gree to mitigate the vindictive power of the law; and this alfo is to be exercised no other way than as he is entrufted. But if he acts, even in this capacity, by a delegated power, and in few cafes, he must act according to the ends for which he is fo entrusted, as the fame law fays, "cum magnatum & fapientum con"filio;" and is not therein to pursue his own will and interefts if his oath farther oblige him not to do it; and his minifters are liable to punishment, if they advife him otherwife: if in matters of appeal he have no power; and if his pardons have been of no value, when, contrary to his oath, he has abused that with which he is entrusted, to the patronizing of crimes, and exempting fuch delinquents from punishment, as could not be pardoned without prejudice to the public; I may justly conclude, that the king, before whom every man is bound to appear, who does perpetually and impartially distribute justice to the nation, is not the man or woman that wears the crown; and that he or she cannot determine thofe matters, which, by the law, are referred to the king. Whether therefore fuch matters are ordinary、 or extraordinary, the decifion is and ought to be placed where there is most wisdom and ftability, and where paffion and private intereft does leaft prevail to the obftruction of justice. This is the only way to obviate that confufion and mifchief, which our author thinks it would introduce. In cafes of the firft fort, this is done in England by judges and juries: in the other by the parliament, which being the reprefentative body of the people, and the collected wisdom of the nation, is least fubject fubject to error, most exempted from paffion, and moft free from corruption, their own good, both public and private, depending upon the rectitude of their fanctions. They cannot do any thing that is ill without damage to themselves, and their pofterity; which being all that can be done by human understanding, our lives, liberties, and properties, are by our laws directed to depend upon OUR author, according to his usual method and integrity, lays great weight upon proclamations, as the fignifications of the king's pleasure, which in his opinion is our only law. But neither law nor reafon openly directing, nor by confequences infinuating, that fuch a power fhould be put into an uncertain or fufpected hand, we may fafely deny them to be laws, or in any fenfe to have the effect of laws. Nay, they cannot be fo much as fignifications of his will; for, as he is king, he can have no will but as the law directs. If he depart from the law, he is no longer king, and his will is nothing to us. Proclamations, at most, are but temporary, by the advice of council, in purfuance of the law. If they be not so, the fubject is no-way obliged to obey them, and the counsellors are to be punished for them. Thefe laws are either immemorial cuftoms, or ftatutes. 004 The first /have have their beginning and continuance from the univerfal confent of the nation. The latter receive their authority and force of laws from parliaments, as is frequently expreffed in the preambles. These are, under God, the beft defence of our lives, liberties, and eftates: they proceed not from the blind, corrupt, and fluctuating humour of a man, but from the mature deliberation of the choiceft perfons of the nation, and fuch as have the greatest intereft in it. Our ancestors have always relied upon these laws; and it is to be hoped we shall not be fo abandoned by God, fo deprived of courage and common fenfe, to fuffer ourselves to be cheated of the inheritance which they have fo frequently, fo bravely, and fo constantly defended. Though experience has too well taught us, that parliaments may have their failings, and that the vices, which are induftriously spread amongst them, may be too prevalent; yet they are the best helps we have, and we may much more reafonably depend upon them, than upon those who propagate that corruption among them, for which only they can deferve to be fufpected. We hope they will take care of our concernments, fince they are as other men fo foon as a feffion is ended, and can do nothing to our prejudice that will not equally affect them, and their pofterity; befides the guilt of betraying their country, which can never be washed off. If fome thould prove falfe to their truft, it is probable that others would continue in their integrity: or if the bafe arts, which are ufually practifed by thofe who endeavour to delude, corrupt, enflave, and ruin nations, hould happen to prevail upon the youngest and weakest, it may be reasonably hoped, that the wifeft will fee the fnares, and inftruct their companions to avoid them. But if all things were fo put into the hands of one man, that his proclamations were to be esteemed laws, the nation would be expofed to ruin, as foon as it fhould chance to fall into an ill hand. It is in vain to fay we have a good king, who will not make an ill ufe of his power; for even the beft are fubject to be deceived by flatterers, and crowned heads are almoft ever encompaffed by them. The principal art of a courtier is to obferve his master's paffions, and to attack him on that fide where he seems to be most weak. It would be a ftrange thing to find a - man impregnable in every part; and, if he be not, it is impoffible he fhould refift all the attempts that are made upon him. If his judgment come to be prepoffeffed, he and all that depend on him are loft. Contradictions, though never fo juft, are then unfafe; and no man will venture upon them, but he who dares facrifice himself for the public good. The nature of man is frail, and ftands in need of affiftance. Virtuous actions, that are profitable to a commonwealth, ought to be made, as far as it is poffible, fafe, eafy, and advantageous; and it is the utmost imprudence, to tempt men to be enemies to the public, by making the moft pernicious actions to be the means of obtaining honour and favour, whilst no man can ferve his country, but with the ruin of himself, and his family. However, in this cafe, the queftion is not concerning a perfon: the fame counfels are to be followed, when Mofes or Samuel is in the throne, as if Caligula had in vaded it. Laws ought to aim at perpetuity; but the vir tues of a man die with him, and very often before him. Those who have deferved the highest praifes for wifdom and integrity, have frequently left the honours they enjoyed to foolish and vicious children. If virtue may in any refpect be faid to outlive the perfon, it can only be when good men frame fuch laws and conftitutions as by favouring it preferve themfelves. This has never been done otherwife, than by balancing the powers in fuch a manner, that the corruption which one or a few men might fall into, should not be fuffered to spread the contagion to the ruin of the whole. The long continuance of Lycurgus's laws is to be attributed to this: they restrained the lufts of kings, and reduced thofe to order who adventured to tranfgrefs them; whereas the whole fabric must have fallen to the ground in a fhort time, if the firft that had a fancy to be abfolute, had been able to effect his defign. This has been the fate of all governments that were made to depend upon the virtue of a man, which never continues long in any family; and, when that fails, all is loft. The nations therefore that are fo happy to have good kings, ought to make a right ufe of them, by establishing the good that may outlast their lives. Thofe of them that are good, will readily join in this work, and take care, that their fucceffors may be obliged, in doing the like, to be equally beneficial to their own families, and the people they govern. If the rulers of nations be retrained, not only the people is by that means fecured from the mifchiefs of their vices and follies, but they themselves are preferved from the greateft temptations to |