edge, therefore, casually acquired that the vessel has arrived and will discharge her cargo at a particular wharf, is not enough.1 Generally, if a notice in the newspaper is relied on, it must be shown that the consignee read the notice.2 If, however, the consignee is absent or cannot be found after diligent search, the want of notice is excused.3 If the master has wrongfully omitted to sign a bill of lading, and has sailed without learning the names of the consignees, he cannot avail himself of his ignorance as an excuse for not giving notice of the landing of the goods. But if it is the fault of the shipper that there is no bill of lading, notice published in a paper taken by the consignees is sufficient. And it is the duty of the master, if no

Manufacturing Co. v. Bark Tangier, U. S. C. C. Mass. Dist., May T. 1857, 21 Law Reporter, 6; The Ship Middlesex, 21 Law Reporter, 14; Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Price v. Powell, 3 Comst. 322; House v. Schooner Lexington, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 4; Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314, 5 Scott, 667, Arnold, 120, affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, 3 Man. & G. 643, 3 Scott, N. R. 1, and in the House of Lords, 7 Man. & G. 850. In Barclay v. Clyde, 2 E. D. Smith, 95, goods were shipped from New York to Philadelphia. On arrival the carrier sent them by a cartman to the store of the consignee. When they reached the store they were found to be damaged, but it did not appear whether it was caused by the cartman or whether it happened on board the ship. It was held that the carrier's liability continued till the goods were delivered, and that the delivery on the wharf was not sufficient, as no notice had been given to the consignee.

1 The Ship Middlesex, 21 Law Reporter, 14.

2 Kohn v. Packard, 3 La. 224. In Northern v. Williams, 6 La. Ann. 578, no direct notice was given, but the answer did not set up want of it, and the court were of opinion that the consignee received the bills of lading, and saw the notice of the arrival in the papers, though there does not appear to have been any proof of this last fact. 3 Fisk v. Newton, 1 Denio, 45. The consignee was a clerk in New York, having no place of business of his own, and his name was not in the directory. The agent of the carriers made diligent inquiry for him, but could not find him. He then placed the goods in the hands of storehouse keepers, who were then in good credit, and they gave a receipt for the same. After some months the consignee appeared, demanded the goods, and paid the freight on the receipt being given up to him. But as the storehouse keepers had failed, he sought to recover from the carriers. Held, that they were not liable. Mr. Justice Jewett said: "When goods are safely conveyed to the place of destination, and the consignee is dead, absent, or refuses to receive, or is not known, and cannot, after due efforts are made, be found, the carrier may discharge himself from further responsibility by placing the goods in store with some responsible third person in that business at the place of delivery, for and on account of the owner. When so delivered, the storehouse keeper becomes the bailee and agent of the owner in respect to such goods." See also, Mayell v. Potter, 2 Johns. Cas. 371.

4 The Peytona, Ware, 2d ed. 541, 2 Curtis, C. C. 21.

5 Medley v. Hughes, 11 La. Ann. 211. And probably notice in any paper would, in such a case, discharge the vessel.

consignee is named in the bill of lading, to store the goods for the benefit of the owner.1 And this is his duty generally, when the consignee refuses to receive the goods; and after the goods are on the wharf the consignee has a reasonable time, in which to inspect them, and determine whether or not he will accept the consignment. Till he does accept, he is not liable for freight. If he refuses to accept he incurs no liability, and the master cannot leave the goods to perish, but is bound to store them for the owner.2 The delivery must be on a proper day as regards the weather, and must also be on a business day,3 and at a proper hour of such day; and a clerk or truckman in the employment of the consignees has no authority to bind the latter to receive the goods at an unusual time; and the liability of the vessel continues till the consignee has had that reasonable time to examine the goods to determine whether he will accept them or not as spoken of above. In general, the delivery must be reasonable, in time, place, and circumstance.5

1 Galloway v. Hughes, 1 Bailey, 553.

* Arthur v. Schooner Cassius, 2 Story, 81; Ostrander v. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371. In this last case the action was brought on the bill of lading by the consignor. The consignee refused to accept the goods, and the master took no further care of them, and they accordingly perished. The court held, that if the consignee ordered the goods unconditionally, he was bound to accept them, and then the master would not be liable; but if not, the master should have stored them for the owner.

