Spain which had been swore to, as he himself says in page 236? Finally, I must remind him, that when I had the command-in-chief of all the forces of the united kingdom, and the superior officers and generals of the army were presented to me in a body, he himself addressed me aloud in these words, "What you have done, has rendered you superior to all of us lieutenantgenerals, your colleagues, and hence we see you with pleasure at the head of the army, and we will obey you." Why did he thus express himself, if he disapproved of what I had done? Why did he gather the fruits of a revolution which was contrary to his principles, by occupying the situation of minister of war, a situation he would never have obtained without it?→ Why did he take the oath?

4th. The General in several pages of his book abuses the national parliament; and in page 184, he says, that almost all the deputies were chosen by the carbonari by force of arms; yet he afterwards declares, (page 186) that only seventeen of them were carbonari.

5th. All the documents published by the General go to prove the partial disorders which took place in his division. What general, desirous of exposing the faults of his troops, cannot find means of so doing? But can he assert that a single cry was heard in favor of absolute power? His troops disbanded without seeing the enemy, as soon as they heard that, with a few troops and a small body of militia, I was abandoned without reinforcements to the Austrian army which surrounded the Abruzzi. His famous circular, page 425, completed the loss of confidence among those he commanded, and occasioned the fatal disorders which he narrates with so much complacency.

6th. As to what regards myself, among the many things he mentions, the inconsistency of which I shall notice at a proper time, he pretends that at the moment in which I entered Naples at the head of the Constitutional army, I was not safe in my own camp. After having, in his usual manner, put words of his own into my mouth, he confesses, that in the course of that very day, the troops and the national guards would have put him to death, if I, seeing his danger, had not made him take hold of my arm, which was sufficient to ensure his being treated with respect. (Page 117.) In page 41, the General says, that though I was desirous of a constitution, I should never have attempted it, if the government latterly had not shown some suspicion of my conduct. But he contradicts himself in page 33, when he asserts, that a month before the political change, I had combined the whole plan of the revolution, which being deferred by various accidents, I ordered the chief of my staff, Deconcilis, never to speak to him again on the subject. I shall now relate a circumstance, upon which I cannot, as I have been in so many other cases, be any longer silent. Some days before the breaking out of the revolution, he came to my house, having in his hand the Memoir of M. Pradt upon the Spanish revolution. I assured him in the presence of Colonel Deconcilis, that I had arranged every thing in readiness to overthrow absolute power; that ten thousand national guards organized and equipped, with several regiments, were only waiting my orders; but that nevertheless, having only the good of the nation in view, and remembering also that he was my senior, I would with pleasure give up to him the direction of the enterprise. Carascosa, however, adduced many reasons in which I could not agree, and refused my offer, so that afterwards I took care to leave him in ignorance of my intended operations. He praises me much for resigning in the assembled parliament my command-in-chief (page 182), but he suggests that in my heart I was unwilling so to do; an unusual method this of writing history with impartiality. The General condemns me (page 189), because on my resignation of the command I walked on foot among the people, as if during my command I had

fallen into the opposite extreme.-Why does he not relate, that having presented me in the first days of the political change in the name of the Duke of Calabria, with an order on the Treasury, that I might appear with more splendor during my command, I would not accept it? In short, after the General has employed many pages in explaining his manœuvres, which were always performed at the distance of about fifty leagues from the enemy, he comes to the conclusion, that the Austrians, who by forced marches from the Po had succeeded in surrounding the Abruzzi, would never have begun hostilities, if I had not provoked them to it, and that otherwise they would have left me time for assembling the whole of the division, and of forming an intrenched camp at Aquila, for which operations I should have required at least a month. It is then the decided opinion of General Carascosa, that I was wrong in attacking the Austrians, and in distrusting their kindness and pacific intentions; while he, on the other hand, was perfectly right in shutting himself up in his headquarters, nine days' march behind me, notwithstanding the instructions he received from the Prince Regent. In the 5th article of the instructions signed by the Duke of Calabria, it is said, "If the enemy shall declare himself by advancing with the greater part of his troops on the Abruzzi, General Carascosa shall assist General Pepe by his manœuvres and by his troops." This is one of the documents which General Carascosa forgot to insert among the 564 pages of his volume, but which will be found in my narrative published in London in 1822. This circumstance, alone, is sufficient to convince the public, that the fatal reverses, which we unfortunate Neapolitans experienced in 1821, ought not to be imputed to the nation at large.

