66 due in respect of the most recently imposed rate, and by arrears of rate" were meant sums due in res pect of by-gone rates. The plaintiffs having shown a right to sums due in respect of the most recently imposed rate only, Held, on special demurrer, that the count was bad, and that the Court could not construe "rates' to be synonymous with "arrears of rate," the plaintiffs by their pleading having affixed to those expressions distinct meanings. C. P. The Guardians of Ballinrobe Union v. Browne 546 5. A count in an action for poor's rate, due in four Electoral Divisions of the Union, averred, as to two of those Electoral Divisions, publication of notice of the rate having been made, but omitted to aver such publication as to the two other Electoral Divisions; Semble, that the count was bad in regard to the two latter Electoral Divisions. Held, however, that the cause of action being divisible, the demurrer should have been confined to the bad part of the count; and that having been aimed at the whole count, the demurrer must be overruled as too large. Ibid 6. In an action for poor's rate, brought against an immediate lessor by the Guardians of the Union, the plaintiffs may combine in one declaration, or in one count of it, claims for rate due from the defendant in respect of several Electoral Divisions of that Union. Semble in this case, and so Held in Castlebar Union v. Browne (infra, in notis.) Ibid 7. In a count for poor's rate, Semble in this case, and Held in Castlebar Union v. Browne (infra, in notis), that the parties who allowed the rate, and their authority to do so (under 6 & 7 Vic. c. 92, s. 10), were sufficiently set forth by an averment"that one A B, to wit, a paid officer, who was then and there the Chairman of the day of the said Board, and one C D, and one E F, to wit, two 8. paid officers, to wit, two Guardians, then present at said Board," &c., allowed the rate. Ibid In an action against an immediate lessor for poor's rate, the plaintiffs were stated to be "the Guardians of the Poor of Ballinrobe Union." In a similar action the plaintiffs were stated to be "the Guardians of the Poor of Castlebar Union." Semble in the former case, and Held in the latter, that the description of the plaintiffs' title to sue was sufficient. Ibid 9. In an action against an immediate lessor for poor's rate, it is not necessary to state the respective numbers (as appearing in the rate-book) of the several rateable hereditaments in describing them, generality of statement in this respect being admissible, as the defendant may obtain all necessary information on the subject from the rate-book.-Semble in this case, and Held so in Castlebar Union v. Browne (infra in notis). Ibid 10. A count, in an action against an immediate lessor for poor's rate, stated that the defendant became liable to pay the amount of the said rate so remaining due and unpaid as aforesaid by the defendant in respect of the said hereditaments, situate, &c., for which respectively he as such immediate lessor was by virtue of a certain Act of Parliament "in due form of law rated as aforesaid. Whether this referential averment, in the absence of any other allegation, that the defendant was rated, is sufficient, Quare? A special demurrer to this count, assigning as cause of demurrer that the count did not state "how or in what manner the rate was imposed, or how the defendant is liable to the said rate," was held not to point out with requisite precision the insufficiency of the above referential averIbid ment. POOR RATE. See POOR LAW, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. POSSESSION. 1. In an ejectment on the title, brought to recover "the Dummilly estate," the will of the Bishop of Ferns, who was in possession of and residing at Dummilly-house in 1786, was given in evidence; and by that will he devised all the lands and hereditaments of which he was seised in the county of Armagh, to N. A. Cope and Sarah his wife, for their joint lives, and the survivor, with remainder to their first and other sons in tail male, with remainder to their issue female. The will also contained a power to tenants for life to create a charge not exceeding £4000. The lessor of the plaintiff was sole daughter of that marriage, and claimed under the second remainder in tail. Held, that evidence of the Bishop's possession of one denomination of the estate, viz., a lease of Lissheffield, and payment and receipt of rent under that lease, was admissible as evidence of possession of the whole estate by the Bishop, coupled with evidence of the receipt of rents from 1795 to the period of the death of the last tenant for life, out of the whole lands which were known as the Dummilly estate. Q. B. Lessee Garland v. Cope 514 2. The power of charging was exercised in 1818 by the tenant for life; and in 1838 a younger son, not in possession, executed a deed assigning