to an unexpected destruction. And if in the kingdom of Naples the revolution of 1799, in which so few individuals took part, produced in twenty years so great a change in public feeling, and converted it entirely to the interests of the nation, what may not be expected from the revolution (though suppressed) of 1820, in which all the citizens took part? Austria, and the Bourbon family, will be convinced of this, on the first favorable occasion that shall present itself for forwarding the interests of humanity.

FALL OF PORTUGUESE LIBERTY.

The situation in which the people of Portugal were placed was not exactly similar to that of Spain. The Portuguese had not a war truly insurrectional; and the opposition which they made to the French failed to give any impulse to their ideas, because they acted as blind instruments in the hands of the English. And though by being commanded by English officers, the Portuguese troops acquired a degree of discipline and of steadiness in front of the enemy which the Spaniards never attained, yet they did not, in any part of Portugal, imbibe that sacred enthusiasm which is inspired by patriotism and the love of liberty: This is the reason why we have not seen, either among the citizens or the troops in Portugal, that zeal which was manifested in Spain; and for this reason, though it was not attacked by any foreign force, the freedom of Portugal expired before that of Spain.

The situation of Portugal with regard to Spain was like that of Piedmont relative to Naples; that is to say, Portuguese liberty could never have resisted the attacks of its enemies, unless Spain had done the same: but unfortunately this truth, which was so evident to the eyes of others, was not so to the Portuguese. But a few hours before the liberty of Portugal expired, the incautious ministry was heard to declare that even if Spain fell, Portugal would remain unmolested.

After having said that Portuguese and Spanish liberty were neçessarily dependant on each other, it seems superfluous to develope minutely the causes of the counter-revolution; but as Portugal might have had so beneficial an influence on the affairs of the whole peninsula, it may be interesting to many persons to become acquainted with the true situation of that state, and the particular causes of its unfortunate return to its ancient enslaved condition.

Though from what has been already said it appears that no particular circumstances had arisen to give the people in general a strong desire for freedom, yet many distinguished liberals existed in that country, who, though not belonging to great families or

enjoying any elevated rank in the army, yet wanted neither talents nor influence. If these liberals had formed an union, and had acted wisely, they might certainly have been in a condition to assist the Spanish government so as to have prevented or at least delayed its fall. Almost all the circumstances which have been mentioned in speaking of Spain, apply equally to Portugal; but the following are the causes of failure common to both countries, and also those which more nearly concern Portugal herself. 1st. Preserving the ancient dynasty.

2d. Leaving the King the command of the army.

3d. Not taking any proper measures with regard to the clergy. On these three topics we refer the reader to what has been already said with regard to Spain.

4th. While in every part of Spain exertions were making to enlighten the people, and to instruct them in the Constitutional system, either by means of political societies, by free-ma sonry, and afterwards by the celebrated sect of the Communeros, nothing of this kind was attempted in Portugal. And though there existed a patriotic society in Lisbon, and another in Oporto, they seemed paralysed by a death-like torpor. Why were there never more than two such societies established in all Portugal ? Free-masonry was in vigor in Lisbon and in Oporto; but besides the impossibility of making its way among the people, who are even more superstitious than the Spaniards, what influence could it diffuse from thence over the more remote provinces ? An Italian Colonel established there the sect of the Carbonari, but it never took root, because it was hardly tolerated even by the Constitutional government itself. Finally, the public journals were far from active in promoting patriotic sentiments, even among persons of education-as for the lower order of persons in that country, they are seldom able to read.

From this negligence on the part of the Constitutional government, the people of the provinces never understood the real meaning of the word Liberty; they referred themselves to their priests for an explanation, who defined it to be a diabolical invention for the subversion of the Catholic religion, and for the taking away the power of the King, in order to give it to infidels. In spite of all this, however, it is an undoubted fact that in Oporto, and above all in Lisbon, the youth of the city were beyond measure disposed to support liberty; notwithstanding this, the ministry never took any advantage of that circumstance, which, as Lisbon has much more influence over Portugal, than London has over England, would have been of the greatest moment; as they might in that case have disposed of ten thousand young men of the militia of the city of Lisbon. The great influence which this

large city possesses, is owing to its containing the sixth part of the population, and to its being the residence of the richest citizens of the state.

Neither the Cortes nor the ministry inspired in the militia or the troops of the line, any enthusiasm for, or interest in, the cause of national liberty. In fact, the last to abandon the Constitutional standard was the King himself, who went not over to the enemy until after all the officers of the army had so done ; to which he was probably instigated by the liberals themselves, who advised him to join his son, that he might not become the victim of the Queen's intrigues. We find in history some examples of armies, who pass from the hands of a legitimate king to those of an usurper, and who afterwards abandon the latter; and also of armies who change from one leader to another in a short space of time but to see an army proclaiming the liberty of the nation in 1820, and then abandoning the national interests, and restoring the country to its ancient state of slavery, was reserved for the times in which we live, and which are so fertile in extraordinary events. That not one officer in any regiment should refuse to embrace the party of absolute power, is a shameful circumstance, and must be chiefly attributed to the indolence and ignorance of the Constitutional government.

