Bank of the United States would cease its efforts for, and its hopes of, a re-existence, and would endeavor to perform its duty to the country, by closing its affairs with as little injury as possible to any individual or public interest, the state banks would be able to extend their loans, confidence would be restored, and the pressure upon the money market would soon cease. Apprehension, a just apprehension of the hostile movements of this great institution, is the most powerful cause of the present scarcity of money. This scarcity must exist so long as this apprehension continues. How, then, is it to be allayed? would seem to be the pertinent inquiry. The honorable senator from Massachusetts answers us by the bill upon your table. Recharter the bank; appease the monster by prolonging its existence, and increasing its power. I say, no, sir; but act promptly and refuse its wish; destroy its hope of a re-charter, and you destroy its inducement to be hostile to the state institutions. A different interest— the interest of its stockholders-to wind up its affairs as profitably to themselves as possible, becomes its ruling object, and will direct its policy. The more prosperous the country, the more plenty the money of other institutions, the more easily and safely can this object be accomplished; and every hope of a continued existence being destroyed, that this will be the object of the bank is as certain as that its moneyed interest governs a moneyed incorporation. Mr. President, this is unquestionably the opinion of the country. Look, sir, at the files of memorials upon your table, and however widely they may differ as to their views of the bank, they all hold to you this language, 'act speedily, and finally settle the question.'

"But we are told, sir, that the country cannot sus

tain the winding up of the affairs of this bank. Is this so? What does experience teach us upon this subject? The old Bank of the United States, within four months of the close of its charter, was more extended in proportion to the amount of its capital than the present bank is at this moment, and still it is almost two years to the close of its charter. The old bank struggled as this does for a re-existence; the country was then alarmed; memorials in favor of the bank were then, as now, piled upon the tables of the members of Congress; the cries of distress rung through these halls then, as distinctly as they now do ;-nay, more, gentlemen were then sent here from the commercial cities to be examined upon oath, before the committees of Congress, to prove the existence and the extent of the distress; business was then in a state of the utmost depression in all parts of the Union; commerce was literally suspended by the restrictive measures of the government ; trade was dull beyond any former example; property of all kinds was unusually depressed in price; and the country was on the eve of a war with the most powerful nation in the world. Still, Congress was unmoved, and the old bank was not re-chartered. Such is the history of that period, and, with the final action. of Congress, all knowledge of the distress ceased. Who has ever heard of disasters to the business of the country, proceeding from the winding up of the old bank? I, sir, can find no trace of any such consequences. I do find that, in a period of about eighteen months after the expiration of the charter, the bank disposed of its obligations, and divided to its stockholders about eighty-eight per cent. upon their

stock.

"It is now admitted, on all hands, that the country

is rich and prosperous in an unusual degree; property of all kinds is abundant; commerce is free, and extensive, and flourishing, and business of every description is healthful and vigorous. If then, we cannot, in this condition of things, sustain the closing of the affairs of this great moneyed incorporation, it is safe to assume that the country will never see the time when it can do it. Grant it longer life and deeper root, and in vain shall we try in future to shake it from us. It will dictate its own terms, and command its own existence. Indeed, Mr. President, the whole tendency of the honorable senator's argument seemed to me to be, to prove the necessity of a perpetual bank of this description ; and we have been repeatedly told, during the debate of the last three months, that this free, and rich, and prosperous country, cannot get on without a great moneyed power of this description to regulate its affairs. The bill before the Senate proposes to repeal the monopolizing provision in the existing charter, and the honorable senator tells us that this is to be done that

Congress may, within the six years over which this is to extend the life of the present bank, establish a new bank to take its place, and into which the affairs of the old may be transferred, so as to be finally closed without a shock to the country. Sir, this is not the relief I seek. My object is the entire discontinuance and eradication of this or any similar institution. We are told the distresses of the country will not permit this now. When, sir, will it ever permit it better? When will the time come, that this odious institution can be finally closed with less distress than now? Never, while cupidity obeys its fixed laws; never, sir, never! "This distress, Mr. President, did not exist when we left our homes; we heard not of it then; it commenced

with the commencement of our debates here; and I doubt not it will end when our debates end, and our final action is known, whatever may be the result to which we shall arrive. It must necessarily be temporary, and it does not prove to my mind the necessity of a bank, but the mischiefs a bank may produce. I care not whether it be or be not in the power of the bank to ameliorate the evils now complained of. That it can cause them in any manner, is proof that, if the disposition exist, it can cause them at pleasure; and this very fact is the strongest evidence, to my mind, that no institution, with such a power, ought to exist in this country.

"Sir, the subject of our present action involves two great first principles: one of constitutional power, and one of governmental expediency. Upon neither should our action be governed solely by considerations of temporary derangement and distress in the money market. Revulsions in trade and business, and pecuniary affairs, will happen. They must be temporary ; the country will restore itself, and money will again be plenty; but the settlement of important principles must involve consequences of an enduring character,-consequences which will exert an influence for good or for evil, through all time."

Early in the session, Mr. Clay introduced in the Senate two resolutions-the one declaring that the reasons given by the secretary of the treasury for the removal of the deposits, in his report to Congress, were insufficient and unsatisfactory; and the other, having reference to the President of the United States, which was modified previous to the final vote thereon, so as to read as follows:

"Resolved, That the President, in the late executive

proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." The debate on these resolutions was protracted to a late day in the session, and called out the most powerful talent in the Senate. All the prominent members of that body spoke on the subject. The clashing and collision of so much intellect in the fiery debate, it was terrible to witness. The relation which the bank sustained to the government as its fiscal agent; the extent of the discretionary authority of the secretary to control the funds; the power of removal and appointment to office; and the right to censure or impeach the President; were reviewed at length. It was a severe school to a new member like Mr. Wright; but he sustained himself, even above the expectations of his friends. On the 26th of March, 1834, he delivered one of the most touching and forcible speeches that was made upon the resolutions, and which elicited the highest encomiums from those who heard it.* "Mr. Wright," said the correspondent of an opposition paper in the city of New York, "argued long in defence of the full and complete power of removal from office given to the President; and, taking the ground as formerly by Mr. Benton, that the President was amenable criminally, and subject, if guilty, to impeachment by the House of Representatives, the Senate, he concluded, as his judges, ought not to entertain the resolutions; that the resolutions were not relevant, and if relevant, there was nothing in the facts to support them. After arguing upon all these, and urging much in deprecation of the proceedings the Senate was about to take, to blast the character of one whose actions, commencing in the * See Appendix.