a sum of £1000, part of his portion of the £4000 charged on the estate. Held, that the deed of 1818 was admissible in evidence as being against the interest of the party making it; it is not merely a declaration by the tenant for life, but a substantive act done by the possessor of the estate. Held, that the deed of 1838 was admissible, on the same principle, as being executed by a person interested in the estate, both deeds showing that the Dummilly estate was enjoyed under the limitations in the will, and therefore evidence of seisin in fee of the Bishop of the whole. Ibid its passing, and the line to be formed according to the course delineated in the plans, and where they afterwards obtained an Extension Act containing no clauses dispensing with the Company's obligation to form the line: Held, that a mandamus to the Company commanding them to set out and purchase all lands necessary to make and complete a portion of their Railway, and to take all necessary proceedings so as to have all such land purchased, would not be granted on the application of a private individual through whose lands a portion of the Railway was to run; such applicant not appearing to represent the public in any capacity, nor resting his application on other than private grounds. Q. B. Murphy v. The Great Southern and Western Railway Company 219 2. To a declaration for calls by a Railway Company, the defendant pleaded that he was not before or at the time of the commencement of the action, nor is, a holder of the shares in the declaration mentioned, or any of them, in manner and form as is in the declaration alleged; and further pleaded that the Company, with others, did fraudulently enter into a contract for a purchase of the Royal Canal, upon conditions inconsistent with the terms of their Act, and without any lawful authority; and that the calls were made for payment of that purchase and not for the purpose of the Railway. Held, on demurrer, that such special pleading was bad, the defence amounting to the general issue. Q. B. The Midland Great Western Railway Company v. Bourke 297 RAILWAY CLAUSES CONSOLI- See LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDA- RAILWAY SHARES. See DEPOSIT. RATE. See POOR-RATE. RECOGNIZANCE. See ERROR, 4. RECORD. See CRIMINAL INFORMATION, 2. RECORDER'S COURT. See BOROUGH Court. REGISTRY. By the 5 G. 4, c. 159, s. 1, the Hibernian Joint Stock Company are enabled to sue in the name of the Governor or Secretary for the time being of the Company; and by the 2nd and 3rd sections a memorial of the names of the persons forming the Company is to be enrolled in the manner prescribed by the Act, prior to which enrolment they are not at liberty to sue. A declaration stated the plaintiff to be the Secretary of the Company, but did not aver that any such registry as required by the Act had been made. Held, on demurrer, that the omission of this averment was immaterial. Q.B. Fottrill v. Willans 482 RENT. See LEASE, 4. NOTICE OF Rent due. REPLICATION. See PLEADING. RETAINER. See ATTORNEY, 3. RETURN. See LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDA- REVIVAL. See SCIRE FACIAS. RULE TO PLEAD. See PLEADING, 49. SALE. See EVIDENCE, 4. 1. A contract for "the cargo of the ship S." is not a contract for the specific cargo of the S., and does not stand on | 3. This Court will not allow a scire the same footing as a contract for the sale of a specific chattel; such words imply a sale of the cargo, if it answer the description given by the purchaser. Q. B. Malcomson v. Morton 230 2. Semble. If a party purchases an article, whether specific or not, the value of which is fluctuating and uncertajn, on a stipulation that it is of a certain quality, he is at liberty to reject it if it does not agree with the description, and sue for the value which it would have borne if it answered the description. Ibid 3. On a contract founded on this note : "Sold Messrs. M., &c., per Mr. C. C., the cargo of the Science from Smyrna, say about 1250 quarters of Indian corn, as per sample, at £12. 15s. per ton, payment cash, less one-half per cent., to be taken from alongside the vessel, free of charge except weighing and measuring ;" and these words were added by the agent of the plaintiffs: "I agree to send boats alongside as soon as I hear of the vessel being ready to discharge." Held, that such words so added did not imply a condition, the performance of which it was necessary to aver in the declaration. SAMPLE. See EVIDENCE, 4. SALE, 2, 3. SCIRE FACIAS. Ibid See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE of, 3, 4, 5. 