TO THE

RIGHT HON. LORD MELVILLE.

MY LORD,

HAVING your Lordship's permission to address you on the subject of British Seamen, I shall take a slight review of our Marine, since the commencement of the war, in 1793, to this time. I shall also try to fix your attention on the means of our retaining our rank of first maritime power; to which purpose it will be necessary to render ourselves equal to at least half, or three-fourths, of the maritime powers united: and the experience of the late American war must have convinced even those unacquainted with nautical affairs, that there is but one means of maintaining a decided superiority, and that is to have always a sufficient number of regularly bred seamen.

In 1793 we had the greatest number of regularly bred seamen we ever possessed, arising from a peace of ten years-a time almost requisite to form able seamen; at least it will be universally admitted that seven years are necessary for that purpose; and a much longer experience is indispensable to the formation of offi

cers.

At that time the fleets of our enemies were manned with many regularly bred seamen: also the first actions of the war were generally well contested by our enemies; but it was at that period when our ships were so well manned that our decided superiority became conspicuous, particularly after the victory of Nelson. The loss they sustained in seamen in that memorable engagement, combined with preceding defeats, destroyed the confidence of their men, and with it their pretensions to maritime power. But we must also date from that period the inattention to procure good seamen, arising from excess of security which was displayed in our own navy, with progressive effect, till the commencement of the American war, as well as the consequent disregard to the merchant service, both as to ships and men.

After this time, the Navigation Act also was not so particularly attended to as it ought to have been, making every due allowance for the circumstances of the times. Hence originated the cause of so much foreign shipping having been employed by British subjects, which was in many instances unnecessarily done; and unfortunately this practice still exists to this day; thereby preventing the use of British shipping, and the rearing of British seamen. The allowing ships to run with small force and few men; say ten guns and fifteen men; whereas no ship ought to be allowed to run, in time of war, with less than sixteen guns, and from fifty to sixty men at least, constituted another cause of the decline of British seamen, and why so many were not comparatively reared as in the war of American independence. I knew one ship in that war to have had thirty-nine servants belonging to her; which had of course the effect of augmenting the number of seamen. At the commence

ment of the late American war, when we had to cope again with regular bred seamen, (to use a seaman's phrase, we were taken all aback,) it was then found that our ships, generally, were not manned; that our discipline had not been regularly attended to: in fact, that we had not regularly bred seamen to man half the ships of our navy. When I say this, I am well aware that the American ships in general were of a larger size, had more guns, heavier metal, and were manned with seamen; yet we had some instances where the only difference was, their being manned with regular bred seamen but to those advantages we certainly ought to have opposed superior talent for command and greater expertness of discipline; whereas this does not generally appear to have been the case. It proves what I have advanced to your Lordship, viz. that the character of a seaman is peculiar to himself, formed from early youth; and it will ever raise him superior to other men, while acting on his peculiar element.

After twenty-two years war, when we ought to have to boast (if proper methods had been adopted) of having a greater number of regular bred seamen than this country ever before possessed, there never were fewer for the last sixty years than at the present time. The cause, there is no doubt, arises from the improper mode of impress, which is attended with the most wanton insults, both to officers and men of merchants' ships, through the improper conduct of your officers sent on that service, and of those to whom. they too often intrust it, who are, generally speaking, the refuse of mankind. This irritates the minds of men; and impresses on the minds of our youth an aversion to our naval service, which is seldom ever after eradicated. Both officers and men are torn, with such wanton disregard, from their ships, that the latter are left without help to aid them into port; and when help is procured, it is frequently at a great expense to the owner. Hence the decided

preference, in all foreign voyages, which is given to foreigners over Englishnien, as men or apprentices.

