will or its probate, and the statute applies to written and nuncupative
wills, the preliminary admission of a nuncupative will to probate and
the temporary control taken of the property, both real and personal,
by the probate court without the notice required by statute, do not
so deprive the parties of their property without due process of law
within the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as to afford a
constitutional basis for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the
United States in a suit where diverse citizenship exists to enjoin the
enforcement of the decree of probate, and the decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals is final. Ib.
D. OF DISTRICT COURTS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.
E. OF FEDERAL COURTS GENERALLY.
Interference with State in administration of its law for prosecution of crime.
It is only where fundamental rights, specially secured by the Federal Con-
stitution, are invaded that the Federal courts will interfere with a
State in the administration of its law for the prosecution of crime, and it
will not be presumed that if the freedom of a person properly con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death is improperly restricted that
the state authorities will not afford the necessary relief. Federal courts
will not, by writs of habeas corpus, reverse the proceedings of state
courts while acting within their jurisdiction under statutes which do
not conflict with the Federal Constitution, and the decision of the
state court that it is not necessary for the court to refix the day for
execution of a person already sentenced by the court and reprieved by
the Governor, where the reprieve definitely sets the day, is one wholly
within state practice and is not controlled by Federal Constitution or
laws. Rogers v. Peck, 425.
F. OF CRIMINAL COURT OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4.
JURY TRIAL.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
STATES, 8.
LAND DEPARTMENT.
See COURTS, 1.
LAND GRANTS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.
LEGAL FICTIONS.
See TAXATION, 10.
LEGISLATIVE POWERS.
See LOCAL LAW (FLORIDA);
NATIONAL BANKS, 1;
STATES, 2.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Limitation of personal actions in Porto Rico.
In the absence of express Spanish legislation affecting Porto Rico the law
prior to the extension of the Civil Code thereto in 1889 concerning limi-
tations of personal actions, is that generally prevailing under Spanish
law and in this case the twenty-year term applied and not the fifteen-
year term applicable under the Civil Code after its extension to Porto
Rico. Royal Insurance Co. v. Miller, 353.
See INTERNAL REVENUE, 1, 2;
California. Health regulations (see Municipal Corporations). Reduction
Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306; Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
District of Columbia. Conveyance by disseisee (see Deeds, 3). Chesapeake
Beach Ry. v. Washington R. R., 247.
Florida. Power of legislature to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive
charges by public service corporations. The constitution of Florida has
a clause to the effect that the legislature is invested with full powers
to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges by persons and
corporations engaged as common carriers and performing other public
services of a public nature, and that it shall provide for enforcing such
laws. In pursuance of this clause a law was passed empowering cities
to prescribe by ordinance maximum reasonable charges for water,
provided that the act should not impair the validity of any valid con-
tract, or be held to validate any contract theretofore made. After the
constitution, but before the act, the city of Tampa had made a contract
with a water company, giving the water company the right to charge
certain rates. After the act it passed an ordinance fixing lower rates
not, however, alleged to be unreasonable. The Supreme Court of
Florida sustained the ordinance, reading the statute as giving the power
to fix reasonable rates, when it was possible, without impairing the
obligation of contracts, and the constitution as meaning that the legis-
lature was to have an inalienable power to make such laws. Held that
this interpretation was sufficiently plausible to be followed. Tampa
Water Works v. Tampa, 241.
Iowa. Code of 1897, § 1754 (see Constitutional Law, 2). Carroll v. Green-
wich Insurance Co., 401.
Kansas. Anti-trust law (see Constitutional Law, 17). Jack v. Kansas, 372.
Minnesota. G. S. 1894, § 2701, liability of railroads for damages through
negligence of fellow servants (see Constitutional Law, 7). Minnesota
Iron Co. v. Kline, 593.
New York. Sanitary Code, § 66 (see Constitutional Law, 5). Lieber-
man v. Van De Carr, 552.
Philippine Islands. Procedure of courts in criminal cases (see Courts, 7).
Trono v. United States, 521.
Porto Rico. Limitation of actions (see Limitation of Actions). Royal In-
surance Co. v. Miller, 353. Mortgages (see Mortgage and Deed of
Trust, 1). Ib.
South Carolina. Dispensary law (see Internal Revenue, 2). South Caro-
lina v. United States, 437. Highways (see Highways). Manigault v.
Springs, 473. State powers over navigable waters (see States, 3). Iò.
Vermont. Executive power to grant reprieves (see States, 11) Rogers v.
Peck, 425.
Washington. Probate of wills (see Jurisdiction, C 5). Farrell v. O'Brien, 89.
MANDAMUS.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 3;
PROHIBITION.
Justifiable abandonment of vessel affecting contract of affreightment.
