. our Forces abroad, and that all the Silver Money which goes into Holland, is there melted down, left otherwise it should find its Way Home: And befides this, the Dutch are so very covetous of our Silver, that they actually give at prefent 56 Stivers for every English Crown Piece, tho' the Exchange is only 52; by which Means fuch Quantities of our Coin are clandeftinely carried thither, that we already find a fenfible Want of it: Which Courfe, if it be not speedily prevented, will leave us very little in a fhort Time; for notwithstanding the Foreign Expence of our Treasure is very great, the Weft-Indies bring us in but little Supply.

I have been the larger on this Head, to convince you how much it is our Intereft to ftrengthen ourselves as far as poffible, by bringing in the Scotch Nation to a Union with us in the Fishing Trade; for Want of which, the Advantages the Dutch make by that Trade are too many here to be enumerated.

How much it would be the Intereft of both Nations to have the Scotch Crown fettled upon the Proteftant Line and Houfe of Hanover, is fo well known, that it needs no Proof: It belongs not to me to fay by what Arts and Methods that miscarried in the laft Seffion of the Scotch Parliament; but furely there cannot be a more powerful Motive to perfwade the Scots to come into it, than by convincing them that we ourselves are in Earneft: And I may fay there cannot be a greater Inducement to perfwade that Nation to fettle their Crown as we have done, or to fecure our own Settlement in Cafe they should not, than if our Prefumptive Heir of the Illuftrious House of Hanover was always refiding here, under the Care and Protection of Her Majefty.

A few Particulars, amongst many which might be mentioned, will be fufficient, I think, to convince any unbiafs'd Man of the Reafon and Advantage of this Propofition.

Tis certain, if the Prayers of the People and the Perfonal Virtue of a Prince could make any one immortal, the Happiness and Security we at prefent enjoy under her Majefty would be perpetual; but how great foever these Bleffings are, they all hang upon the fingle Thread of Her Majesty's valuable Life.

The Queen herself was fo fenfible of this, that amongst other Things in her first Speech to her Parliament, fhe recommended the procuring a lasting Foundation of Security to England; which neceffarily includes the Care of the Proteftant Succeffion, because without it as now fettled in the House of Hanover by Acts of Parliament, what other reasonable Foundation can we have of a Jafting Security to our Laws, Liberties, and Religion?

That which every good Englishman, I believe, wishes, is a long Life to her Majefty, and a Succeffor after her, that may inherit her Virtues and Piety, her Zeal for the Church, and her Care for the State; who being fashioned and formed by her own Hand to her own Mind, by a daily View of her great and princely Virtues, may at once be led both to admire and imitate the great Original.

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Nor can there be, in my Opinion, a greater Advantage and Security to the Church of England, than to have a Succeffor to the Crown long and perfonally acquainted with the Reverend Prelates, her great Ornaments and Defence; whereby he would have a greater Opportunity of being more fully inftructed in her Doctrines, and more evidently convinced of their Merit, who, in the late dangerous Times, fhew'd their Learning in their Writings, and Courage in their Steadiness to her Interest.

'Tis the Glory of our Religion, as of Truth, to be admired and loved according to the Degrees of its being known: So that it cannot be without fome Prejudice to a Church, that the prefumptive Succeffor to the Crown fhould be at a Distance from thofe Perfons who are beft able to inftruct him; and that he should receive Things with the great Disadvantage and Uncertainty of diftant Reports, who otherwife might be an immediate Obferver of Mens Principles and Actions.

It would be another Advantage to England, rather to have a Succeffor to the Crown well acquainted with our Perfons, Laws, Customs and Conftitutions, with a Heart entirely English, than one, who coming over very much a Stranger to all thefe, is liable to the Misfortunes of a late Prince, who, by: the Weakness or Flattery of his Ministry, was led into fuch frequent Mistakes, fuch falfe Steps, as often proved very troublesome to himself, and very grievous to his People.

For the Knowledge of Men and Things comes not to any Perfon by Infufion, but is gain'd by nice Obfervation and great Experience; and yet is fo abfolutely neceffary, that 'tis fcarce poffible any Government without it can be managed as it ought: For, as to the first Step of Government, the Choice of a Council, that must be the mere Effect of Chance in a Prince, who is altogether ignorant of Mens Merits and Qualifications; and the Refolutions a Prince, who is unacquainted with the Nature and Circumstances of Affairs, takes upon the different Opinions offered, are the Effects of blind Confidence, rather than the Acts of Judgment: The Orders fuch a Princegives, the Alliances he ratifies, the War and Peace he makes, and all other Treaties in general, are fign'd by a Hand without Eyes; he knows not what he does, and fo Treachery always finds him unprovided, and each Minifter. reigns abfolutely in that Part of Government which is affigned to him, making his Fortune out of the Publick, while all wink at one another.

But if it unfortunately happen, that fuch a Prince puts himself and the Government into one Hand, no Man knows what the Confequence of fuch a Confidence may be either to Prince or People; for he is not born a Prince; when he sees himself thus cloathed with delegated Majefty, he will take Pride in fhewing it, by exercising both his Authority and Paffions; and if he happen to be of a grasping and hungry Temper, it is yet the more dangerous to the Prince, who, if he knows it not, is generally accufed of Incapacity, Remiffness or Neglect; or though he does, yet may want Strength, Refolution, or Knowledge, to free himfelf from fuch a Clog, or change the Scene of his Ministry.

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