Epistemology: Contemporary ReadingsMichael Huemer Psychology Press, 2002 - 619 Seiten This comprehensive anthology draws together classic and contemporary readings by leading philosophers on epistemology. Ideal for any philosophy student, it will prove essential reading for epistemology courses, and is designed to complement Robert Audi's textbook Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 1998). Themes covered include, perception, memory, inductive inference, reason and the a priori, the architecture of knowledge, skepticism, the analysis of knowledge, testimony. Each section begins with an introductory essay, guiding students into the topic. Includes articles by: Russell, Hume, Berkeley, Malcolm, Quine, Carnap, J.L. Austin, Pollock, Nozick, Putnam, G.E. Moore, Huemer, Reid, Plato, BonJour, Coady, Carroll, Fumerton, Edwards, Foster, Howson, Urbach, Stove, Empiricus, Oakley, Alston, Gettier, Clark, Goldman, Lehrer, Paxson, DeRose, Dretske, Klein and Chishol |
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Ergebnisse 1-5 von 83
Seite 8
... position ( earlier expressed by David Hume ) that “ tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions " ( p . 171 ) , where by " tautologies " Ayer meant to include all and only truths of logic and ...
... position ( earlier expressed by David Hume ) that “ tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions " ( p . 171 ) , where by " tautologies " Ayer meant to include all and only truths of logic and ...
Seite 10
... position than is Reid . Coady attacks what he calls " the reductionist thesis , " which he quotes from the same passages in Hume's Enquiry just referred to : " The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians , is not ...
... position than is Reid . Coady attacks what he calls " the reductionist thesis , " which he quotes from the same passages in Hume's Enquiry just referred to : " The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians , is not ...
Seite 19
... position for skepticism , as well as for under- standing knowledge in ordinary cases ( on almost any analysis of knowledge we might plausibly give ) , are significant . We can maintain that the skeptic provides a context in which the ...
... position for skepticism , as well as for under- standing knowledge in ordinary cases ( on almost any analysis of knowledge we might plausibly give ) , are significant . We can maintain that the skeptic provides a context in which the ...
Seite 21
... position . Klein Peter Klein , by contrast , argues that skeptics cannot show that we would not know in such a case that the animal is not a mule ( his focus is on justification , but he apparently intends his main points to apply to ...
... position . Klein Peter Klein , by contrast , argues that skeptics cannot show that we would not know in such a case that the animal is not a mule ( his focus is on justification , but he apparently intends his main points to apply to ...
Seite 23
... positions of the first kind . But it is more difficult to defend the position , held by Moore and probably Chisholm , that we have non - inferential knowledge of epi- stemic propositions . It may be , however , that we do ; and even if ...
... positions of the first kind . But it is more difficult to defend the position , held by Moore and probably Chisholm , that we have non - inferential knowledge of epi- stemic propositions . It may be , however , that we do ; and even if ...
Inhalt
V | 27 |
VI | 32 |
VII | 37 |
VIII | 46 |
IX | 51 |
X | 64 |
XI | 74 |
XII | 85 |
XXXVII | 298 |
XXXVIII | 311 |
XXXIX | 320 |
XL | 333 |
XLI | 344 |
XLII | 352 |
XLIII | 369 |
XLIV | 372 |
XIII | 88 |
XIV | 91 |
XV | 104 |
XVI | 113 |
XVII | 125 |
XVIII | 131 |
XIX | 142 |
XX | 152 |
XXI | 166 |
XXII | 176 |
XXIII | 194 |
XXIV | 208 |
XXV | 217 |
XXVI | 219 |
XXVII | 221 |
XXVIII | 234 |
XXIX | 239 |
XXX | 251 |
XXXI | 253 |
XXXII | 256 |
XXXIII | 259 |
XXXIV | 270 |
XXXV | 275 |
XXXVI | 293 |
XLV | 375 |
XLVI | 387 |
XLVII | 402 |
XLVIII | 417 |
XLIX | 433 |
L | 435 |
LI | 440 |
LII | 444 |
LIII | 447 |
LIV | 450 |
LV | 464 |
LVI | 475 |
LVII | 491 |
LVIII | 507 |
LIX | 513 |
LX | 524 |
LXI | 539 |
LXII | 552 |
LXIII | 575 |
LXIV | 590 |
LXV | 602 |
LXVI | 606 |
613 | |
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Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
A.J. Ayer accept actually analysis analytic answer appear argue argument assert Ayer body brain brain-in-a-vat called causal claim Closure Principle cognitive coherence coherentism completely justified concept conclusion consider context definition depend Descartes direct realist dispositional beliefs doubt empirical entails epistemic epistemology Euclidean Euclidean geometry evidence example existence experience explain fact false follows foundationalism foundationalist foundherentism Gadwall geometry Grabit grebe grounds human Hume Hume's Hume's principles hypothesis ideas inductive inference instance intuitive justified beliefs justified in believing justifiedness kind large numbers least logical means mind nature non-Euclidean geometries notion observation particular perceive perception person philosophers physical objects position possible premise present priori knowledge probability problem problem of induction proof proposition question rational reason reason-giving relevant alternatives remember requires seems sense sense-data skeptic someone sort source of justification statement suppose synonymy testimony theory things thought tion true truth words zebras