Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

This act authorizes citizens to fell and remove timber from the public domain for mining and domestic purposes, but does not limit the cutting of the timber to mineral lands.

San Juan Lumber Co., In re, 2 L. D. 824.

b. EXTENT OF MINERALS-PROOF.

The question of the character of the land under this statute is always one of fact, and the most satisfactory evidence is the actual use to which such land has been placed by those who occupy it, and while it may not be conclusive evidence, yet the testimony as to the actual use of such land tends to establish its character and is relative and material for that purpose.

Lynch v. United States, 138 Fed. 535, p. 540.

The mere appearance of mineral and the mere presence of color here and there, as in a placer claim, is not sufficient to constitute land mineral, but there must be at least sufficient mineral to induce mining men of experience to go upon the ground and take and work it with the expectation of finding mineral, and this rule applies particularly to a country or district that had during long series of years been thoroughly explored and prospected, and not to a case of newly discovered mineral country, and the circumstances are proper to be considered in connection with the alleged good faith of a person cutting timber from such lands.

Anderson v. United States, 152 Fed. 87, p. 92.

Under this statute a person may lawfully cut timber on lands situated in mountainous, barren regions, unadapted to agriculture and the founding of homes, and which are interspersed with gulches and narrow valleys, and minerals are known to exist at different points therein, and where such timber may be essential not only for direct use in and about the mines to be opened and operated, but for building homes and fences for the use of the people desiring to occupy and develop such communities, and where such lands are not subject to entry under existing laws of the United States except for mineral.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 246.

See United States v. Basic Co., 121 Fed. 504.

United States v. Rossi, 133 Fed. 380.

The right to cut timber under this statute should not be restricted to the spot or minor tract of land on which mining is being actually done, but the citizen may enter upon and take timber from adjacent lands, they being mineral, though no mining development work has been done thereon, and in this sense it is mineral in character if contiguous or near thereto there be lands on which mineral has been actually discovered by development work and the land in question be of like topography or delineation with the same surface indication of what is known as a lead or float in a placer mining region, then the land is mineral within the meaning and intent of this statute.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 247.

If land is worth more for agriculture than mining, it is not mineral land, though it may contain some gold or silver.

United States v. Plowman, 216 U. S. 372, p. 374.

C. COAL LANDS.

Coal lands are not considered mineral lands within the meaning of this act authorizing the use of timber upon lands in Colorado, Nevada, and certain Territories and mining districts, for mining purposes.

Truan, In re, 2 L. D. 827.

Where coal mines exist and the coal can be utilized for fuel purposes the department requires that such coal should be used instead of timber as an article of fuel. Gregg, In re, 2 L. D. 827.

d. TIMBER LANDS-WHAT CONSTITUTES.

Land to be within the provision of this act must be in its present state, because of its timber growth, substantially unfit for cultivation.

United States v. Budd, 144 U. S. 154, p. 167.

Grenon v. Miller, 39 L. D. 577, p. 580.

Timber of a kind useful for mining purposes and in such location with reference to mines as to give it value for such purposes, and to make the value of the land in excess of its present value for agricultural purposes, makes such land timber land within the meaning of this act.

Grenon v. Miller, 39 L. D. 577, p. 579.

The matter of marketing the timber is not to be a material factor in determining the timber character of land under this act.

Grenon v. Miller, 39 L. D. 577, p. 579.

6. PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO CUT AND USE.

Possession of a mining claim confers the right upon locators to work the claim for precious metals, but confers no right to take the timber thereon except as it may be reasonably necessary in legitimate mining operations, as the mining claim does not divest the legal title in the United States or impair his right to protect the land from trespass and waste.

McQuillan v. Tanana Electric Co., 3 Alaska 110, p. 118.

See Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273.

Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562.

The locator of a mining claim has the right to cut down or destroy trees where they stand in the way of the process of mining.

United States v. Nelson, 27 Fed. Cas. 86.

Ladda v. Hawley, 57 Cal. 51, p. 55.

