should be equivalent to £5000 of the £3 per cent. annuities, and £4000 to be exchanged for so much of the £3 per cent. reduced annuities as should be equivalent to £4000 £3 per cent. annuities, and said stocks to be transferred into the name and to the credit of R. C., without any authority to the traverser to sell, negociate, transfer, or pledge the said £9000 £3 per cent. annuities; and that the traverser, in violation of good faith, and contrary to the purpose for which the £9000 were entrusted to him, unlawfully sold and converted the same to his own use. Held, that stock in the £34 per cent. annuities is not a valuable security within the meaning of 9 G. 4, c. 55, under which this indictment was framed. Q. B. Regina v. Lanauze 407 2. Held also, that the indictment, averring a total absence of authority to sell, transfer, negociate, or pledge, was at variance with the special purpose for which it alleged the annuities to have been entrusted to the traverser, and that therefore judgment should be arrested. Ibid

GRAND JURY CESS. The occupier of a stall in the market of the city of Cork, for which he pays a weekly rent to the Corporation of Cork, who are the owners in fee of the soil, and who preserve a general control over the market, is liable to be rated to grand jury cess; he occupying it by the sale of meat during the day, leaving in it at night a desk under lock and key, and other property; and the circumstance of the servants of the Corporation shutting the outer gates in the evening, so that none but the servants of the Corporation can remain therein during the night, does not affect the occupier's liability. Q. B. Waugh, petitioner; The Treasurer of Cork, respondent

GUARANTEE.

451

1. A being indebted to B in several sums of money, C, the son of A, enters into

the following guarantee in a letter written by him to B:-"At the request of my father, who informs me of your having proceeded on a certain judgment obtained by you against him, contracted by an advance made by you to W. M., which judgment you have proved under proceedings at the suit of R. H. F., and under which proof both my father and myself expect your demand will be paid and discharged: if, however, contrary to this expectation, there may be any disappointment in the payment of it, I hereby engage to pay or secure, in the event of my father dying before the demand can be satisfied, provided no further proceedings are carried forward or taken; and at the same time I have to inform you, that my father and myself intend submitting in a short time an arrangement to his creditors, which we confidently hope will meet their wishes, and which, when submitted to you, I shall of course consider this letter of no effect." This letter being objected to by B as an insufficient guarantee, the following letter was then written by C, addressed to B:-"At the request of my father, who informs me of your having proceeded on a certain judgment obtained against him by you for an advance made to the late W. M., which judgment you have proved under proceedings at the suit of R. H. F., and under which proof we had hoped your claim would have been discharged. Should, however, my father's death take place before an offer can be made to you, together with other creditors, for the payment of both you and them, to the extent within my power to accomplish, and which I am making every exertion to effect as soon as possible, I shall consider myself bound to pay you such an amount, agreeable to your wishes of being secured against the casualty I have mentioned occurring before an arrangement could be offered, provided all proceedings cease." The first three counts of a declaration, founded on the first of these letters, set

out the consideration thus:-" That no further proceedings should be carried forward or taken by B against A on the judgment, and that B would give time to A in his lifetime for the payment of said sum of money; and the fourth count set forth a similar consideration on the latter of these letters. Held, that the letters did not sustain the declaration, the true meaning of the guarantee being, that all proceedings in the suit of R. H. F. should cease. Q. B. Carr v. Dunne 202

2. Held also, that the two letters did not constitute one guarantee, but that the one was a substitution for the other. Ibid

3. D. on his marriage in 1819, executed bonds to his trustees, payable at his death, and not in his lifetime, save at the option of his trustees. B having obtained a judgment against A, assigned it to D., who assigned this judgment over to his trustees as part payment of those bonds. D. then

filed a charge on foot of this judgment in a cause then pending in the Court of Chancery, in the name of B, and in B's name instituted an action on the above guarantees. Held, D. was an incompetent witness in such action, he being a person in whose immediate and individual behalf the action was brought. Ibid

GUARDINS, POOR-LAW. See PLEADING, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20.

HABERE.

Where a tenant after the execution of an habere was allowed to remain in possession under the provisions of 9 & 10 Vic. c. 111, s. 8, the Court will not order the habere to be renewed without a previous demand of possession. Q. B. Lessee Knox v. Gildea 198

HIBERNIAN JOINT-STOCK

COMPANY.

See PLEADING, 11.

1. An indictment stated that R. C. entrusted to the traverser, being a broker and agent, for a special purpose, a certain valuable security, to wit, a certain amount of Government stock, to wit, the sum of £9000 in the new £3 per centum annuities, the said special purpose being as followsthat is to say, that the £3 per cent. annuities should be exchanged for two portions of two other stocks, to wit, £5000, one part thereof to be exchanged for so much of the £3 per cent. consolidated annuities as should be equivalent to £5000 of the £3 per cent. annuities, and £4000 to be exchanged for so much of the £3 per cent reduced annuities as should be equivalent to £4000 £3 per. cent annuities, and said stocks to be transferred into the name and to the credit of R. C., without any authority to the traverser to sell, negociate, transfer, or pledge the said £9000 £3 per cent. annuities; and that the taverser, in violation of good faith, and contrary to the purpose for which the £9000 were entrusted to him, unlawfully sold and converted the same to his own use. Held, that stock in the £3 per cent. annuities is not a valuable security within the meaning of 9 G. 4, c. 55, under which th

407

INTERPLEADER.

