object of obtaining judges who will favor the unions. The Socialist party in its platform, recently adopted for the coming presidential election, has declared for the election and recall of Federal judges by the people.

In our scheme of government, the people set up over themselves a supreme law embodied in our constitutions which can not be overthrown by law-making assemblies but which can only be changed or superseded by the people themselves so acting for such a purpose. To guard and uphold our Constitutions, both State and Federal, we have conferred upon our Courts the previously unheard of and enormous power to say that a statute conflicting with the fundamental law, is null and void. Under this theory of a limited Constitution, Alexander Hamilton says in his great paper in the Federalist entitled "An Examination of the Judiciary Department" that "the complete independence of the Courts of Justice is peculiarly essential." Again in the same masterful paper, Hamilton says:

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"The standard of good behavior for continuance in office of the judicial magistracy is certainly one of the most valuable improvements in the practice of governments. In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws. That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals which we perceive to be indispensable in the Courts of Justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed either to the executive or Legislature, there would be danger of improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a dis

position to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws."

The Federal Constitutional Convention affirmed the life tenure of the judiciary by an unanimous vote, so greatly were they impressed with the desirability of life tenure. They deemed the risk of the continuance in office of an incompetent judge a less evil than a subservient judiciary. Yet with the excellence of the English and Federal systems always before them, the States have almost with unanimity elected their judges for shorter terms. Frequent elections are an incentive for opposition. Efficiency is promoted by the experience of long continued service.

In Georgia we have attempted the impossible by expecting good results from judges appointed or elected always for short periodical terms. We have failed to recognize the fundamental principles so powerfully asserted by Hamilton. If we have obtained many excellent judges and some great ones, it was in spite of the system we were using, a tribute not to the method, but to the high resolve of the men who were not contaminated by the many subtle influences calculated to drag down the character of the most incorruptible.

At different times when this subject has heretofore been under discussion by the Association, the suggestion has been seriously offered that it be made the duty of the Supreme Court to nominate eligibles for the Superior Court bench. This innovation, designed probably to prevent politics in the selection of judges, would have just the contrary effect. The plan in my opinion, is objectionable in the extreme. It would mean a merger of judicial and executive functions. The Supreme Court judges would be drawn into politics with a vengeance. Constantly they would be subjected to the importunity and solicitation of aspiring candidates and their friends. Their judicial duties would be interrupted and they would be continually harassed with partisan claims.

Given tenure of office during good behavior, or for a long number of years, as in New York State where Supreme and Appellate Court judges have a 14-year term of office, even election by the people produces good results. In Maryland the people elect, but the term of office is 15 years. The system is reported satisfactory. On the whole, however, I firmly believe that appointment by the Governor is the method of selecting our judiciary which would secure most satisfactory occupants of the bench. Presidential appointments to the Federal bench have been uniformly excellent with apparently but the single design of obtaining men best fitted by character, training and talents for their high and important station. A Governor is himself responsible to the people. It is reasonable to suppose that every Governor will, in all probability, be respectable, reputable, and have a fair degree of ability. To confide to him the serious duty of selecting judges to administer the law, would be a sobering influence upon any man and an inspiration to justify the confidence of the people in him by appointing only men of proved ability and of admitted character to so important a post. Centering such a responsibility in the Governor, the spot-light of fierce and just criticism would make him hesitate long before he knowingly abused or proved recreant to his trust. Appointments by the Governor should, of course, be subject to confirmation by the Senate. The nomination of a good man would rarely be overruled. On the other hand, any substantial deficiency in a nominee of the Governor would be known or ascertained by the Senate and such nominee would meet with certain rejection. A two-thirds vote of the Senate would be preferable. It is a proposition, demonstrable almost with the precision of mathematics, that one man in whom. the responsibility was lodged, could more efficiently analyze, investigate and determine the merits and demerits of a prospective subject for the bench than the whole mass of people themselves. I am not apprehensive that any

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Governor could or would build up a powerful political machine for selfish advancement provided the terms of the judges were fixed either during good behavior, or for a long period of years, not less than twelve. Of course, the change from our present system should be effected gradually so that it would not fall to the lot of any one Governor, either now or hereafter, to appoint all the judges. The wisdom of appointment by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, has been well exemplified by the excellence of the appointees of Governors during the last twenty years, to fill unexpired terms as the result of vacancies caused by death or resignation. Justices Beck, Gilbert, George, Atkinson and Hill, of our Supreme Court, were all first appointed by Governors to fill vacancies, and have since been continued in office by the people without opposition. The great Judge Bleckley was first an appointee of a Governor. In point of continuous services, some of the oldest and best judges of our Superior Courts, were originally appointed to fill vacancies.

No Governor, in my recollection, has abused this power of appointment, and named either an unworthy or an unfit man to the bench. All have on the other hand, earnestly endeavored to make appointments of the highest type. It is true that generally appointments were confined to friends of the Governor, but once the position was cepted and the oath of office taken, partisanship was left behind. So why, if otherwise suited, should we object to a lawyer for the bench merely because he was a friend of the appointing power? It is rarely probable that judges appointed by the Governor will ever have occasion to pass judgment on matters in which the Governor in his private capacity is a party. But it always happens that a judge elected by the people, will have to pass upon an issue to which both political friend and foe are parties. Then whatever the judgment be, suspicion and distrust follows. My emphatic views on the entire subject can

not be more forcefully presented and aptly expressed than by using the words of a great Englishman, both a profound student and admirer of our Constitution. James Bryce, in his American Commonwealth, says:

Mr.

"The American State bench has suffered both from the too prevalent system of popular election and from the scanty remuneration allotted. To procure men of character, learning, and intellectual power, and to secure in them that public confidence which is now sometimes absent, ample remuneration must be paid, a life tenure secured, and the appointments placed in responsible hands."

Our English ancestors by the Revolution of 1688, overthrew James II and then accomplished early in the reign of William and Mary the immobility of judges in office in place of the previous tenure at the pleasure of the king. The despotism of the crown was thence restrained, justice was enthroned, and that type of English judge made possible which has since evoked the admiration of the world. Let us remember the lesson and interpose a like barrier to protect the impartial and stable administration of the law by judges who render righteous judgments but do not please popular fancy. The times are not without hope that the people themselves realizing the iniquity of our present system, are ready for change to a sane and sound system. I have heard many jurors, litigants and members of the laity so express themselves. We have had an over-dose of almost unlimited democracy. Many are ready to right about face. The pendulum has swung too far. Our problem is to save from the assaults of the socialist and all the new faddists and theorists in government, the glorious heritage handed down to us of a representative republican form of government. An independent, stable and upright judiciary is the bulwark of our liberties. Without it we can not have that impartial and complete protection to persons and property which is the paramount duty of government.