THE late political storm struck the ship of state at its weakest point, and as these storms return periodically there seems to be a kind of common consent that some substantial repairing or rebuilding must be done. The experience of mankind and the testimony of writers on civil polity agree that an elective monarchy is, of all governments, the most liable to disquiet, violence, and the peril of disruption. In this category they include elective chief-magistrates of sovereign states, by whatever name they are called, and however limited may be their powers. Our ancestors determined upon a form of government which gave us a single elective head, clothed with as great powers as any monarch not absolute, and they trusted to escape the dangers attending his election, not only by the contrivance of distinct electoral colleges of States, but by the aid of many conservative and counteracting provisions, circumstances, and habits, upon which it was not unreasonable in them to rely. But now, not only is the contrivance of the electoral colleges evaded, but many of those things upon which they relied have disappeared from the body politic, and new practices and new elements of danger have shown themselves which they could not be expected to foresee. No one proposes to abandon or materially change the feature of the single elective head of the administration; but, whether by amendments proposed by Congress or by VOL. CXXIV. NO. 254.

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the agency of a convention, it seems plain that some changes must be made touching the method of his election. At the same time some provisions must be arranged to secure the proper counting and ascertaining of the vote, which, though in the nature of details, are yet important; but there is one subject which seems to go far deeper, and to touch the wellsprings of our political life, about which little has been said, and this we propose to treat of first.

Election by General Ticket.

Under the power allowed by the Constitution to each State to appoint the electors of President in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, it is familiar history that many of the States at first chose electors by their legislatures, and South Carolina continued that mode of choice until the Rebellion. Gradually the people asserted their preference for the choice of electors directly by themselves. As each State was entitled to as many electors as it had Senators and Representatives in Congress, that is, two for the State, as such, and one for each member of the House,they naturally chose one elector for each congressional district, and the two electors at large, either by the legislature or by the vote of the whole people of the State, and at length by the latter method only. This mode of choosing electors, namely, two by the vote of the whole State and one by the vote of each congressional district, was the safest and fairest method ever adopted. But causes came soon into operation which destroyed it. Having the right to determine its method of appointment without interference by Congress, the State legislatures began to require the choice of the whole college of electors on a single ticket voted for by the people of the whole State, instead of by single districts. Before that change, large States were often very nearly equally divided in their vote. In the contest between Mr. Adams and General Jackson, for instance, the district electors of New York were equally divided, while the two electors at large were carried for General Jackson.

This change did not come from any desire of the people themselves, but was rather the contrivance of the political managers and electioneering experts, who saw in it a great increase of their own power and importance. While the electors were chosen by single districts, the vote of an electoral district of New York or