and the sum of twenty sous a league was offered to each dame and each girl, to pay the expenses of her journey home. It appears by the records, that the second pupil who left the school after the promulgation of this decree was Marie Anne de Buonaparte. Napoleon, then captain of artillery, having come to Paris upon business, resolved to remove his sister from the dangers to which she and her associates were exposed. In a wretched carriage the future Emperor and the future Princess of Lucca and Piombino set out from St. Cyr, on the evening of the 2d of September, 1792. The young captain little thought that in a few short years he should revisit that place to examine his Imperial Military School.

The fearless resolution of the dames delayed for a time the day of their final dispersion. They began to depart on the 30th of April, 1793, and on the 1st of May the last of their number bade adieu to their ancient home, by a solemn prayer at the tomb of Madame de Maintenon. Some of them returned to their families, but several of their number spent their days at Versailles in public instruction. The building served for a military hospital. The body of Madame de Maintenon was dragged from its grave, and, amidst the shouts of a brutal soldiery, was thrown into a hole in the cemetery.

In the year 1800 the house was appropriated to the use of a college called the Prytanée Français. In 1802, M. Crouzet, the director of the college, exhumed the corpse of Madame de Maintenon, and with solemn ceremonies interred it in the court, which was overlooked by the apartments that she had formerly occupied. He erected a monument to her memory, and surrounded it with weeping-willows. But the remains of the poor woman were not long suffered to repose. In 1805 the Prytanée was changed into a military school. Gen eral Dateil, who presided over it, destroyed the monument, tossed the decaying body into a rough box, and packed it away in a garret, among piles of old furniture. There it remained for thirty years. In 1837 Colonel Baraguay d'Hilliers, then commandant of the school, obtained permission from the Minister of War to erect a monument in the chapel to the distinguished patroness of the Royal House of St. Cyr.

He found, in the grave where she had first been buried, the remains of her coffin, some spices, the heel of a woman's shoe, a little ebony cross, and some fragments of linen and of parchment. These and the bones, which had been lying neglected in the garret, he carefully placed in an oaken box, and enclosed them in a mausoleum of black marble, which bears this simple inscription:

CI-GIT

MADAME DE MAINTENON.

1635-1719.

1836.

It is the only relic of the royal house of St. Cyr which can now be found at the Ecole Militaire.

ART. IV. A Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Opinions of the Judges thereof, in the Case of Dred Scott versus John F. A. Sanford. December Term, 1856. By BENJAMIN C. HOWARD, Counsellor at Law, and Reporter of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 389 to 633.

THE decisions of courts are required by law to be promulgated, printed, and published. The reasons of the decision are to be stated, to enable the court to expound the principles of law, and show their bearing on the case; as also to give assurance of the permanency of the rules of law, and of the wisdom and impartiality of their application, by reference to other decided cases. The court may thus justify its conclusions to the jurisconsult, and secure the confidence of the community, while it settles the rights of litigants. The promulgation and publication of judicial opinions is one of the greatest safeguards of the purity of judges, and of the impartiality of their judgments. Published opinions become a part of the literature of the day. They are submitted to the

criticism of the country. The law, the logic, and the morality, embodied and set forth in these carefully studied productions, are the legitimate subjects of examination and criticism. The greater the authority of the writers, the more dangerous are their errors. And the more important the public interests affected by them, the more imperative is the duty of pointing out their errors, or of vindicating their claim to confidence and respect. Moreover, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are in no sense sectional, but national topics. Their validity, their mode of operation, their bearing on the civil status of individuals and classes of men, it is the concern of our whole people to investigate and determine. While, therefore, we have felt it our duty, in a Review intended primarily to represent the thought, sentiment, and literature of the nation, to avoid subjects of sectional controversy, this very consideration seems to force upon us the cognizance of a decision, or rather of a series of opinions, emanating from a tribunal which constitutes the judicial mind and conscience of the country, taken collectively.

The plaintiff brought this action of imprisonment, in the Circuit Court of the United States, to try his right to freedom. That court, after sustaining their own jurisdiction against a plea in abatement, rendered a final judgment against the plaintiff on the merits, and in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff then brought a writ of error to the Supreme Court, to obtain a reversal of that judgment, and the establishment of his right.