* Salmon Falls Co. v. Bark Tangier, 21 Law Reporter, 6. It was held, in this case, that a delivery on Fast day was not good, there being evidence that for more than thirty years Fast day had not been considered a day of delivery. See also, Goddard v. Bark Tangier; Pearson v. Same, 21 Law Reporter, 12.

* Goddard v. Bark Tangier, 21 Law Reporter, 12.

Price v. Powell, 3 Comst. 322, which was an action brought by the consignor, it was held, that the liability of the carrier continued till the consignee had had a reasonable time, in which to take away the goods. Notice was given late in the evening, and it was held that the consignee was not obliged to take away the goods before the next day, and that if they were injured in the night while on the wharf, the carrier was liable. So, in Segura v. Reed, 3 La. Ann. 695, which was also an action by the consignor. After the delivery on the levee, and notice to the consignees, some of the goods were stolen. The court said: "The contract of the vessel is to deliver the goods to the consignee, and the responsibility continues until there is an actual delivery, or some act which is equivalent to, or a substitute for it. Even assuming the general rule to be, that putting the goods on the wharf discharges the vessel, where there has been a notice to the consignees of the time and place of the delivery, it seems to us that this rule is not to be applied with such rigor against the consignee as to put the goods unqualifiedly at his risk from the very instant of landing them, when he has

It has been held, that a usage to deliver goods without notice may be shown. But a usage for a wharfinger to accept goods on behalf of the consignees, is not one which will be considered binding.2 And, whatever the law may be in regard to a usage, it is clear that the parties may make a special contract in regard to the manner of delivery. The goods should be plainly marked, so that the consignee may be known; and if, without any fault on the part of the carrier, the owner sustains a loss in

made repeated calls for them during the day, and the discharge is not made until an advanced hour of the day." The consignee in this case received notice between twelve and one o'clock on Saturday, and went himself, and sent his clerk at three to receive the cotton. It was not then delivered, and nothing was said in regard to the time when it would be delivered. It was put on the levee at four o'clock on that day. On Monday ten bales were missing. The carrier was held liable. See also, Northern v. Williams, 6 La. Ann. 578.

1 Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305; Farmers and Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Transp. Co. 16 Vt. 52, 18 id. 131, 23 id. 186. But see Price v. Powell, 3 Comst. 322. In Steamboat Albatross v. Wayne, 16 Ohio, 513, a local usage regulating the mode of delivering goods at Memphis, was held not to be binding on shippers of goods from Cincinnati to that place, unless it was known to the merchants and shippers there generally. This was so held, on the ground that a practice which is unknown to those generally engaged in the trade, cannot be sustained as a usage, and cannot control the terms of a contract, because the parties to it cannot be presumed to have contracted with reference to the usage.

2 The Ship Middlesex, 21 Law Reporter, 14. So in Harkness v. Church, 10 La. Ann. 64, it was held that a delivery by a carrier to a wharf-boat at the port of destination, without notice to the consignee, was not sufficient. But that, if the consignee paid the freight to the owner of the wharf-boat, which he had advanced, this would amount to a recognition of the authority of the wharf-boatman to receive the goods as the agent of the consignee. See also, Wayne v. Steamboat General Pike, 16 Ohio, 421; Steamboat Albatross v. Wayne, id. 513.

In the case of The Grafton, Olcott, Adm. 43, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 173, two hundred and sixty-seven bales of hemp were shipped from New Orleans to New York. Notice of the arrival was given, but the consignees, who were also the owners of the goods, refused to receive them on account of the weather, which they alleged was not suitable for the discharge of the cargo. The evidence showed that the day was one of good working weather after nine, A.M.; that there were clear indications of rain about noon, and that the storm, which damaged the goods in the afternoon, came on abruptly, with but few minutes previous warning. Notwithstanding the refusal of the consignees to receive the goods, the ship began to unload them; but at a little before noon, an agreement was entered into between the consignees and the agents of the vessel, that the latter should cease to unload, if the consignees would take away what was already unloaded. The consignees took away a number of bales, but the ship continued to unload, and in the afternoon the bales on the wharf, and some of those which were taken away, but not stored, were damaged by rain. There was evidence that the number taken away was greater than that on the wharf at twelve, though the number stored was less. The court held, that though generally a delivery on the wharf with notice

consequence of the illegible direction, the carrier is not liable. But if the goods have been delivered to the owner and the freight paid, and the carrier afterwards takes them back without the knowledge of the owner, and delivers them to a third person who claims them, it is no defence to an action for the goods. that they were not distinctly marked, although the carrier acted in good faith.1

