new office.1 But it seems that if he be afterwards degraded for incapacity, he cannot recover his advanced wages during the period of his advancement, but only wages as a seaman.2

The power of the master, however, to degrade an officer3 or a seaman, is limited and cannot be exercised for trivial offences.1 And as the power to disrate is remedial only, and not penal, the

any member of the crew might be transferred without the rest, and that articles signed by the captain stipulating for higher wages for the plaintiff, he having been transferred, were null and void. In Mesner v. The Suffolk Bank, 1 Law Reporter, 249, it was held, where a steamboat came into collision with a sailing vessel, and was in imminent danger of sinking, that a promise of a reward by a passenger to the officers or crew to secure their exertions in saving his property, was not binding.

But if the ship is captured, and the captain, to induce one of the crew to become a hostage, promises to pay him wages, at the same rate as before the capture, as long as he shall remain a hostage, such promise is binding on the owners. Yates v. Hall, 1 T. R. 73.

1 The Providence, 1 Hagg. Adm. 391; The Gondolier, 3 Hagg. Adm. 190; Hicks v. Walker, Exch. 1856, 37 Eng. L. & Eq. 542. Where the mate succeeds to the command of the vessel, on the death of the captain, he becomes entitled to extra wages, but a question has arisen whether he can sue in rem for his services as master. In England it is settled that he cannot. Read v. Chapman, 2 Strange, 937; The Favourite, 2 Rob. Adm. 232. The case of The Brig George, 1 Sumner, 151, has been supposed to advance a contrary doctrine. The action was in rem by the mate to recover his wages. The claim was admitted, but the owners sought to set off a claim for money expended on account of his sickness, after he had become master. It does not appear that the increased wages due him as master were included in his demand, and the only point in controversy was as to the validity of the set-off. The English authorities have been followed by Mr. Justice Betts in the case of The Schooner Leonidas, Olcott, Adm. 12. See also, Airey v. The Brig Ann C. Pratt, 1 Curtis, C. C. 395, 398.

2 Wood v. The Nimrod, Gilpin, 83.

3 In the case of The Ship Mentor, 4 Mason, 84, 101, Mr. Justice Story said: "I must be permitted to say, that when a man ships in any particular capacity on board a ship, it is not for slight causes that he is to be degraded or compelled to perform other duty. He is not to be subject to the caprice, or distaste, or petulance of the master. He stipulates for fair and reasonable knowledge, and due diligence; but not for extraordinary talents. If he is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation he is doubtless subject to all just consequences. But when he acts bonâ fide, and is willing to perform his duty, if he should be more tardy in his movements than other men, it constitutes no just ground for degradation." See also, Atkyns v. Burrows, 1 Pet. Adm. 244, 247; The Exeter, 2 Rob. Adm. 261; Thompson v. Busch, 4 Wash. C. C. 338. But if an officer or seaman is incompetent he may be disrated. The Elizabeth Frith, 1 Blatchf. & H. Adm. 195, 210; The Exchange, id. 366; Morris v. Cornell, 6 Law Reporter, 304. And a steward may be disrated for embezzling the ship stores. Burton v. Salter, U. S. C. C., Mass., 21 Law Reporter, 148.

4 Sherwood v. McIntosh, Ware, 109. It was held, in this case, that a steward could be degraded for acts of dishonesty or habits of intemperance, but not for a single act of intemperance.

master cannot degrade a person to the lowest station if there be an intermediate one which he is competent to fill.1

officer is promoted during the voyage by the captain, it seems that he may send him back to his former situation for a less offence than he could, if he had originally been shipped for the higher station.2 Accidental omissions in the shipping articles may be supplied by parol; and if seamen sail without any shipping articles, they are then entitled to the highest rate of wages paid at the place at which they ship, within the preceding three months, for the same voyage. All interlineations, erasures, or alterations, are presumed to be fraudulent, unless satisfactorily

1 Smith v. Jordan, U. S. C. C., Mass., 1857, 21 Law Reporter, 204. It was held, in this case, that a cooper could not be disrated, and ordered to do the duty of a foremast hand, but he should be first tried as cooper's mate.