Another cause of the evil, to which I have directed your Lordship's attention is, that, in the war just terminated, the navy was more divided than at any former period, from the merchants' service; in consequence of which distinction, few, if any, brought up in the latter, could have any hopes of advancing in the former. The view of this subject fully, in all its bearings, I know will never be listened to by naval men: however, when France shall have acquired regularly bred seamen once more, and America a small navy, and a junction be effected between both, then the acknowlegement will be made, when it shall be perhaps too late, that the superiority of your navy must arise from the merchants' service. As that period must sooner or later arrive, some regulations ought to be made which give seamen a chance of promotion, as they are more likely to prove efficient officers, than the generality of navybred officers are to become seamen. That it is too general a doctrine in the navy, that a man may be a good officer and not a good seaman, cannot be denied that a man may perform as an officer certain duties under the command of another, I can easily conceive; but that any man is fit to command a ship, or manage a ship's company of seamen, who is not a seaman, I most resolutely deny. The person exercising command should have no superior in that knowlege which is the first point of his profession, and on which his own judgment ought to decide; and this applies particularly to seamen, who, of all other men most despise their superior when he is deficient in professional skill.

Having had some opportunities through life to form a judgment of the education given to young men trained for the navy, I am sorry to say, few are taught the real duties and requisites of an officer, and few indeed the real duties and tactics of seamanship. This was fully exemplified in the general mutiny, when, to the best of my remembrance, I only read of one solitary instance of an officer having performed his duty under such grave circumstances. This will appear almost incredible, but I believe it to be the fact.

I do not think, my Lord, that, with the present ideas of seamen, any mode for raising men for the navy without impress can be immediately adopted; particularly at the commencement of a war, or in a certain emergency, although I have no doubt but it may be brought about in the course of time, by properly training the minds of our youth following the sea. Registering-men by tonnageand giving a pension-three plans proposed before this time to do away the impress-all have their good points: yet as the welfare of this country depends on her maritime power, and as there is a rising state consisting of people the same as ourselves, having all the hardihood and enterprise of Britons, it becomes more than

ever necessary to adopt some plan by which the youth who follow the maritime service may be impressed with a love of their country; and if they are to have their rights and privileges, as Britons, encroached on, it will be necessary to secure to them such rights and privileges as are connected with their profession. Besides, this is but a common act of equity and justice; and when it constitutes the only safe means of our navy, almost every other consideration ought to give way to it.

When I consider the expressions of men on negro slavery, and the tender feelings they manifest on that subject, I cannot reconcile their indifference to the hardships sustained by the defenders of their country, to whose services, hardihood, and courage, this country owes its great political consequence mainly. What must be the feelings of men returning from a long voyage, having a wife, children, or friends, when dragged away, and, perhaps, sent off again, without seeing them, for years; and these men brought up with ideas of liberty! Compare their sensations with the feelings of a negro, whose ideas are contracted, and who is, more or less, a slave in his own country; yet our philanthropists, whilst they whine over the hardships of the one, appear totally insensible to the more exquisite feelings of the other. On the treaty of peace, I think, some expressed that they would rather have ten years of war than that the slave trade should not be abolished. I ask you, my Lord, if such had been the case, and these kindhearted humane individuals had been called on, or dragged away, to serve their country, if they would not have altered their opinion immediately?

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Such being the case, who can blame the man that leaves the country where he does not raise those feelings of compassion towards his situation, which are expressed for the native of Africa? Think seriously, and reflect, on what I have advanced on this subject, for it involves the continuance of our naval ascendancy, and consequently our commercial advantages. You must endeavor to dispense with foreigners; lay down fixed rules for impress, and adhere to them; and then you will have British seamen: this will prevent desertion, lower wages, and cause us to retain that superiority over other nations, which it is the object of the present letter to promote.

Having so far considered the cause of the want of seamen, and their aversion to the navy, I shall now offer what I conceive necessary to do it away-1st. It is necessary that the officers of the navy should be taught, that one of the first duties of an officer is to gain the confidence and good-will of the men by example and regular conduct, for this is the foundation of good discipline. Example will always have ten times more effect than rules. They