A vessel bound on a voyage from Pensacola to Montevideo with a cargo of
lumber under a charter party, "the dangers of the seas, fire and naviga-
tion always mutually excepted" was abandoned, justifiably, in conse-
quence of dangers of the seas and was afterwards picked up by salvors
and brought into Boston. The master who was at St. John was notified
and claimed the vessel and cargo from the salvors, stating his intention
to repair the vessel and complete the voyage, to which cargo-owners
objected, claiming that the voyage was abandoned and they were en-
titled to the cargo and obtained an order for its sale. The Circuit Court
held that the master should have been allowed to complete the voyage
and earn freight and charged the cargo-owners personally with the net
freight. Held error, and that the abandonment of the vessel by the
master and crew gave the cargo-owners the right to refuse to go on
with the voyage and that they were not to be treated as guilty of
breach of contract for preventing the continuance of the voyage by
VOL. CXCIX-41
their refusing to do so and procuring the sale. An open cessation of
performance with the intent to do no more, even if justified, excuses
the other party from further performance on his side. The same
principles which apply to the making of a contract apply to the breach
of it, and to non-performance of the conditions attached to the other
side. If there is no injustice it is desirable that the maritime law of
this country and of England should agree. The Eliza Lines, 119.
MAXIMS.
See TAXATION, 10.
MONOPOLY.
See RAILROADS, 3.
MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST.
1. Inclusion in mortgage of growing crops and effect of harvest and manu-
facture of product therefrom on lien of mortgage.
The owner of an estate in Porto Rico mortgaged the property to a bank,
the mortgage being granted by notarial act describing the property and
the fruits thereof and declaring that it was all planted in cane except
certain specified parts including the sugar manufactory and that the
loan secured was to enable the borrower to develop and keep the
plantation; as additional collateral the owner delivered to the bank a
policy of fire insurance on "stock of sugar and molasses deposited in
the sugar manufactory on the estate" which was not to take effect,
however, until several months thereafter; after the policy took effect
and during its life the sugar house and stock was burned; action was
not brought until more than fifteen but less than twenty years there-
after. Meanwhile the bank had become bankrupt and a special master
appointed with power to collect the assets thereof. In an action by
the special master on the policy the company denied liability and the
plaintiff's capacity to sue, also pleading prescription. The lower court
permitted one of the parties claiming an after-acquired interest in the
policy antagonistic to the plaintiff to be joined as party plaintiff. A
verdict was rendered for both against the company. In sustaining the
verdict, Held, that: under the law in force in Porto Rico the growing
crop was, by operation of law, included in the mortgage to the bank
even though it had not expressly purported to embrace the fruits
growing upon the mortgaged premises. The growing crop continued
to be affected by the mortgage after its harvest or manufacture into
sugar up to the time of its removal or warehousing. Royal Insurance
Co. v. Miller, 353.
2. Right of mortgage creditor to indemnify for insurance on crops.
The rights of the mortgage creditor attached to indemnity for insurance
upon the mortgaged property, including the crops, provided the loss
occurred after the execution of the mortgage. Ib.
3. Indivisibility of mortgage under civil law.
In countries governed by the civil law a mortgage is indivisible and where
junior incumbrances have not acquired rights necessitating a different
course a mortgagee may assert the entirety of his mortgage rights against
any or all of the property affected by the mortgage. Ib.
See DEEDS, 2;
RAILROADS, 2.
Power to make and enforce reasonable sanitary and other regulations, and to
fix period of privilege to be exercised for public benefit.
The Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco have
full authority under the constitution and laws of the State of Cali-
fornia to make and enforce within that city and county all such rea-
sonable sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with any
general statute or with the constitution, and which have for their
object the preservation of the public health by whatever cause en-
dangered. Where the power of the authorities to grant privileges to
be exercised for public benefit is not limited by law in that respect the
duration of the period for which the privilege is granted is a matter
in their discretion to be determined on grounds of public policy, and,
even if such privileges ought not be granted for long periods, the courts
cannot declare a grant void merely on that ground. Where a regulation
enacted by competent public authority for the protection of the public
health has a real, substantial relation to that object the courts will not
strike it down on grounds of public policy or expediency. Reduction
Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306; Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 20, 22;
STATES, 2.
1. Conclusiveness of determination by Comptroller of the Currency relative
to collection of assessment on stock.
A national bank is an instrumentality of the United States, the administra-
tion whereof is vested in the Comptroller of the Currency, who, in case
of insolvency, appoints the receiver and directs his acts. The lia-
bility for assessment on the stock dates from the order of the Comp-
troller who decides when it is necessary to institute proceedings there-
for, and his determination is conclusive. This power is derived from
a statute of the United States and cannot be controlled or limited by
state statutes. Rankin v. Barton, 228.
2. Citizenship-Jurisdiction of Federal courts-Power of States.
States have no power to enact legislation contravening Federal laws for the
control of national banks, but such banks are, for actions against them
at law or in equity, deemed citizens of the States in which they are
located, and the Federal courts have such jurisdiction only as they
have in cases between individual citizens of the same States. Guthrie
v. Harkness, 148.
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