Not only is the authority and permission to fell and remove timber and trees extended to cover only the public mineral lands, susceptible of mineral entry alone, but the act does not as to such lands secure to miners of the vicinity an exclusive right of timber appropriation.

Gallagher v. Gray, 35 L. D. 90, p. 91.

7. USES FOR WHICH CUTTING IS PERMITTED.

a. USES NAMED IN STATUTE.

See 26 Stat. 1095, p. 1164.

The uses for which timber may be cut on mineral lands are for building purposes, agriculture, mining, or other domestic purposes.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 211.

See United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 659.

A citizen of the United States resident in Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, or Montana may cut timber on mineral lands for agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes.

United States v. Lynde, 47 Fed. 297, p. 302.
Anderson v. United States, 152 Fed. 87, p. 89.

This statute permits bona fide residents or mining companies to cut and remove timber from mineral lands for mining, agricultural, and domestic purposes, in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Interior.

United States v. Homestake Min. Co., 117 Fed. 481, p. 483.

United States v. Gentry, 119 Fed. 70, p. 72.

See United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663.

Powers v. United States, 119 Fed. 562, p. 563.

The right to cut timber under this act is quite narrow, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming the right.

United States v. Plowman, 216 U. S. 372, p. 374.

b. REDUCTION, SMELTING, ROASTING, ETC.

Reduction of ore, whether mined or purchased, and refining the products thereof, is mining, within this statute permitting the cutting of timber for mining purposes. United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415, p. 419.

As quartz mills and reduction works are indispensable to a mining community the cutting of the timber and the use in such mills and works of such timber is clearly within the provisions of the statute, and the consumer is as fully protected by it as if he consumed it in his dwelling.

Hardin, In re, 1 L. D. 597, p. 598.

Under this act timber on mining lands may be cut and used for smelting purposes, as this is included in the term " 'or other domestic purposes."

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 213.

United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415.

See United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 658.

A company that extracts the ore from its mine, carries that part needing such treatment to the roasting dump, and uses wood in roasting therefrom sulphur, arsenic, and other volatile substances, and then runs the ore through its reduction plant and converts the same into a merchantable product, the extraction of such ore from the mines, the roasting of it upon the dumps preparatory for its final reduction in the furnace and their reduction plants established for such purpose, is clearly a part of mining, and the whole process of such extraction and preparation taken together is within the protection of this act.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 8 Ariz. 186, p. 194.

The roasting of ore is a part of the process of mining and for which timber on mineral lands may be cut and used.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 212.

This act makes provision in certain States and Territories for the free cutting of timber on public lands that are known to be of a strictly mineral character for the particular uses named in the act, and regulations against cutting timber to be used for smelting purposes are invalid.

White, In re, 34 L. D. 78, p. 79.

See City and County of Beaver, In re, 34 L. D. 112.

A corporation engaged in mining and refining bullion may purchase for its uses wood and charcoal made from timber cut from public mineral lands.

United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 666.

C. DOMESTIC PURPOSES-MEANING.

The term "other domestic purposes" is not used in this statute in the narrow sense of household purposes, but in the broader sense of other industries in the locality,

including the right of persons cutting and removing timber to sell it for domestic consumption as contradistinguished from exportation from the State.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 215.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 246.

See United States v. Richmond Min. Co., 40 Fed. 415.

d. EXPORTING PROHIBITED.

A locator of a mining claim or a person in possession of mineral lands is authorized to cut and remove therefrom any and all timber and trees growing thereon for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes, but is prohibited from exporting such timber from the State.

Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, p. 244.

e. POWER TO SELL, BUY, OR EMPLOY OTHERS TO CUT.

Miners and others inhabiting mining districts have the right to cut or employ others to cut the timber from the mineral lands of the United States for domestic purposes. Breman, In re, 2 L. D. 823.

This act authorizes the cutting of timber on the mineral lands of the United States for domestic uses, and it is not supposed that Congress intended to say to the inhabitants of the mineral regions that they might cut timber for their own use, yet they could not employ others to cut timber for them or purchase it from others who had cut and prepared it for use.

