now.

TO RICHARD HENRY LEE.

Camp, near Dobbs's Ferry, 15 July, 1781.

DEAR SIR, The moving state in which the army was at the time your letter of the 12th ultimo came to hand, the junction of the allied troops at that period, and a variety of matters which have occurred since the junction, and consequent thereon, rather than a disinclination to continue a correspondence, the benefits of which were in my favor, must plead as an excuse for my silence till Unconscious of having given you just cause to change the favorable sentiments you have expressed for me, I could not suppose an alteration on your part; and, as I never suffer reports, unsupported by proofs, to have weight in my mind, I know no reason why our correspondence should cease, or become less frequent than heretofore, excepting on my part, that, as our affairs get more or less involved in perplexity, my attention is proportionably engaged, and more or less leisure is allowed for indulgences.*

It will be recollected, that the name of Richard Henry Lee occurs in the papers relating to Conway's Cabal, and he was supposed by some persons to take a part hostile to Washington in that affair. This opinion seems never to have been sustained by any other evidence than suspicion. It had the effect, however, to break off the intimacy, which previously existed between the two friends. On the present occasion, Mr. Lee made the first advance, and commenced his letter in the following words.

"Although our correspondence has been long interrupted, I hope that our friendship never will be, notwithstanding the arts of wicked men, who have endeavoured to create discord and dissension among the friends of America. For myself, having little but my good wishes to send you, it was not worth while to take up your attention a moment with them. The contents of this letter will, I am sure, require no apology, because you always approve that zeal, which is employed in the public service, and has for its object the public good."

He then proceeds to describe the situation of things in Virginia, with the enemy in the heart of the State and an inferior force to resist

That we have had a very competent portion, and a great variety of difficulties of late, a person, so well informed of public matters as you are, needs not be told. The distresses of Virginia I am but too well acquainted with; but the plan you have suggested as a relief for it is, in my judgment, a greater proof of your unbounded confidence in me, than it is, that your means proposed would be found adequate to the end in view, were it practicable to make the experiment, which at present it is not, as there are insuperable obstacles to my removing from the immediate command of the auxiliary troops.

The reasons for this opinion I cannot commit to paper, at all times liable to miscarriage, but peculiarly so of late. I am fully persuaded, however, and upon good military principles, that the measures I have adopted will give more effectual and speedy relief to the State of Virginia, than my marching thither with dictatorial powers, at the head of every man I could draw from

them, and the dangers that threatened upon every side. "It would be a thing for angels to weep over," said he, "if the goodly fabric of human freedom, which you have so well labored to rear, should in one unlucky moment be levelled with the dust. There is nothing I think more certain, than that your personal call would bring into immediate exertion the force and the resources of this State and the neighbouring ones, which, directed as they would be, will effectually disappoint and baffle the deep laid schemes of the enemy."

In this letter Mr. Lee enclosed a copy of one, which he had written to some of the members of Congress, and in which he had expressed himself as follows.

"Let General Washington be immediately sent to Virginia, with two or three thousand good troops. Let Congress, as the head of the federal union, in this crisis direct, that, until a legislature can convene and a governor be appointed, the General be possessed of dictatorial powers, and that it be strongly recommended to the Assembly, when convened, to continue those powers for six, eight, or ten months, as the case may be; and that the General may be desired instantly on his arrival in Virginia to summon the members of both Houses to meet where he shall appoint, to organize and resettle their government." - MS. Letters, Chantilly, June 12th.

hence, without leaving the important posts on the North River quite defenceless, and these States open to devastation and ruin. When I say this, I would be understood to mean, if I am properly supported by the States eastward of Jersey inclusive. My present plan of operation, which I have been preparing with all the zeal and activity in my power, will, I am morally certain, with proper support produce one of two things; either the fall of New York, or a withdrawal of the troops from Virginia, excepting a garrison at Portsmouth, at which place, I have no doubt of the enemy's intention of establishing a permanent post. A long land march, in which we have never failed to dissipate half of our men, the difficulty and expense of transportation, and other reasons not less powerful, but which I dare not commit to writing, decided me in my present plan; and my hopes, I trust, will not be disappointed.

In half an hour's conversation I could, I think, convince you of the utility of my plan; but, as I have before observed, I do not attempt it by letter, because I have already had two important ones intercepted in the mails, the sight of which, I am persuaded, occasioned the retrograde movements of Lord Cornwallis, and will be the means of bringing a part of his force to New York, to the accomplishment of one part of my expectation.

