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"(1) In a glove sewing machine, the combination of an intermittently revolving feed-disk, with a second feed-disk, forming frictional contact therewith, and turning on the end of a curved supporting arm arranged, above the feed-disks, to leave a free space below the same, substantially as and for the purpose set forth."

This claim was rejected by the examiner on the fifteenth of November, 1877, upon reference to the Polmateer patent of November 23, 1875, and a few days thereafter it was amended, and again presented as follows:

"(1) The feed-disks, D, D1, arranged with respect to the remainder of machine, and their curved support, D2, to leave a subjacent space for handling the work, as shown and described."

The claim, as amended, was again rejected on the twentieth of November, 1877, the reference being the same. The complainant knew of the action of the examiner in this respect, and wrote to his solicitors on the seventh of December, 1877, reiterating the demand that the first claim referred to should be retained. He also had frequent consultations with them through an interpreter. The first claim of the reissue had therefore been the matter of discussion between the complainant and his solicitors, and between the solicitors and the officials of the patent-office. It had been deliberately rejected, and the ruling was acquiesced in by the solicitors, December 14, 1877. In the spring of 1880 the defendant commenced the sale of the infringing machines. Besides the defendant's, other rights intervened; the arrangement of the feed-disks being shown in English and American letters patent granted to Wollenberg and Priesner, the latter being dated August 6, 1878. The complainant, on discovering that he could not maintain a suit against the defendant upon his original patent, promptly applied for a reissue.

Upon these facts, can the reissue be sustained? The impression obtained on the argument was that the complainant had made a meritorious invention, and the record has been examined with care to discover, if possible, some theory upon which the patent can be lawfully upheld; but it is thought that there is no way of fairly distinguishing the case in hand from the well-known adjudications upon this subject. No proposition can be advanced in support of the reissue that does not find an apt and ready answer in the language of the courts. Every avenue of escape is closed. Among many authorities, the following have been selected as particularly applicable and decisive of the questions involved: Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U. S. 96; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1137; Coon v. Wilson, 113 U. S. 268; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 537; Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 355; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Leggett v. Avery, 101 U. S. 256; Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350; New York Belting & Packing Co. v. Sibley, 15 Fed. Rep. 386; Arnheim v. Finster, 24 Fed. Rep. 276; In re Hatchman, 26 O. G. 738. Great stress is laid upon the fact that the complainant is a Frenchman, and unfamiliar with the English language. He was, it is said,

ignorant that the claim in dispute had been finally omitted until a fortnight before the application for the reissue. Should such excuses be accepted by the courts? These questions must be determined upon broad and general principles. The march of the law cannot be arrested or diverted from the broad and traveled highway, to deal specially with each isolated and peculiar transaction. No two cases are precisely similar, and the rule should not be changed because of slight variations upon the facts. Ignorance of domestic law is never an excuse, nor is ignorance of fact, when it is traceable to the culpable negligence of the party who seeks relief. Were it otherwise, inadvertence and mistake would be synonymous with willful and intentional neglect. To hold that the complainant's failure to understand our language exonerates him, would lead logically to the conclusion that a patent might legally be reissued to a foreigner which would be held invalid if reissued, in like circumstances, to an American. There was enough in this case-far more than ordinarily appears-to put the complainant on his guard; to induce him, at least, to have his patent read, and, if need be, explained, in order that he might ascertain the full extent of the government grant to him. Instead of pursuing this obviously prudent course, he waited supinely for over two years, and now, when other rights have intervened, he answers the charge of laches by saying that he did not know what his patent contained. The law will not permit him to do this. To every patent the public is an indirect party. It is for the advantage of the whole people that all meritorious inventions shall be protected, but it is clearly the duty of the courts to see to it that the public is not required to pay tribute for that which may be fairly considered as abandoned by the inventor.

But, irrespective of the question of laches, Leggett v. Avery, Arnheim v. Finster, In re Hatchman, New York Belting & Packing Co. v. Sibley, Mahn v. Harwood, supra, and Shepard v. Carrigan, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, (Sup. Court, February 1, 1886,) are authorities for the proposition that when a claim has been examined and rejected by the commissioner, the rejection acquiesced in by the patentee, or his solicitor, and the patent reissued without the claim, there is no inadvertence, accident, or mistake which entitles the patentee to a reissue. His remedy is by appeal.

The bill is dismissed.

HUDNUT V. LAFAYETTE HOMINY MILLS and others.1

(Circuit Court, D. Indiana. February 22, 1886.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-HOMINY MILLS.

In a suit on reissued letters patent No. 10.057, of March 7, 1882, to Theodore Hudnut, it was shown that one of the alleged infringing machines was made in accordance with an earlier patent, and therefore heud that such machine was not an infringement.

2. SAME-REISSUE WITH ENLARGED CLAIMS.

It is not competent for a patentee, by a reissue of his patent, procured after a delay of more than 10 years, to so enlarge the scope of his invention as to cover devices, patented in the mean while, which were not embraced in the original.

In Equity.

C. P. Jacobs, for complainant.

McDonald, Butler & Mason, for defendants.

WOODS, J. Suit for infringement of reissued letters patent No. 10,057, issued to the complainant, for an improvement in hominy milis, March 7, 1882. Besides denying the novelty of the complainant's invention and the validity of his reissued letters, the defendants also deny infringement.