1. The Court will not, as against an executor de son tort, permit the revival of a judgment. Semble. C. P. O'Malley v. O'Malley 78 2. Where an interlocutory judgment had been obtained against a feme dum sola, and before final judgment she marries, the proper course is to enter a suggestion, and there is no necessity to apply for a scire facias to revive the judgment. Q. B. Coates v. Shields 216 4. facias to issue for the revival of a judgment, where that judgment has been assigned, and there has not been any payment on foot of it to the assignee, unless there be some evidence, other than the affidavit of the assignee, to show that there was something due on foot of the judgment at the time of the assignment. Where it appeared that the conusor was a party to the deed of assignment, by which the assignor covenanted that there was a sum then due on foot of the judgment, the Court considered that there was sufficient evidence. C. P. Agar v. Phaire 330 Scire facias issued at the suit of A B, the assignee of a judgment, averring in the ordinary manner the execution, by the conusee, of the deed of assignment, and according to the form of the statute, "as by the memorial and record thereof remaining in our said Court, &c., manifestly appears." Plea executio non, because the conusee did not assign, transfer, or make over the said alleged judgment debt and damages in the scire facias mentioned to the said A B modo et formâ, &c., concluding with a prayer of judgment. Held, on special demurrer, that the plea was bad. C. P. Assignee of Lynch v. Kennedy. SEAL. See EVIDENCE, 10. SECURITIES. See GOVERNMENT STOCK. 341 SERVICE OF PROCESS. SERVICE, SUBSTITUTION OF. 1. Semble-That where there has been by an order of the Court a substitution of the service of a capias ad respondendum, it is not necessary that an affidavit should be filed verifying the service originally effected by the process-server. And at all events, it is irregular to apply to set aside the subsequent proceedings for want of such affidavit, without first seeking to set aside the order for the substitution of service. L. E. Morris v. M'Cormick 45 2. Where the defendant being confined in a private Lunatic Asylum, the process-server gave copies of the writ and notice at foot, and showed the original to the proprietor of the asylum (who refused to let him see the defendant) and to the defendant's brother, who was managing defendant's business in the house of the latter, the Court ordered that service of the writ of capias and of the order upon the defendant's brother, who was conducting the defendant's business on his behalf, and on the keeper of the Lunatic Asylum, be deemed good service of the defendant; serving upon the brother and keeper the particulars of the plaintiff's demand, and transmitting second copies of the process, order and said demand to the keeper of the Lunatic Asylum, to be by him transmitted to the person who pays for the maintenance of the defendant. L. E. Vance v. O'Connor 60 3. Order for the substitution of service of a capias ad respondendum, under certain circumstances, upon the niece of a defendant, who resided with him. C. P. Fottrell v. Armstrong 70 4. This Court will not substitute service on a partner resident within the jurisdiction, for his co-partner out of the jurisdiction, though the debt be sworn to be a partnership one. Q. B. M'Cann v. Thomson 201 SETTING ASIDE PROCEEDINGS. See PAYMENT INTO COUrt. Pleading, 44, 47. 1. Semble-That where there has been by an order of the Court a substitution of the service of a capias ad respondendum, it is not necessary that an affidavit should be filed verifying the service originally effected by the process-server. And at all events, it is irregular to apply to set aside the subsequent proceedings for want of such affidavit, without first seeking to set aside the order for the substitution of service. L. E. Morris v. M'Cormick 45 2. Where there being no affidavit of service of process upon two of three defendants, who had been included in the same capias, and yet the plaintiff entered parliamentary appearances for them, and declared jointly against all three; the Court refused to set aside the proceedings, but ordered the declaration to be amended by striking out the names of the parties who had not been served. L. E. Morris v. Scully 4. Where the only affidavit of the service of the writ was that of the processserver, which stated that he personally served the defendant with a writ of capias ad respondendum dated the 1st of February 1847, returnable the 17th of February 1847, with a notice at foot directing the defendant to appear at the return thereof, being the 17th day of April 1847; the Court set aside the parliamentary appearance and subsequent proceedings, upon an affidavit by the defendant "that he was not served with any process in this cause by J. M. the process-server, or by any other person, and never knew of the institution of this suit until the Sheriff of the Queen's County entered his house and seized his goods and chattels at the suit of the plaintiff." L. E. Mooneys v. Purcell 51 5. The Court will not allow a declaration to be amended by adding Counsel's |