person is convicted of the offence of bribery or PENALTIES. (b) If it appears to an Election Court or Election (c) Where an entry is made in the register of licences of any such conviction or report, it shall be taken into consideration by the licensing justices in determining whether they will or will not grant to such person the renewal of his licence or certificate, and may be a ground, if the justices think fit, for refusing such renewal. BRIBERY. Freedom of election is at common law essential to GENERAL the validity of an election. If this freedom be by any means prevented generally, the election is void at common law. An election is therefore avoided by general bribery, although not brought home to the candidate or his agents: Beverley, 1 O'M. & H. 147. But an election. will not be avoided upon this ground unless the bribery/ (n) Ante, p. 244. BRIBERY. GENERAL is shown to have been so extensive that there could not have been a free election: Bridgewater, 1 O'M. & H. 115; Bradford, ibid. 40. In Manchester, 4 O'M. & H. 121; Day's El. Cas. 5, the petition alleged that the respondent "was by his agents guilty of general corruption;" thus confounding two distinct offences, viz., corruption by an agent, and general corruption at common law. The latter avoids an election irrespective of any question of agency. The Court refused to amend the petition. Where general bribery was alleged to have been committed in one of five wards in a borough, Cave, J., said that if general corruption all through that ward had been proved, he might have held it sufficient to invalidate the election. It must, he said, depend to a considerable extent upon the majority, because, though with a small majority the bribery of ten or twelve persons might be important, it could not be so important where the majority was a large one; bribery, though confined to one ward, might affect the whole election: Ipswich, 4 O'M. & H. 70. In the latter case Denman, J., said it would obviously be unfair to avoid an election upon the ground of general bribery if the bribery had not been committed in favour of the candidate elected. See also general treating and general intimidation, post, pp. 308, 325. LAW. Ir may be doubted whether treating, properly SO AT COMMON called—that is, the giving of entertainment to voters at an election without any corrupt motive-was ever considered an offence at common law. See per Willes, J., Lichfield, 1 O'M. & H. 25. Indeed, it was not till it became excessive and extravagant, leading to enormous expense on the one hand and debauchery on the other, that complaints arose upon the subject. Moreover, the early attempts which were made to counteract the evil seem to contemplate the violation of the freedom of election as the necessary result rather than the direct object of such proceedings (a). Where, however, the giving of the entertainment was proved to have been for the purpose of influencing the election, it clearly came within the scope of the common law as a species of bribery. (a) See the titles of the early bills introduced on this subject. Even the Treating Resolution (9 Journ. 410) was only directed against the abuse of an innocent practice at elections. It prohibits excessive entertainment of voters by providing that it should not exceed the value of 107., or be given at any other place than the giver's own dwelling-house, as if not wishing to interfere with the common duties of hospitality: Herefordshire, 1 Peck. 191. On the history of Treating, see 1 Whitelocke, 387; 2nd Southwark, Cliff. 156, 232; Herefordshire, 1 Peck. 191. AT COMMON Distinction between, and bribery. From the meagre reports, in the Journals of the House of Commons of avoidances of elections before the passing of the Treating Act, it is impossible to state positively that any election was avoided for such treating; but it is not an improbable inference from many of them, and from other circumstances, that corrupt treating rather than money bribery was the means of corruption. The debate in the year 1669, on the earliest Bill introduced to prevent abuses at elections, turned as much on those "procured by entertainments of meat and drink" as on those procured by gifts of money. See also Treating Resolution passed on 2nd April, 1677, 9 Journ. 410; the Mitchell case (A.D. 1690), 10 Journ. 469. Of late years no doubt has existed as to the illegality of corrupt treating, independently of the Treating Act (7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 4). In Hughes v. Marshall, 2 Tyr. 134; 5 C. & P. 150, which was an action to recover payment for provisions furnished to electors, Lord Lyndhurst, delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "It is said that it is not very material whether the case fall within that statute (the Treating Act) or not; for that, if the plaintiff furnished these provisions with a view to influence the election, such conduct would be illegal at common law, and no action would be maintainable: now, that is true if such a case were made out; if bribery" (i.e., by corrupt treating) "is brought home to the party, he is guilty of an offence at common law, and can maintain no action." Although the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, and the 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, have in some respects assimilated bribery and treating, there is a wide difference in the nature of the two offences, both as regards the candidate and the voter. In bribery, a corrupt contract between the voter and the candidate for the purchase of a vote usually exists; but not so in treating. Bribery is directed to obtain the adverse, or fix the doubtful voters; treating is resorted to to confirm the good intentions and keep up the party zeal of those believed to be already in the interest of the candidate. The distinction between the LAW. two offences was clearly recognized in the 17 & 18 Vict. AT COMMON c. 102; by which bribery was made an indictable offence, while treating was merely illegal and the penalty imposed upon the latter was only half of that attached to bribery: see Windsor, 1 O'M. & H. 4, per Willes, J. Although both bribery and treating are now corrupt practices and indictable offences, the 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, makes a distinction by affording relief for the latter under certain circumstances: see "Relief," ante, p. 232. Another distinction arises under section 4 of that Act, ante, p. 290. Treating can more successfully be practised than bribery in the present large constituencies, because a little amount of it, as Cave, J., said in Hexham, 4 O’M. & H. 147; Day's El. Cas. 93, procures a great deal of popularity. Different considerations apply to it than to bribery, because men often give and accept drinksbut not money: per Wills, J., in Montgomery, Day's El. Cas. 150. The Treating Act, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 4, prohibited treating by a candidate at any time between the teste of the writ and the election, and also the promise of rewards or entertainment at any time; the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 102 extended the prohibition to acts of treating done after the election; and the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, s. 4, placed the law of treating, except as regards the person treated, very nearly on its present footing. Many of the cases referred to below were decided under the lastmentioned Act, but are still in point. BY STATUTE. All these enactments are now repealed, and treating 46 & 47 is defined by 46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 1, as follows:— (1.) Any person who corruptly Vict. c. 51 |