THE END OF NO. XLVII.

ADVERTISEMENT.

In the absence of the Marquess of Hastings, his friends have deemed it expedient to print some copies of the following Summary of his Lordship's Administration in India, with a view to the information of the Proprietors of India Stock. A transcript of this Document was left in the hands of some of his Lordship's Friends, and of certain of the Public Authorities, previously to his late departure from the country.

SUMMARY,

&c. &c. &c.

THE solicitude which every one of just feelings must experience to prove his having adequately fulfilled an important trust, ought in my case to be increased by the peculiar nature of the office which I have held. The extent and multiplicity of its functions are little understood at home; and still less are those circumstances comprehended, which called on me for exertions beyond the ordinary demands of my situation. If those unusual efforts were not necessary, they either risked improvidently the welfare of the Honorable Company, or they were illicit aggressions on weak, unoffending native powers. It thence behoves me to justify the principle and the prosecution of the measures alluded to. The exposition will be short, because it aims not at submitting any detail of operations. A statement of the ground on which each material determination rested, will enable every one to decide on the equity, as well as prudence of the course adopted; while the general result may answer whether the main object of the Honorable Company's financial prosperity was duly kept in sight, during those complicated transactions. The facts asserted are so supported as not to admit of controversy. Proofs of them are for the most part in the hands of the Court. Where that is not the case, the

official vouchers will be found in the Appendix: and it is hoped it will appear, that whatsoever were the advantages attained for the Honorable Company, the interests of our country at large have been simultaneously promoted; the comforts of the Indian population being at the same time signally consulted.

I entered on the management of affairs at Calcutta, in October 1813. My first view of them was by no means pleasing. The treasuries of the three presidencies were in so unfurnished a condition, that the insufficiency of funds in them to meet any unusual charges (and many such menaced us) excited considerable uneasiness. At that period the low credit of the bonds, which had at different times been issued as the securities for monies borrowed, made eventual recourse to a loan seriously discouraging in contemplation. As twelve per cent. discount on the above securities was the regularly calculable rate in the market, when no immediate exigency pressed on us, the grievous terms to which we must have subscribed for a new supply of that nature, in an hour of alarm, could not be disguised to any foresight. Under this embarrassment, an attempt had been made by the preceding Government to provide in a partial degree for the anticipated difficulties, by curtailing the annual disbursement, so as to leave a surplus of receipt. What are called the military charges, the provision for all warlike objects, offensive or defensive, had appeared the only head of expenditure in which a saving of efficacious magnitude could be made. The paring-knife was thence applied with rather an undiscriminating hand to many of the articles of the military establishment, which had till then been deemed indispensable towards a tranquil tenure of the country. As it was matter of simple arithmetical measurement, the contemplated surplus was produced; but it was attended with circumstances which had not been taken into reckoning. Let it not be supposed that I am insinuating a censure on an expedient, to which the Government was pressingly urged by financial difficulties. The limit within which a reduction of disbursement in the military branch would not entail mischief, was perhaps not to be computed without trial. As it was, experience showed that hazard had been incurred in a degree quite unapprehended. The saving had principally arisen from a great diminution of our armed force. The operation of such a measure was not confined to the question of sufficiency for eventual defence; nothing would mislead the judgment more than a parallel between the employment of the Indian army, and that of our military at home. The native troops are, in fact, the police of India; the Burkendauzes, or armed attendants of the magistrates, being totally inadequate, if not supported by the regulars. Hence the complication of duties resting on the soldiery is