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decision which you may adopt say, for the present; for such is the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success. Having read this letter, and heard Charmilly's communication, Sir John Moore gave him no reason to suppose that the intention of retreating would be given up. He retired, however, to reflect upon what he had heard.His instructions directed him to receive the representations both of the Spanish government and the British ambassador with the utmost deference and attention :-both deprecated his retreat. Charmilly had been an eye-witness of the preparations which were making in Madrid, and accounts confirming his report came from various other quarters. He was persuaded that a great improvement in the public affairs had taken place, and that it was not becoming him to fly at such a time; and he wrote, that night, to Sir David Baird, telling him to suspend his retrograde march till he heard again, and to make arrangements for returning to Astorga, should it be necessary.

Still the rooted feeling of his heart was despondency. In this very letter he expressed his fear that the spirit of résistance had arisen too late, and that the French were now too strong to be resisted in that manner. All this, he said, appeared to him very strange and unsteady; yet if the spirit of enthusiasm did arise, and the people would be martyrs, there was no saying, in that case, what a British force might do. In the morning he wrote a second letter, ordering Sir David to return to Astorga. "We must be at hand," said he, "to aid and take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our coun

try and our duty demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended." But he added,-" I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it." These were ominous words. It was apparent that he had no confidence in the patriotism of the Spaniards, nor in his own means of resisting the French, however strong the country; it was apparent also, that, while these impressions weighed upon him, he looked on with apprehension to the opinion of the English public, and that in deference to that opinion he was sacrificing his own.

While Sir John Moore was dispatching these instructions to General Baird, it was not known at Salamanca that he had changed his intention of retreating; officers and men alike were delivering their opinions loudly, and speaking of another investigation. Charmilly hearing this, and being equally ignorant of the determination which had been formed, supposed that his second letter was necessary, and accordingly delivered it. The general, not perceiving the intent for which it was written, and feeling like a high-spirited officer who thought himself injured, tore the letter in pieces, and gave vent to his indignation in violent language. Part of his anger fell upon Charmilly, and, on the following day, he ordered him to quit Salamanca. By what authority he was empowered to order an English subject to quit a Spanish town, he probably did not ask himself; and his prepossession against Charmilly, as a French emigrant, prevented him from perceiving that there were circumstances in his situation which might exempt him from a suspicion generally just, or from feeling the cruelty of thus

insulting and disgracing an officer in the British service, because he had been trusted by the British ambassador with a commission which had offended him. Charmilly respectfully represented that he had not deserved this treatment. The general replied that he did not mean to give him the smallest offence; but he repeated the order, and it was obeyed.

Sir John Moore, in his resentment against what he conceived the improper interference of the ambassador, soon, however, recollected what was due to him as the king s minister. He told him, therefore, that he should abstain from any remarks on the two letters delivered by Colonel Charmil ly, or on the message which accompanied them. "I certainly," said he, "did feel and express much indignation at a person like him being made the channel of a communication of that sort from you to me.Those feelings are at an end, and I dare say they never will be excited towards you again. If M. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, natural for you to employ him; but I have prejudices against all that class, and it is impossible for me to put any trust in him." He informed the minister that every thing should be done, for the assistance of Madrid and the Spanish cause, that could be expected from such an army as he commanded, but he could not make a direct movement on Madrid, because the passes of Guadarrama and Somosierra were in the hands of the French, and, besides, he was much too weak, until joined by Sir David Baird.

On the following day, Sir John received a letter from Dec. 7. the junta of Toledo, telling him that they intended to re-unite the dispersed armies there, and defend

the city to the last extremity. He replied, that if the Spaniards acted up to such sentiments, there could be no doubt of their ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French might gain: and he sent a British officer to reside at Toledo, and concert measures for its defence. On the 8th, he informed Sir David Baird that he should move a corps on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, and ordered him to push on his troops, by brigades, to Benevente. But, on the 9th, Colonel Graham, whom he had dispatched to Morla and Castelfranco, returned from Talavera, with tidings that these men had betrayed Madrid. The number of the French there was computed at between 20and 30,000 men, and it was said that they remained at the Retiro, not having taken possession of the city, in consequence of the temper of the inhabitants. Another part of the French army was engaged in besieging Zaragoza. From Toledo the news was equally discouraging: Victor no sooner approached that place than it was surrendered to him.

These circumstances did not induce the British general to alter his plan: his object was to threaten the French communications, draw their attention from Madrid and Zaragoza, and thus favour any movements which might be projected by the armies forming on the south of the Tagus. If no advantage was taken of it, and no efforts made, he saw that the French might turn against him what portion of their force they pleased. That they would be able to do this he expected; and he believed that nothing which his army could effect would be attended with any other advantage than the character which might be won for the British arms. He looked, therefore, to a retreat, as

an event which would soon be unavoidable; in his dispatches home, dis suaded the government from sending out reinforcements, and desired that transports might be ready, at Lisbon and at Vigo, to receive the troops; being fully persuaded that the efforts of England could be of no avail, and that it would be necessary to evacuate the peninsula.