Hardin, In re, 1 L. D., 597.

f. SAWMILL OWNERS-DISPOSAL Of lumber.

The owner or manager of a sawmill shall not sell or dispose of timber or lumber made from such timber without taking from the purchaser his written agreement that the same is not to be used except for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes, and it is not a compliance with this rule to obtain such an agreement three months after the sale or disposal of the timber or lumber, as the object of the rule was to require the person who was taking timber from the mineral lands to keep a record of his transactions and written agreements from his purchasers to the end that the inspectors of the Government might see by the examination of these writings whether or not he was complying with the act of Congress, but the reduction of the agreement to writing within a few hours after the sale or disposal might be a reasonable compliance with the regulation, as it is not imperative that the agreement should be written and signed at the very instant of the sale, but it must be at substantially the time the timber is sold and disposed of.

United States v. Gentry, 119 Fed. 70, p. 72.

Where timber was taken from mineral lands then the cull or rejected lumber may be disposed of by millmen or contractors to miners, settlers, and other bona fide residents of Colorado.

Timber Cutting-Mill Men, In re, 1 L. D. 600, pp. 612, 613, 618.

8. REGULATIONS AS TO CUTTING.

a. AUTHORITY AND EFFECT.

This statute gives the right to cut trees under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may provide for the protection of the timber and undergrowth growing upon such lands and for other purposes, and compliance with such rules and

regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Interior is necessary in order to give a license to cut trees or timber, and such license must be specially pleaded as a defense in an action for cutting timber.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 665.

See United States v. Homestake Min. Co., 117 Fed. 481, p. 488.

The rules and regulations provided by the act to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior were only intended to furnish detailed instruction as to the manner of taking the timber to prevent waste and unnecessary destruction, and such rules and regulations can not take the place or exceed the terms and requirements of the statute. United States v. Rossi, 133 Fed. 380, p. 384.

See United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 658.

b. VALIDITY-RESTRICTING STATUTE.

This statute concerns the public good or the general welfare and pertains to the citizens and bona fide residents of the States and Territories named therein and should be liberally construed, and it will not be supposed that Congress intended to give the Secretary of the Interior the power to annul or limit its effect.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 667.

This act clothes the Secretary of the Interior with power to prescribe rules and regulations concerning the cutting and removal of timber, but he has no power to enlarge or restrict the purposes expressed in the act for which timber may be cut.

United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 8 Ariz. 186, pp. 188, 190.

The regulation of the Secretary of the Interior prohibiting the cutting of timber on mineral lands is an unauthorized restriction of the statute and therefore void. United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U. S. 207, p. 211.

See United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed. 655, p. 659.

The rules and regulations authorized by the Secretary of the Interior under this section can not limit the rights granted by the statute, and he is not authorized to make any distinction between the lands designated as being mineral in the statute and lands designated by him as "strictly mineral.”

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 665.

United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 7 Ariz. 80, p. 89.

See United States v. Copper Queen Min. Co., 185 U. S. 495.

The rules and regulations adopted by the Secretary of the Interior under this statute upon the subject of cutting and disposing of cordwood should be reasonable and designed to promote the policy of Congress as indicated by this statute.

United States v. Mullan Fuel Co., 118 Fed. 663, p. 667.

See Anchor v. Howe, 50 Fed. 366.

C. REGULATIONS AS TO SIZE OF TREES.

According to the regulations prescribed under this act the cutting of trees is limited to those less than 8 inches in diameter.

Timber Cutting, In re, 1 L. D. 600, pp. 602, 616, 617, 618.

The rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior prohibiting the cutting of timber under 8 inches in diameter on mineral lands are, in effect, a part of this statute, and a person cutting timber in violation of such rules is not relieved from liability because these rules were, pending a prosecution for such violation, repealed, as the cutting of timber was a trespass for which the defendant was liable. United States v. Williams, 8 Mont. 85, p. 87.

See United States v. Williams, 6 Mont. 379.

« ZurückWeiter »