two instruments set up constitute together but a single defense. A plea may consist of a variety of facts and circumstances. All that is required is that those facts and circumstances should give, as their result, one clear ground upon which the whole equity of the bill may be disposed of. Daniell, Ch. Pr. 607; Story, Eq. Pl. § 654; Whitbread v. Brockhurst, 1 Brown, Ch. 415; Didier v. Davison, 2 Sandf. Ch. 61.

The first plea in bar is sustained, and the bill dismissed.

UNITED STATES v. DOHERTY.

(District Court, D. Massachusetts. April 10, 1885.)

1. FEDERAL ELECTIONS-INSPECTOR RECEIVING FRAUDULENT VOTE-REV. ST. §

5511-INDICTMENT.

In an indictment for aiding or assisting in the commission of the crime of illegal voting at an election for a representative in congress, it is not necessary to state the particular acts constituting the aid or assistance, as these are mere matter of evidence to make out the offense at the trial.

2. SAME-PLACE WHERE ELECTION HELD.

Where the indictment alleges that the offense was committed "at Boston, in said district of Massachusetts, at an election for a representative in the congress of the said United States for the Fourth congressional district of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, instituted and held in said Boston on said fourth day of November, in accordance with the laws of said commonwealth and with the laws of said United States," this is a sufficient averment that the election was held in the Fourth congressional district, which is a part of Boston. 3. SAME-VIOLATION OF OFFICIAL DUTY.

An indictment that charges that defendant, as inspector of elections, knowingly and willfully received the vote of a party named, knowing that he was not a resident of, or registered in, the voting precinct, sufficiently alleges a violation of duty on the part of the defendant as officer of elections.

Motion in Arrest of Judgment.

W. K. Blodgett, for the United States.

E. L. Barney and Wm. B. Gale, for defendant.

NELSON, J. This indictment originally contained eight counts. The first and fourth counts were disposed of before trial by the entry of a nolle prosequi. The defendant, having been found guilty on the remaining counts, now moves in arrest of judgment.

The second, third, fifth, and sixth counts are founded on section. 5511, Rev. St., and charge the defendant with having aided one John F. Hayes to vote illegally for a representative in the congress of the United States for the Fourth congressional district of this commonwealth, at an election held in Boston on the fourth day of November last. In the seventh and eighth counts he is charged with having violated his duty as an inspector of elections in allowing and aiding Hayes to vote illegally at the same election.

The motion merely states in general terms that the indictment is

defective, uncertain, and insufficient, and that no crime is legally and formally set forth, without specifying any particular defect. I shall consider, therefore, only those objections made to it by counsel at the hearing.

One ground of objection, common to all the counts except the seventh, is that the indictment does not set forth the special means used in aiding the illegal acts of Hayes. But the rule is well settled that, in an indictment for aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime, it is not necessary to state the particular acts constituting the aid or assistance. These are matters of evidence to make out the offense at the trial, and it is not necessary to aver them in the indictment. U. S. v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460; U. S. v. Simmons, 96 U. S. 360.

Another objection common to all the counts is that it is not alleged that the election was held in the Fourth congressional district. The words of the indictment in each count are: "At Boston, in said district of Massachusetts, at an election for a representative in the congress of said United States for the Fourth congressional district of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, instituted and held in said Boston, on said fourth day of November, in accordance with the laws of said commonwealth, and with the laws of the said United States." This is a sufficient averment that the election was held in the Fourth congressional district, which is a part of Boston. The offense with which the defendant is charged is laid in Boston, in this judicial district, within the jurisdiction of this court.

The rule governing the courts of the United States in construing criminal indictments is that no indictment is to be deemed insufficient, nor the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon, be affected, by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant. Rev. St. § 1025. The court will take notice that the Fourth congressional district includes a part of Boston. St. 1882, c. 250. If this is a defect, which is by no means clear, it is one of form only, and is cured by the statute. It is impossible that the defendant can suffer prejudice from it. The same answer may be made to the objection to the sixth and seventh counts: that it is not alleged that the Fourth precinct of the Seventh ward of the city of Boston is within the Fourth congressional district. By the statute of the state above cited, of which the court is bound to take notice, the Seventh ward of Boston, which must of necessity include the Fourth precinct of that ward, is made part of the Fourth congressional district. To this may be added that if these counts should be adjudged defective for the reasons assigned, the verdict being general, the other counts are sufficient to sustain a judg ment. Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. 242, 250; Snyder v. U. S., 112 U. S. 216; S. C. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118.

Objection is made to the seventh count that it does not allege that the defendant violated any duty as inspector of elections; but it is charged in distinct terms that the defendant knowingly and willfully

received Hayes' vote knowing that he was not a resident of, or registered in, the voting precinct. This certainly was a violation of one of the plainest duties of an officer of elections.

Motion in arrest of judgment overruled.

WESTERN UNION TEL. Co. v. BALTIMORE & O. TEL. Co.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. 1885.)

1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-REISSUE - ENLARGING CLAIMS - MISTAKE - DILI

GENCE.

A patent cannot be lawfully reissued for the mere purpose of enlarging a claim, unless there has been a clear mistake, inadvertently committed in the wording of the claim, and the application for reissue is made within a reasonable time.

2. SAME QUESTION FOR COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS-REASONABLE TIME, QUESTION FOR COURT.

Whether there has been such an inadvertent mistake is, in general, a matter of fact for the commissioner to decide; but whether the application is made in reasonable time is matter of law which the court may determine by comparing the reissued patents with the original and, if necessary, with the records in the patent-office when presented for record.