No endeavours of mine have been wanting to obtain a naval superiority in these seas, nor to employ that which we have to valuable purposes. How far I have succeeded in the latter is but too obvious; how far I may see my wishes accomplished in the former, time must discover. With great esteem and regard, I am, dear Sir, &c.

SIR,

TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL WATERBURY.

Head-Quarters, 21 July, 1781.

The army will make a movement this evening. You will march your corps on the same route, and in such time and manner as to be at East Chester between daybreak and sunrise. Your troops should be supplied, if possible, with three days' cooked provisions; and the movements of the army, as well as of your troops, must be kept a secret until the moment you march.*

er.

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With a view of ascertaining the exact position of the enemy on the north end of New York Island, General Washington resolved to reconnoitre their posts from the western shore of the Hudson. For this purpose, on the 18th of July, he crossed the river at Dobbs's Ferry, accompanied by Count de Rochambeau, General de Beville, and General Duportail. They were attended by an escort of one hundred and fifty men from the Jersey troops, then stationed on the west side of the rivThe day was spent in reconnoitring from the high grounds between Dobbs's Ferry and Fort Lee. The subsequent manœuvres near Kingsbridge are briefly sketched in the following extract from his Diary. July 21st. I ordered about five thousand men to be ready to march at eight o'clock, for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's posts at Kingsbridge, and of cutting off, if possible, such of Delancey's corps as should be found without their lines. At the hour appointed the march commenced, in four columns, on different roads. Major-General Parsons with the Connecticut troops, and twenty-five of Sheldon's horse, formed the right column, with two field-pieces, on the North River road. The other two divisions, under Major-Generals Lincoln and Howe, together with the corps of sappers and miners, and four field-pieces, formed the next column on the Saw-mill River road. The right column of the French, on our left, consisted of the brigade of Bourbonnois, with the battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs, two field-pieces, and two twelvepounders. Their left column was composed of the legion of Lauzun, one battalion of grenadiers and chasseurs, the regiment of Soissonnois, two field-pieces, and two howitzers. General Waterbury, with the militia and State troops of Connecticut, was to march on the East Chester road, and to be joined at that place by the cavalry of Sheldon, for the purpose of scouring Frog's Neck. Sheldon's infantry was to join the legion of Lauzun and scour Morrisania, and to be covered by Scammell's light infantry, who were to advance through the fields, waylay the roads, stop all communication, and prevent intelligence from getting to the enemy. At VOL. VIII.

J

In order to prevent the enemy from obtaining any intelligence whatever from us, I have ordered small parties to waylay all the roads from the North River to East Chester. I must request that you will send an active subaltern and twenty men with good guides early this afternoon across the fields and woods from your encampment to some good position for an ambuscade, on the side of the road leading from New Rochelle to

Valentine's Hill the left column of the American troops and right of the French formed their junction, as did the left of the French also, by mistake, as it was intended it should cross the Brunx by Garrineau's and recross it at Williams's Bridge. The whole army (Parsons's division first) arrived at Kingsbridge about daylight, and formed on the heights back of Fort Independence, extending towards Delancey's Mills; while the legion of Lauzun and Waterbury's corps proceeded to scour Morrisania and Frog's Neck to little effect, as most of the Refugees had fled, and hid themselves in such obscure places as not to be discovered; and by stealth got over to the islands adjacent, and to the enemy's shipping, which lay in the East River. A few, however, were caught, and some cattle and horses brought off.

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July 22d.—The enemy did not appear to have had the least intelligence of our movement, or to know we were upon the heights opposite to them, till the whole army was ready to display itself. After having fixed upon the ground, and formed our line, I began with General Rochambeau and the engineers to reconnoitre the enemy's position and works; and first from Tippet's Hill opposite to their left. From thence it was evident, that the small redoubt (Fort Charles) near Kingsbridge would be absolutely at the command of a battery, which might be erected thereon. It also appeared equally evident, that the fort on Cox's Hill was in bad repair, and little dependence placed in it. There is neither ditch nor friezing, and the northeast corner appears quite easy of access, occasioned as it would seem by a rock. The approach from the inner point is secured by a ledge of rocks, which would conceal a party from observation, till it got within about one hundred yards of the fort, around which, for that or a greater distance, the ground has little covering of bushes upon it. There is a house on this side under Tippet's Hill, but out of view, I conceive, of the crossing-place most favorable to a partisan stroke. From this view, and every other I could get of Forts Tryon, Knyphausen, and Laurel Hill, the works are formidable. There are no barracks or huts on the east side of the hill, on which Forts Tryon and Knyphausen stand, nor are there any on the hill opposite, except those by Fort George. Near the Blue Bell there is a number of houses, but they have more the appearance of stables than bar