CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT ОР PENNSYLVANIA. FLEMMING V. THE MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY. [4 WHARTON, 59.] EVIDENCE TENDING TO PROVE A FACT must be submitted to the jury, however slight it may be. THE JURY MUst Judge the Credit and EFFECT of a witness' testimony. JURY MUST RECEIVE THE LAW FROM THE COURT and act according to its in. structions, whether correct or incorrect. RATIFICATION Of an Act Done FOR ANOTHER May be Presumed, when it is for his benefit; so held where a policy of insurance for whom it may con. cern was obtained by R., and an action was brought thereon by R. for the use of M., the owner. DAMAGES FOR WHICH INSURER OF GOODS FOR A VOYAGE is liable must be such as arose from some extraordinary disaster occurring on the voyage against which human skill and foresight could not well guard. Damages resulting from the vessel's not being seaworthy can not be recovered. COVENANT on a policy of insurance, on goods laden or to be laden on the brig Seneca, on a voyage from New York to Havana. Plea, non infregerunt conventionem. The trial was before Kennedy, J., and a jury, in Philadelphia. Evidence was received of the execution of the policy, of the shipping of goods by plaintiff, consigned to B. Mitjans, Havana, and that John Marcia, for whose benefit the assurance was obtained, and for whose use the action was brought, was the true owner of the goods. The judge charged the jury, in effect, as follows: To maintain this action the plaintiff should satisfy you that Joseph Flemming procured the policy, intending it for the benefit of John Marcia; and that Marcia was the owner of the goods, and either previously authorized or subsequently ratified Flemming's act. From the evidence, if true, it would appear that Marcia became the AM. DEC. VOL. XXXIII-3 |