2 Wood v. The Nimrod, Gilpin, 83.

8 Stat. 1790, ch. 29, § 1, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 131; Stat. 1840, ch. 48, § 10, 5 U. S. Stats. at Large, 394. The former of these acts has been held not to be applicable to a seaman on board a tug boat which ran from the mouth of the River Detroit to Port Huron. Milligan v. Propeller B. F. Bruce, 1 Newb. Adm. 539. In England if the articles are signed, and the rate of wages omitted, parol evidence of the rate agreed on is admissible. The Porcupine, 1 Hagg. Adm. 378; The Harvey, 2 Hagg. Adm. 79; The Prince George, 3 Hagg. Adm. 376. The same rule has been adopted in this country. Wickham v. Blight, Gilpin, 452; The Warrington, 1 Blatchf. & H. Adm. 335. It seems to have been supposed, by Mr. Justice Betts, that the highest rate of wages payable within the three months previous might be recovered in such a case. But the statute of 1790 applies only when the master neglects to insert in the contract the voyage and the length of time, and does not apply to the omission to insert the rate of wages. Under the statute of 1790, Mr. Justice Peters, in the case of Jameson v. The Ship Regulus, 1 Pet. Adm. 212, stated that he had been of the opinion that if there was a verbal agreement for wages, this superseded the law, and was to be taken as the contract. Mr. Justice Story, in a note to Abbott on Shipping, 607, said: "No case is referred to where such a decision had been made; and before it could be made, it would require very grave consideration, how far such a verbal agreement, in contravention of the statute, should be admitted to supersede the positive direction of the statute as to the highest wages." In The Crusader, Ware, 437, parol evidence was held inadmissible to prove that a lower rate of wages or a different mode of compen sation was agreed on. The Act of 1840 has enlarged that of 1790 to some extent. The tenth section provides that "all shipments of seamen made contrary to the provisions of this and other acts of congress, shall be void; and any seaman so shipped may leave the service at any time, and demand the highest rate of wages paid to any seaman shipped for the voyage, or the sum agreed to be given him at his shipment." The Act of 1790, does not exempt the seaman from penalties and forfeitures incurred under the maritime laws preexistent to that act. Jameson v. The Ship Regulus, 1 Pet. Adm. 212. If a seaman ship without signing the articles, an implied contract is presumed by which he is bound to remain with the ship till the voyage is terminated. Jansen v. The Heinrich, Crabbe, 226.

explained. It may be added, that the usual rules of evidence and of construction apply to the shipping articles; 2 but a seaman may show by parol that written statements were made to induce him to sign,3 as that the voyage or time of service represented was not that which is on the paper; or that the articles have been altered since they were subscribed.

In the United

1 Stat. 1840, ch. 48, § 4, 5 U. S. Stats. at Large, 395. In the case of The Sch. Eagle, Olcott, Adm. 232, it was held, that this applied only to such alterations as would vary the effect of the shipping articles in regard to seamen, and not to immaterial erasures.

ner.

"But a court of admiralty will construe the articles liberally. Mr. Justice Story, in the case of The Brutus, 2 Gallis. 526, 537, said, speaking of shipping articles: "These, like all other mercantile instruments, are drawn up in a very lax and inartificial manTo construe the language by the technical rules of literal interpretation would be to defeat the manifest intention of the parties. We are, therefore, bound to construe it with great liberality, and to look to the general scope and object of the instrument, rather than to weigh minutely the force of detached expressions."

3 Baker v. Corey, 19 Pick. 496; The Enterprise, 2 Curtis, C. C. 317, 320.

4 In The Cypress, 1 Blatchf. & H. Adm. 83, twelve months was the time of service mentioned in the articles. Held, that it could be shown by parol that nine was the time agreed upon. The question, in regard to the admissibility of parol evidence to change the voyage described in the shipping articles, was elaborately discussed in the late case of Page v. Sheffield, 2 Curtis, C. C. 377. The action was for wages alleged to be due on a voyage from San Francisco to Calcutta, and thence to Boston. The libellant was discharged against his will at Calcutta. In the articles the voyage was described to be from San Francisco to Calcutta. Evidence was offered to prove that the libellant shipped for the whole voyage from San Francisco to Boston. Mr. Justice Curtis held, that it was admissible on two grounds. First, that the voyages from San Francisco to Calcutta, and from the latter place to Boston, might be considered as distinct, and the articles for the first not being intended to include the second, the latter might be proved by parol. Second, if the contract was entire, then the articles did not describe the voyage, and the master was, therefore, prohibited from taking the libellant to sea under such articles, and parol evidence is always admissible to impeach a contract, by showing it to be made in violation of law. See also, the same case in the District Court, 18 Law Reporter, 99. But the ship-owner cannot vary the voyage by parol evidence. The Triton, 1 Blatchf. & H. Adm. 282; The Exchange, id. 366. 5 See supra, note 1. The general rule in regard to parol evidence is stated in Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mason, 161, 169. Mr. Justice Story there said: "But primâ facie the shipping articles are presumed to import verity, and to be as well known to the owner as master; and it is incumbent on the owner, if he means to contest the fact, to offer some evidence of fraud, mistake, or interpolation." If there is a stipulation in writing for a series of voyages, this may be terminated or varied by the mutual consent of the master and crew, and a new voyage substituted by a parol agreement. Piehl v. Balchen, Olcott, Adm. 24. In The Trial, 1 Blatchf. & H. Adm. 94, it was held, that in a suit for wages if the owners do not produce the shipping articles, even though they are not called upon to do so, parol evidence of the terms of hiring may be given. But see The Brig Osceola, Olcott, Adm. 450.