There are two machines, somewhat different from each other, which the defendants are shown to have made or used, and which constitute the alleged infringements. One of these is known in the record of the case as the "Sinker-Davis Machine," and the other as the "Burns Machine." The first-named machine, in the particulars in which infringement is alleged, is made in substantial conformity with letters patent No. 57,605, dated August 28, 1866, issued to J. A. Welsh, and therefore cannot be regarded as an infringement of complainant's patent, which was issued some years later. The other machines in question are shown to have been made in conformity with letters patent No. 247,882, issued to Edward R. Burns, and dated October 4, 1881. This date is earlier than that of the reissued letters sued upon, but later than the dates of complainant's original letters and the first reissue; the original letters being dated December 26, 1871, and the first reissue, (numbered 5,520,) bearing date March 22, 1873.

Now, conceding their validity as inventions, it seems to me quite evident that the Burns patent, or a machine made under it, does not infringe any claim, either of the original letters of the complainant or of the first reissue, because the combination specified in each claim thereof included the "arms, I," which are not found in the Burns device. The third and fourth claims of the second reissue, however, omit all express reference to the "arms, I," and the question arises whether or not these claims are valid, and have been infringed by the defendants.

1 Reported by Charles C. Linthicum, Esq., of the Chicago bar.

By the dates already given, it appears that this reissue was taken more than ten years after the date of the original letters, and nearly nine years after the date of the first reissue, and some months after the granting of the Burns patent. The complainant's original invention and first reissue, as I construe them, not only embraced in every claim the "arms, I," but, by force of the specifications, were confined to a particular mode of adjustment; that is to say:

"The cutters, which consist of steel plates, G, with the inner point of the cutting edges, H, projecting over a true circle struck from the axis of the shaft, are bolted to the arms, I, between them, and these arms are bolted to the lugs, F, on the plates, being laid across said plates tangentially," etc.

And in the first reissue it was added that "these holders [arms, I] constitute part of the cutters, and act, by reason of their curved shape, very effectively, in connection with the stationary cutters of the case, in cutting or breaking grain." Other effects and benefits of this adjustment are shown in evidence. Besides omitting the arms or holders entirely, the knives in the Burns device were so shaped, and fastened directly to the lugs in such manner, as to accomplish, in some particulars, directly opposite results or effects to those of the complainant's machine.

Upon this state of facts, I do not think it was competent for the complainant, by a second reissue of his patent, procured after so long a delay, to so enlarge the scope of his invention as to cover devices, patented in the mean while, which were not embraced in the original letters.

Bill dismissed for want of equity.'

THE LOTUS No. 2.1

WALKER and others v. THE LOTUS No. 2.

(District Court, S. D. Alabama. January 27, 1886.)

1. SHIPS AND SHIPPING-HOME PORT-ENROLLMENT OF VESSEL.

The word "port, as used in the system of laws relating to the importation of merchandise, has a restricted meaning, and is applicable only to a place for the collection of duties on imports; but when not so used, it has a wider and an entirely different meaning.

2. SAME "HOME PORT" DEFINED.

In the latter sense it means, not a port of entry only, but may mean also the place of residence of the owner. The "home port" of a vessel, therefore, may be a port of entry, or it may be a port or place other than a port of entry. 3. SAME-VESSEL, WHERE ENROLLED.

The location of the custom-house determines the place of enrollment; but when the place of enrollmer.t and of residence of the owners of the vessel

1 Reported by Theodore M. Etting, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar.

differ, the latter will be considered the "home port," even though the place of enrollment is in another state, if the facts of ownership and residence were known or might have been known to the material-man.

In Admiralty.

George M. Duskin and H. T. Toulmin, for libelants.

J. T. Overall and D. P. Bestor, for mortgagees.

BRUCE J. We are met at the threshold of this case with the question, what was the home port of the vessel the Lotus No. 2? She was owned by the Columbus Packet Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Mississippi, with its place of business at Columbus, in that state. This company executed to the Columbus Insurance & Banking Company, of that place, a mortgage upon the vessel to secure a debt which had been contracted to put new machinery and repairs upon the vessel. The mortgage bears date April 12, 1884, and it was received for record in the collector's office, custom-house, Mobile, April 14, 1884. The vessel was enrolled in the custom-house, Mobile, and bill of sale from John Doyle of Columbus, Mississippi, to the Columbus Packet Company was received for record, custom-house, Mobile, July 6, 1883. After the execution and record of the mortgage, the vessel continued to be engaged as a carrier of freight and passengers, navigating the rivers between the cities of Mobile, Alabama, and Columbus, Mississippi, and, while at the port of Mobile, certain parties, in the regular course of trade, and at the request of the master of the steam-boat or other agent, furnished the steam-boat with certain supplies, a statement of which accompanies the libels, and it is alleged that the supplies were necessary for the furnishing and fitting of said steam-boat to enable her to perform her voyage or voyages, and were founded on the credit of the steam-boat, and that these bills have not been paid. There are a number of these claims for which the steam-boat was libeled in this court, June 3, 1885. The vessel was sold under the order of the court, and the question arises in the case upon exceptions filed to the report of the clerk of the court, to whom the case was referred, raising the question of the priority of claims upon the fund in the registry of the court. The mortgagees, the Columbus Insurance & Banking Company, claim that they shall be paid next after the payment of the claims which are strictly maritime, about which no question is made, and the parties who furnished the steam-boat with supplies here in Mobile claim that they are entitled to priority of payment, notwithstanding the fact that these claims accrued after the execution and record of the mortgage in the custom-house at the port of Mobile. The claim of priority of payment on the part of the mortgagees is based upon the proposition that the port of Mobile is the home port of the Lotus No. 2, and that, therefore, the supplies were furnished, not on the credit of the vessel, but on the credit of her owners, and therefore they, the mortgagees, are entitled to priority of payment. The question, then, is, where was the home port of this vessel, and

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