perplexed the patience and wisdom of the South? How long will it be before there will be added to that structure a plank of religious intolerance? The grant of power does not produce forbearance, but on the contrary, creates greed and hunger. In the Virginia Convention John Marshall asserted: "I hope no gentleman will think that a State will be called to the Bar of a Federal Court * * * that it is not rational to suppose that its sovereign powers will be dragged before a Court." And yet Georgia suffered that very fate in Chisolm v. State. Thoughtful lawyers who love their State are prone to show some alarm at the modern trend toward the destruction of State rights and the enlargement of the Federal powers. They apprehend the danger, and ought to sound the alarm. Many of the present day innovations are grotesque and amusing. Simply leave them alone and they will live their short day and die without harm to the State, but when fundamentals are assailed, when the foundation of good government is attacked, no faithful lawyer can stand idle in the market place. THE REVIVAL OF PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. ANNUAL ADDRESS BY DEAN OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY. In Coke's Second Institute, a book published by order of the Long Parliament which was little less than a Bible to the founders of our polity, the oracle of the common law, commenting upon the famous twenty-ninth chapter of Magna Charta, quotes Vergil's description of Rhadamanthus dispensing justice to the shades: "Gnossius hic Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna, Castigatque auditque dolos, subigitque fateri,” and in another place: 66* * leges fixit precio atque refixit.” Thus, says Coke, "The philosophical poet doth notably describe the damnable of hell. * * * proceedings of the judge * First he punisheth and then he heareth, and lastly compelleth to confess and make and marre lawes at his pleasure; like as the centurion in the holy history did to St. Paul: For the text saith, 'Centurio apprehendi Paulum jussit et se catenis ligari, et tunc interrogabat, quis fuisset et quid fecisset.' But good judges and justices abhorre these courses." Such is the conception of the public administration of justice in which the Anglo-American has been trained for centuries. We had taken it as definitely established in the seventeenth century that, except for summary proceedings necessary to preserve the peace from imminent disturbance, neither the acquisitions nor the activities of the individual were to be interfered with otherwise than in accordance with settled rules of law invoked in a |