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5th. The obstinacy of the government, in continuing the war in the Brazils. In this respect the Portuguese erred, even more than the Spaniards, by sending continually into America more troops, and in sacrificing in such a cause large sums of money. If the Portuguese, laying aside the insane and unjust project of subjugating the Brazils, had recalled their troops from thence, employed the produce of their mines in organising a good army, and inspiring it with a desire to enter into the national interests, they might have assisted Spain with thirty thousand excellent troops of the line, and at least twelve thousand chosen militia. The Spaniards receiving such a seasonable reinforcement, might have fought the French with success, so as to have cost the Bourbons the throne of France, and saved Europe from that Scourge of humanity, the soi-disant Holy Alliance.

Besides this, the Portuguese and Spanish ships united, though they could not have opposed the French navy, would have been sufficient to have gone to Sicily with a few troops and arms, which would have produced the speedy revolt of the Sicilians and Calabrians against the Austrians. The few troops which garrisoned Sicily would have been easily made pri soners, and the example of the Calabrians and Sicilians would have encouraged the rest of Italy, and even the French themselves, to have trodden under foot a detested despotism. But the feeble

half-measure politicians, whom it is become fashionable to call liberals, have been always disunited, weak, timid and ignorant of state-affairs; they have relied more on the goodness of princes than on their own strength; and if posterity shall show little indulgence towards the blindness of the Neapolitans, who fell while loudly declaring the rights of men, the justice of their cause, and the sanctity of the oath taken by the Nestor among Kings, what shall posterity think of the madness of those men who composed the Constitutional governments of the Peninsula? It will say, perhaps, that it is impossible ever to find men capable of conducting a revolution-but this would be an erroneous conclusion. It might be with more truth alleged, that the four revolutions of the south of Europe, which took place in 1820, were only revolutions in name; and that when revolutions are not rendered complete, or the men capable of conducting them are not placed in responsible situations, or, being so, are defeated by the temporising conduct of others, they can never act with sufficient vigor or decision.

6th. The Portuguese government never having concluded an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Spain. If we had leisure to dwell on the correspondence between these governments, relative to this object, it were difficult to say whether the reader would be presented with a subject most worthy of ridicule or of compassion. It resembles the folly of the decrepid imperial government of Greece, which was deeply employed in discussing theological questions at the very moment when it was about to fall under the yoke of the Mahometans.

Thus the Spaniards and Portuguese, instead of making common cause for their common salvation, instead of investigating the perils which so nearly threatened them-an investigation which involved no less than the question, whether they should pass from freedom to slavery, from the curile chair to the scaffold-lost their time in dividing between them the possession of Monte Video, together with the small territory around it in South America, which ought to belong neither to Spain, nor to Portugal. Their differences on this subject were the principal causes of the Portuguese never having entered into the system of defence for the Peninsula. If the Portuguese army had occupied the centre of Spain, it would not have endangered their own liberty. And yet in the midst of all this, it cannot be doubted, that the two Peninsular governments, during the, last months which preceded their fall, were composed of men devoted to the good cause.

7th. Their having so entirely neglected the army. We might say much on this subject, but we will confine ourselves merely to a few words. It is sufficient to observe on one hand,

that the government did not decree a levy of recruits, to fill up the battalions and squadrons so named, but which were so incomplete as hardly to deserve the name of companies, till after the French had entered Spain; on the other hand, the government contrived so effectually to disgust the troops of the Constitutional regime, that they revolted against them of their own accord, without having any leader in whom they placed much confidence. The King, so far from co-operating in the treachery of the troops, was forced by them to follow their example.

These are nearly all the principal causes of the downfall of the Constitutional government of Portugal; whence it appears that this country can never obtain freedom, unless Spain is also free. We must not let this opportunity escape of observing, that the English are the worst possible judges of political affairs on the continent. In fact, before the insurrection broke out in Portugal, the wisest and best-informed politicians in London were never satisfied with praising the conduct of the Portuguese government, and admiring the perfect state of tranquillity which prevailed among that people, concluding that they had been long more ripe for liberty than the Spaniards. We could mention many other proofs in support of our opinion with respect to the ignorance of the English on the affairs of the continent, but in so doing we should digress too much from our subject.

We will finish this article on Portuguese liberty by observing that it is hardly to be expected that the hereditary Prince, now Emperor of Brazil, will long reign in that country, which must naturally end, like the other American colonies, in a republic. If the unhappy Portuguese have the misfortune to remain long under an arbitrary dominion, it is difficult to say which is most to be desired on the throne, the present Emperor of Brazil, or the Prince Don Miguel.

FALL OF PIEDMONTESE LIBERTY.

If the revolution of Piedmont had broken out fifteen days before its actual appearance, we may presume that neither Italy nor the south of Europe would this day groan beneath the yoke of despotism. Nay, had the rumor of it reached General Pepe in the Abruzzi, it is probable the consequences might have been of the utmost importance. The burst of freedom in Piedmont might then have been fatal to the Austrian power in Italy, or at least would have greatly retarded the fall of the Neapolitans; but no such fortunate circumstance arose to save those devoted nations!

The ruin of Piedmont was inevitable, when the liberty of Naples fell a victim to the inexperience of the parliament, and to