In Pennsylvania it seems to be supposed that a delivery of goods at a foreign port differs from a delivery in the internal or coasting trade. But this distinction does not appear to us to be warranted by law to the extent contended for. If the goods are to be transported over different parts of their route by carriers having no connection with each other, a notice by one carrier to another that the goods have arrived, and that he is ready to deliver them, is sufficient to exonerate him.3

A question of some difficulty has arisen, whether the contract of the ship-owner or master is so far an entirety that their liability continues till the whole consignment is out of the ship and ready for delivery. On the whole, we should say, that, if the consignee was notified that a part was ready for delivery, he would be obliged to take that part, and could not recover if, before all the goods were out, some were burned or otherwise destroyed or injured, on the wharf.*

was a delivery to the consignees, yet that the special agreement ought to have been carried out, and that all the bales taken away from the wharf, whatever their number, were to be considered as accepted by the consignees, but that they might recover for the damage done to the rest.

1 The Huntress, Davcis, 82.

2 See Cope v. Cordova, 1 Rawle, 203. The case of Hemphill v. Chenie, 6 W. & S. 62, was decided on this ground. It was there held, that the responsibility of a carrier on the Ohio does not cease upon the delivery of the goods on a wharf, and notice to the consignee. But when we look at the facts of this case we shall see that it differs in no respect from the well-settled rule of law applicable to contracts of affreightment generally. See ante, p. 155, n. 2. The action was brought by the consignor, and not by the consignee. The carrier put the goods on the wharf, gave noticeto the consignee, and took no further care of them. The goods were probably stolen, and the carrier was held liable.

Goold v. Chapin, 10 Barb. 612.

* The question came before Mr. Justice Sprague, in a late case, Paine v. Bowker, U. S. D. C., Mass. 1856. Three hundred and forty-nine barrels of flour were consigned to a firm in Boston. On the twenty-sixth of the month the consignees were notified that the ship would unload that day, and the greater portion of the flour was landed on the 14

VOL. I.

The goods must be delivered at the port of destination, and therefore the vessel is not discharged by showing that the goods were delivered at an intermediate port, and were to be shipped from thence to the port of destination under a contract made by the defendant with another boat.1

By the custom of the river Thames the master of a vessel is bound to guard goods loaded into a lighter, sent for them by the consignee, until the loading is complete, and he cannot discharge himself from that obligation by telling the lighterman he has not sufficient hands on board to take care of them.2

SECTION IV.

OF THE FORWARDING OF THE GOODS IN OTHER VESSELS.

As the ship-owner has thus no claim for freight until the whole voyage is completed, he has no lien on the cargo for payment of freight until then; but in the mean time he has a lien on the cargo for the earning of freight. That is, he has a right to hold a cargo once shipped on board his vessel, and to carry it to its destination, although circumstances may occur which will cause

wharf. The next morning twelve more barrels were landed. In the afternoon every thing on the wharf was destroyed by fire. All the flour, with the exception of three barrels, which were afterwards tendered to the consignee, but not accepted, was on the wharf at the time of the fire. It was contended that the consignee was not bound to take away any of the barrels till the whole was delivered, but the court decided otherwise, and held, that the ship had earned her freight. See also, Vol. II. in regard to the liability of insurers where part of the cargo is on the wharf and destroyed before the whole is landed.

1 Watts v. Steamboat Saxon, 11 La. Ann. 43.

2 Catley v. Wintringham, Peake, 150; see p. 177, n. 1. In Abbott on Shipping, 379, it is stated that it has been much contested whether the master is, by the usage, bound to take care of the lighter, after it is fully laden, until the time when it can properly be removed from the ship to the wharf. And that, at a trial of this question, it was held, that the master was not obliged to, citing Robinson v. Turpin, before Lord Ellenborough, C. J. But the action in this case was against the lighterman, and the plaintiff recovered. At a former trial the plaintiff had been nonsuited. Whether this former trial was against the master, is not stated, though it is to be inferred that it was.