The judges deliver their opinions seriatim, each in his own language, touching at greater or less length such points as he chooses, and referring with approbation or otherwise to such parts as he pleases of the opinions of any of his brethren. Nevertheless, the argument of the Chief Justice is called the opinion of the court, for what reason does not appear on the face of the report. Only one judge expresses his concurrence with the whole of it, and even he manifests a dissatisfaction with a part of it, by rearguing it for himself. Others express assent to different parts of it, or dissent from the whole. No arguments of counsel appear; but the case is argued by the judges with much zeal, and at great length, and by some of

them with great ability and learning, without any apparent partiality or improper respect to the rights or interests of the parties or either of them, but, on the part of most of them, with a keen and steady view to the political results of the examination. All but two members of the court finally agree to turn the plaintiff out of court, as he came in. On what grounds this is done, they have agreed in no common and authoritative annunciation. With two or three exceptions, each judge may now, or hereafter, with perfect consistency, aver his concurrence or nonconcurrence with every proposition contained in the report, except such as he has published in his own name. On what points they agree or disagree must be ascertained, if at all, by analyzing, classifying, and comparing what each one has said, in regard to every point discussed in the case. This we will now attempt to do.

The matter which the court first encountered was the plea in abatement, and the first question concerning it was whether it was legally before them for adjudication. This is a question of practice. It must have been before the court, in some form, on the docket of every term since the court was established. Cases are here cited upon it, running through a period of more than half a century. And yet the honorable court do not know what the law is upon this point of practice. The Chief Justice says: "Doubts are entertained by some of the members of the court, whether the plea in abatement is legally before the court upon this writ of error." The question must therefore be argued at length, as an original question, and decided by a major vote, if such a vote can be obtained. It is so argued; and every judge, more or less directly, and more or less at large, expresses his views upon it. We shall see who and how many are the doubters, and who sustain each side of the question.

Mr. Chief Justice Taney says: "The plea in abatement is necessarily under consideration; and it becomes, therefore, our duty to decide whether the facts stated in the plea are or are not sufficient," &c. Mr. Justice Wayne is of the same opinion, concurring, as he says he does, entirely in the opinion of the Chief Justice, "without any qualification of its reason

its conclusions" on this or any other question in the

case. Mr. Justice Daniel says: "The question first in order presented by the record in this cause, is that which arises upon the plea in abatement." The idea that it "has been displaced or waived, is regarded as wholly untenable." Mr. Justice Curtis says: "When there was a plea to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, in a case brought here by a writ of error, the first duty of this court is, sua sponte, if not moved to it by either party, to examine the sufficiency of that plea." Mr. Justice McLean says: "The plea to the jurisdiction is not before us, on this writ of error." Mr. Justice Catron says: "The proceedings on the plea in abatement are not open to the review of this court by a writ of error." Mr. Justice Nelson says: "There is some question" about this matter; but he adds: "In the view we have taken of the case, it will not be necessary to pass upon this question, and we shall therefore proceed at once to an examination of the case upon its merits." He of course is one of the doubters. Mr. Justice Campbell says: "My opinion in this case is not affected by the plea to the jurisdiction, and I shall not discuss the questions it suggests." He therefore does not concur in the opinion, that the plea is necessarily before them, and that it is their duty to decide it. Mr. Justice Grier concurs "in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Nelson on the questions discussed by him," of which this is one. He however says: "The record shows a prima facie case of jurisdiction, requiring the court to decide all the questions properly arising in it."

Such is the predicament of the court on this first point of the case. Four judges are of one opinion; two of the opposite; two will give no opinion, and one is divided. When Mr. Chief Justice announces, as he does, "We think theythe plea and demurrer, and judgment of the court below upon itare before us upon this record," he is sustained by Justices Wayne, Daniel, and Curtis only. There is no majority in favor of anything; but a majority against everything suggested; unless it should be claimed that Judge Grier is in favor of something, in which case it would clearly be impossible to prove the contrary from any disclosure he has made of his views on this point in his published opinion.

Notwithstanding this position of the first question, the Chief