States the shipping articles for a fishing voyage are required to be indorsed or countersigned by the owners, but the seaman is not restricted to those who sign, in an action for his wages, but may show aliunde who are the actual owners.1 The master of a vessel has no power to bind the owner to pay a seaman three months' wages after the voyage has terminated and all services on his part have ceased, but if a seaman is hired in a foreign country the master may bind the owners to pay him such sum as will enable him to return.2

Wages, excepting as just above stated, and by limiting the right to demand wages in a foreign port to one third the amount then due, unless it be otherwise stipulated,3 do not enter particularly into the provisions of our statutes. But seamen have a lien on the ship and freight for their wages, enforceable in admiralty, as we shall hereafter state. In general, as freight is the mother of wages, none are earned unless freight is earned, or might have been; but, to avoid repetition, we shall not consider this subject until we speak of wages in connection with admiralty jurisdiction.

SECTION III.

OF PROVISIONS.

Provisions, of due quality and quantity, are to be furnished by the owner under the general principles of law as applied to this particular contract. The quantity for each person on board is, however, prescribed by statute, under penalty of a day's wages

1 Wait v. Gibbs, 4 Pick. 298. It would seem, however, that he could not bring an action on the shipping articles except against those whose names appeared on that instrument.

2 Canizares v. The Santissima Trinidad, Bee, Adm. 353.

8 Act of 1790, ch. 29, § 6, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 133. See also, cases ante, p. 446,

note 3.

This has been the custom among maritime nations from the earliest times. Pothier on Maritime Contracts, n. 215 (Cushing's ed.), 131; Consolato del Mare, ch. 100. See also, 1 Pardes. 335, 381, 483; 2 id. 510; The Madonna D'Idra, 1 Dods. 37; Dixon v. The Cyrus, 2 Pet. Adm. 407, 411.

extra, to every seaman, for the days on which he is on short allowance.1 If, however, the necessity of short allowance springs from a peril of the sea, or any accident of the voyage, or the delivery of a part of the provisions to another vessel in distress, the extra wages are not given.2

It has been held that a deficiency in one kind of provisions is not compensated by an abundance in another; as a deficiency in bread by an excess of beef; but it is clear that the master must have in every port a certain discretion in supplying wholesome and abundant food, of such kinds as can be most economically procured, if those specified in the act cannot be obtained by reasonable exertions. The master must see to the expenditure of the provisions; he should guard against waste; and putting the crew on an allowance is by no means the same thing as putting them on short allowance.5

1 Act of 1790, ch. 29, § 9, 1 U. S. Stats. at Large, 131, 135. In Gardner v. The Ship New Jersey, 1 Pet. Adm. 223, the voyage was an entire one from Philadelphia to Canton, with liberty to go to other intermediate ports, and back to Philadelphia. It was contended that as some of the mariners shipped at foreign ports, they did not come within the statute. But the objection was overruled.

2 Though we are not aware of any case where this point has been expressly decided, yet it follows as a necessary deduction from the fact that to enable the seaman to recover the extra wages, not only must he be put on short allowance, but it must be shown also that the vessel sailed without having on board the stores prescribed in the act. The Ship Elizabeth v. Rickers, 2 Paine, C. C. 291; Ferrara v. The Barque Talent, Crabbe, 216; The Bark Childe Harold, Olcott, Adm. 275. If the vessel sailed with the requisite quantity on board in good condition, but part was spoiled afterwards, so that the crew were put on short allowance, their remedy is by an action for the special damage done them, but they cannot claim extra wages. The Bark Childe Harold, Olcott, Adm. 275. If it is clearly proved that the crew were put upon short allowance, the burden is on the ship-owner to show that the vessel had the requisite provisions on board at the time of sailing. Piehl v. Balchen, Olcott, Adm. 24, 31. In The Bark Childe Harold, Olcott, Adm. 275, 279, it was contended that the same rule applied where the libellant showed that bread of a bad and unwholesome quality had been served out to them. But the court held, that the rule ought not to be extended to require the owner to give evidence of the quantity and quality of provisions stored on board, when the testimony of the libellants showed that there was an abundant supply in the ship and only accused it of being unwholesome in quality when shipped.

3 Coleman v. Brig Harriet, Bee, Adm. 80. In this case the captain left port with only ninety pounds of bread per man instead of one hundred, but there was a great overplus of meat and water. It was held that the seamen should receive one third of the amount of wages contracted for over and above their common wages.

* Mariners v. The Ship Washington, 1 Pet. Adm. 219. But in such a case the articles substituted must be a full equivalent both in quantity and quality for those required by law. The Mary, Ware, 454.

5 What is a proper allowance is to be determined by the navy ration. Mariners v.