3. SAME-WHAT IS REASONABLE TIME.

What is a reasonable time will depend upon the circumstances in each case, but as the patentee is charged with notice of what his patent contains, the court will hold him to reasonable diligence.

4. SAME-PRELIMINARY RELIEF-DOUBT AS TO VALIDITY OF REISSUE.

Where a reissue is obtained, not to correct a mistake, but to secure broad claims that will ostensibly cover more comprehensive rights than belong to the patentee, a preliminary injunction will not be granted to restrain infringement of a good claim, if the defendant has acted in the honest belief that the reissue was wholly void.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

Edw. N. Dickerson, Saml. A. Duncan, and C. L. Buckingham, for complainants.

Frederic H. Betts, Grosvenor P. Lowrey, and J. E. H. Hyde, for defendants.

WALLACE, J. The complainant moves for a preliminary injunction to restrain defendant from infringing the second claim of reissued letters patent No. 10,035, division C, granted to Joseph B. Stearns, assignor to complainant, for "duplex telegraph apparatus.' The motion is resisted upon the ground that there was no patentable novelty in the alleged invention, and that the reissue is void because it includes that part of the invention which had been abandoned to the public by the delay on the part of the patentee in applying for a reissue. The original patent was granted to Stearns, May 14, 1872; it was reissued April 1, 1873, (No. 5,344,) and was again reissued in divisions A, B, and C, February 7, 1882.

No doubt whatever is entertained that Stearns was the first and

original inventor of a very valuable improvement in duplex telegraphy, which obviated a serious practical difficulty in duplex transmission over long lines, caused by the interference of the return charge arising from static induction with the operation of the receiving instrument at the transmitting end. He did this by a new combination of old instrumentalities. He added to the existing duplex telegraph a condenser, so placed that it would receive a charge from the battery equivalent to the charge which the line at the same time received, and would discharge that charge around one coil of the relay at the same time the line discharged its charge around the other coil, so that the armature between the two coils would not be moved by the discharge from the line. As is stated in the affidavit of one of the defendants' experts, "no one before Stearns had endeavored to obviate the effects of the return current due to the static induction upon the receiving instrument in duplex telegraphy with the exception of Varley; and the device used by Varley was not a condenser, nor was it in any sense the known equivalent of a condenser."

The invention thus made by Stearns was fully and clearly described in the specification of the original patent. The claim of that patent upon one construction may be deemed to have been narrower than the real invention. This, however, would affect only the question of infringement. A new and valuable invention was described and claimed.

It is not necessary, in considering the first objection to the validity of the patent, to inquire into the prior state of the art. The defendants' expert says: "The claim does not appear to cover any more than the patentee had a right to claim in view of the state of the art at that date." This concession renders such an inquiry unnecessary, but the concession is abundantly fortified by the facts as they appear upon this motion.

The real question in the case would seem to be whether the reissue, so far as it affects the claim infringed, is void. The claim involved is as follows:

"The combination, in a duplex telegraph, substantially as herein before set forth, of a battery, a main line, and artificial or compensating line, a rheostat in said artificial line, and a condenser having its terminals, respectively, connected with said artificial lines and the earth."

The claim of the original patent reads as follows:

"In tele rraph apparatus for double transmission, the combination, with the relay at each station, of a condenser, for the purpose of neutralizing the effect of the return current due to the static induction of the line, as set forth."

If the case turned solely upon the question whether the claim of the reissue is broader than that of the original, a sufficient doubt would be suggested to require a motion for an injunction to be de nied, because a fair doubt is sufficient to defeat such a motion.

The claim of the original may fairly be construed as limited to a combination in which a condenser is employed in connection with the

relay at each station upon a duplex telegraph line. Of course a duplex telegraph implies a line with a receiving and transmitting station at each end of it. The drawings of the patent show only one end of such a line, and the specification of the original describes the apparatus in detail, including a condenser, a battery, and a branch circuit or compensating line with a rheostat in it at that end of the line shown in the drawing. It may fairly be assumed that the claim was expressed in the terms used in order to exclude any implication that the invention consisted in employing the condenser at one end of the line or at one station only. The real invention of Stearns did not require his condenser to be employed in combination with the rest of the apparatus at both ends of the line. If a condenser were used with the apparatus at one station only, the static effect of induction would be neutralized at that end of the line only. The combination would be operative and advantageous to this extent; but it would be less so than if it were used in the apparatus at each station. If condensers were placed at both stations in the required combination, signals at both could be more rapidly and perfectly received.

It admits of fair argument whether it would not have been a fair construction of the claim of the original to interpret it as meaning the combination of a condenser with the two relays of the duplex system. It would have been the duty of a court to construe the claim in such a way as to protect the real invention unless the language of the specification and the claim would preclude such a construction. The case does not turn solely on this point, however, because within 11 months from the granting of the original patent it was surrendered, and a reissue granted, which contained this claim:

"Claim 2. In an apparatus for double transmission, the combination of a condenser with a branch or compensating circuit, whereby the effect of static induction upon the receiving relay or instrument is counteracted, substantially as and for the purpose herein specified."

The specification was amended by inserting as follows:

"As the apparatus at each terminal station is similar, the diagram represents the apparatus at one station only."

In this claim every unnecessary element of the combination is eliminated. It covers the invention in the broadest form in which it can be stated. Limited, as its terms must be, by the descriptive matter of the specification, and read in view of the prior state of the art, the claim was not too broad. It does not require a condenser at each station as a constituent. In other respects, as is argued for the defendant, the claim is narrower in terms than that in the original, because it restricts the combination to one in which the condenser is employed with "a branch or compensating circuit." If this claim included as one of its constituents, by fair interpretation, "a condenser having its terminals, respectively, connected with said artifi