1. In order to enable the Sheriff to move for an interpleader order under statute 9 & 10 Vic. c. 64, notice of the intended motion must be given as well to the execution creditor as to all the adverse claimants of the goods seized under the fi. fa. by the Sheriff. C. P. Alexander v. Connell 325 2. To entitle him to such an order, an application to the Court, or a Judge in Chamber, must be made by the Sheriff at an early period after he has been made acquainted by the parties with their respective claims. Ibid 3. Form of order calling upon the rival claimants to appear before the Court, where they have not appeared upon a special motion by the Sheriff for an order of interpleader. Ibid

4. Where under the Interpleader Act a Sheriff has been permitted to lodge in Court moneys levied by virtue of a fi. fa.; in the contest before the Court for that sum between the execution creditor and the counter-claimant, the right to begin rests with the latter. C. P. Alexander v. Handy

328

JURISDICTION.

2. This Court will not grant a mandamus to the Master of this Court, commanding him to review his taxation of costs under the 8 Vic. c. 18. Q. B. In re Scully v. Great Southern and Western Railway Company 292 3. Where a peculiar jurisdiction is given by statute, that does not exclude the Common Law jurisdiction of this Court, unless there be an express exclusion. Q. B. Lessee of the Corporation of Waterford v. Newport 359

JURY.

See SPECIAL JURY.

JUSTICES.

See MAGISTRATES.

JUSTIFICATION.

In a plea justifying trespass under process of an Inferior Court, it is not enough to state that the defendant levied his plaint for a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of such Court; the plea should also show that the trespasses complained of were committed within the jurisdiction. Q. B. Butler v. Bianconi 286

LANDLORD AND TENANT. See LEASE.

PLEADING, 37.

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT.

1. A writ of mandamus recited the B. and B. Railway Act, and its incorporation with the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, and Railway Clauses Act, and after setting out the 68th section of the last Act, stated that the prosecutor was in the occupation of a piece or parcel of ground adjoining the said railway, &c.; and also in occupation of another piece or plot of ground, strand or slob, adjoining, &c., and running back to low-water mark in the Belfast Lough, &c.; and that he had erected a dwel

ling-house, &c., and that his principal inducement for so doing was the situation of said property contiguous to the sea, affording facilities for the enjoyment of sea bathing, fishing and shooting; that the Railway Company had raised an embankment upon and over a portion of the lands in his occupation, and by reason thereof he and his family were excluded access to the sea; that by notice he had called on the Company, specifying the accommodation works required to be made by them in consequence of the interruption to the use of his lands, &c.; and that they were not works with respect to which he had agreed to receive compensation instead of the making of said works; that the Company declined to execute the same and concluded by commanding the Company to make such communication under the railway as should be necessary for the purpose of making good the interruption caused by the railway to the use of the lands in the prosecutor's occupation. The return set out several notices to treat, served by the Company on the prosecutor for the purchase of his lands, and then set out the 94th section of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, and averred that the land divided by the railway embankment was and is of much less value than the expense of making a communication between the intersected lands; that the Company called on him to sell the said piece of land, and that the prosecutor failed to treat, and that they then offered him compensation, and he declining, they summoned a jury to assess the compensation; that the prosecutor did not attend before the jury, and that the Company then required a surveyor to make the necessary valuation of the premises, the amount of which valuation they tendered the prosecutor, who refused to receive the same; and that they then paid the same into the Bank of Ireland, and that the lands in question thereby vested in the Company. Held, on

2. Held also, that the words "such land," in the 94th section of that statute, refer to the general heading of the enactment, and do not refer to land in a town, or land built upon, in the 93rd section. Ibid

3. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the taxation of costs by the Master, under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. Q. B. Tennant v. The Belfast and Ballymena Railway Company 290

4. The Court will not grant a mandamus to the Master of this Court, commanding him to review his taxation of costs under the 8 Vic. c. 18. Q. B. In re Scully v. The Great Southern and Western Railway Company

LEASE.

292

See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OFf, 1.
PLEADING, 5, 6, 7, 37.

1. A lease was obtained from the Corporation of D. in 1785, by an Alderman of the Corporation, of certain premises, the subject of the ejectment, for a term of sixty-one years, which expired in 1846; this lease vested in a freeman of the Corporation, who, in 1842, prior to the Municipal Act coming into operation in D., surrendered it to the old Corporation on getting from them a new lease for ninety-nine years, at nearly one-half the rent reserved in the original lease, on payment of £700 as a fine. In an ejectment on the title to recover possession of these premises, brought by the existing Corporation, a resolution of the old Corporation was given in evidence, by which it was referred to viewers and auditors to report what sum of money ought to be paid

by way of fine for renewal, and tenants to be entitled to a lease upon the terms specified. Held, that the new lease for ninety-nine years was executed in pursuance of the resolution, and not by reason of any particular dealing or original contract entered into or made after the disabling statutes. Q. B. Lessee Corporation of Drogheda v. Holmes

348

2. Held also, that such resolution came within the words of the statute 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 100,"in pursuance of some resolution." Ibid

3. All leases exceeding the period limited by the 3 & 4 Vic. c. 109, s. 12, made by a Corporation since 1836, are void, unless they come under the exceptions in that section. Q. B. Lessee of the Corporation of Waterford v. Newport 359

4. A, by indenture, demised to B certain lands, habendum for three lives, at the yearly rent of £187, with the usual clause of distress and re-entry for non-payment of this rent. The lease also contained an agreement by B not to sublet or assign without leave first obtained under the hand and seal of A, and that so long as B should perform the covenants and agreements therein contained, A would be content with the yearly rent of £93. 15s. 2d., payable on the same days as the first reserved rent of £187. Held, that the larger rent thereby reserved was not a penal rent, and that ejectment was maintainable for its non-payment. Q. B. Lessee Lord Ashtown v. White

5.

400

A Corporation executed a lease on which an ejectment was brought, which lease was signed by the members of the Corporation individually, and purported to be made "under their seal." There was no evidence that they possessed a common seal. Held, that the body being assembled when the seal was affixed, it was their common seal pro hâc vice, and that the lease was admissible in evi