He left Salamanca on the 12th. On the same day, Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas; and General Stuart surprised and cut off a party of French who were posted at Rueda. This was the first encounter between the British and French in Spain; and the prisoners all declared that it was universally believed the English army had retreated. On the 14th, when Sir John was at Alaejos, a packet of letters, from the head-quarters of the French army, was brought to him. Some peasantry had killed the officer who had them in charge. Among them was a letter from Berthier to Marshal Soult, directing him to take possession of Leon, drive the enemy into Galicia, and make himself master of Benevente and Zamora. He would have no English in front, it was said; for every thing evinced that they were in full retreat. A movement had been made to Talavera, on the road to Badajoz, which must compel them to hasten to Lisbon, if they were not already gone; and when they had retired, the emperor thought Soult could do whatever he pleased. It appeared, from this letter, that Soult had two divisions with him at Saldanna; that Junot was collecting another at Burgos; and that another, under Mortier (Duke of Treviso,) had been ordered to march against Zaragoza.

Sir John Moore had intended to march to Valladolid, but seeing that Soult was stronger than had been represented, he thought it better to move to Toro, and unite his army there, Baird doing the same at Benevente, from whence the two corps might be joined, either by a forward or flank movement, and strike a blow against Soult, before that general should be reinforced. The cavalry, under Lord Paget, were pushed so forward, that their patroles reached as far as Valladolid; and frequent skirmishes took place, in all of which the British displayed that superiority, which, whenever a fair opportunity is given them, they are sure to maintain. In one of these actions, a French officer of chasseurs was cut down. His cloak-bag was found to contain a silver ewer and bason, beaten close together, for more convenient packing, the handles of some silver knives and forks, a great many trinkets plundered from the churches, and an embroidered jacket, with the badge of the legion of honour. Most of our wounded were cut in the head, owing to their fantastic caps, which were worse than useless; for they afforded no protection to the wearer, and by absorbing the rain, being partly made of pasteboard, became almost unbearable in wet weather. The French helmets were not heavier, though lined with a hoop of iron, and protecting the side of the face, either with chain or bar work. On the 20th, the commander-in-chief reached Majorga, where Sir David Baird joined him. The British forces were now united : they amounted to 23,000 infantry, and about 2,300 cavalry, besides some small detachments left to keep up the communications. On the following day, the

head-quarters were advanced to Sahagun: the weather was severe, the roads bad, and covered with snow; and as the soldiers had suffered a great deal from forced marches, the general halted, that they might recover. A co-operation was also completely concerted here between the British and Romana, who was collecting the wreck of Blake's army at Leon. They were in a miserable state,-badly armed, and worse elothed, but they might occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, and, if they were defeated, would prove active in completing his destruction.

Soult had concentrated his troops, to the amount of 18,000 men, behind the river Carrion: every arrangement was made for attacking him, and orders were issued accordingly, never more welcome to a British army. The convents in Sahagun were prepared for the reception of the wounded; and the soldiers confidently anticipated a glorious vietory. Their general was less sanguine. "The movement I am making," he said to Mr Frere," is of the most dangerous kind. I not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, but to have my communication with Galicia intercepted. I wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to every individual of the army, that we have done every thing in our power in support of the Spanish cause, and that we do not abandon it until long

us.

after the Spaniards had abandoned The truth is, that nothing had been done for the Spanish cause. This, indeed, was not imputable to Sir John Moore; it was not his fault that the army had been sent too late, and to the wrong part of Spain; nor was it his fault that many of the 27,000 Frenchmen who ought to have been cut off in Portugal, were at this time between Vittoria and Burgos, under their old general, rapidly advancing against him: but he was disgusted with the misconduct of the Spanish government, and he had no faith in the patriotism of the people: his own judgment would have led him to fall back from Salamanca; and he only advanced because he knew what would be the feelings of the English public, if its army had retired without attempting any thing. Offended with Mr Frere, for having given his opinion, when he himself had asked it, he did not deem the wise suggestion of that minister, as to making a stand at Astorga, worthy of consideration. It was at once rejected, as futile; and he advanced against this detachment of the French, "bridle in hand," as he himself expressed it," and expecting to have a run for it,"-not thinking that any possible benefit could result from a victory, but seeking an excuse which might appear valid to the people of England, for evacuating the peninsula, and leaving Spain and Porty gal to their fate.

AT the hour appointed, Dec. 23. the whole force was under arms, the right column had begun its march, and the rest were in high spirits, expecting the word of command:-just at this time came a letter from Romana, with intelligence that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to Valladolid or Salamanca; and information to the same purport was received by other messengers, and also, that considerable reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia. Orders were immediately issued that the troops should go back to their quarters, and by day-break next morning, be again under arms. "In my life," says one who heard the order, "I never witnessed such an instantaneously-withering effect upon any body of living creatures! A few murmurs only were heard, but every countenance was changed, and they who, the minute before, were full of that confidence which ensures victory, were at once deprived of all heart and hope." The next

morning, General Hope fell back to Majorga, on the road to Benevente, with his own division and with Ge neral Fraser's. Sir David Baird was ordered to pass the river at Valencia and, on Christmas-day, the commander-in-chief followed General Hope, with the reserve and the light brigades; and the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve on the 26th. Sir John Moore had made up his mind to lose some of his bag. gage, and not to fight, if he could avoid it. Astorga was to be hi rally. ing point: there he informed Romana he should stand, as his retreat from thence, it necessary, would be secure, and he should be in the way to receive the supplies and the reinforcements which he expected from England. At the worst, he could defend himself, and, with Romana's aid, defend Galicia. "You may rest assured," he added, "that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary to secure my supplies from being intercepted." But his dispatches from Benevente, on the 28th,