Federal interference or control, in what courts crime may be prosecuted
and by what courts the prosecutions may be reviewed. Ib.

5. Due process and equal protection of laws-Validity of New York law
regulating sale of milk.

Section 66 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York, regulating the
sale of milk in that city, as the same has been construed by the highest
court of that State, held not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment
as depriving those engaged in that business of their property without
due process of law or denying them the equal protection of the laws.
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 552.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17;
JURISDICTION, C 6;

STATES, 2, 8;
TAXATION, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11.

6. Equal protection of laws-Effect of law of one county as to jury trial differ-
ing from that of other counties.

The fact that a law relating to jury trials applicable to a particular county
in a State is different from the general law on that subject applicable to
all other counties is not necessarily a discrimination against the people
of the county affected and a denial of the equal protection of the law,
and so held, in this case, it appearing that every person within the
county affected was accorded equal protection of the law prevailing
there. Gardner v. Michigan, 325.

7. Equal protection of laws-Validity of legislation confined to a familiar and
well-defined class of perils.

The statute of Minnesota, G. S., 1894, § 2701, providing that the liability
of railroad companies for damages to employés shall not be diminished
by reason of the accident occurring through the negligence of fellow
servants, and excepting from its provisions damages sustained by em-
ployés engaged in construction of new and unopened railroads, does
not, as interpreted by the highest court of that State, discriminate
against any class of railroads or deny to such class the equal protection
of the laws; the exception merely marks the time when the statute
takes effect. There is no objection under the Fourteenth Amendment
to legislation confined to a peculiar and well-defined class of perils,
and it is not necessary that they are shared by the public if they con-
cern the body of citizens engaged in a particular work. Minnesota
Iron Co. v. Kline, 593.

See STATES, 9;

TAXATION, 1, 2, 6.

Fourteenth Amendment. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 17;

STATES, 9;
TAXATION, 2, 10.

8. Implied inhibition as to interference of Federal and state government.
That which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which

is expressed, and amongst the implied matters is that the Nation may

not prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of govern-
ment, and no State can interfere with the National Government in
the free exercise of the powers conferred upon it. South Carolina
v. United States, 437.

9. Limitation of powers delegated to Congress.

The National Government is one of enumerated powers, and a power enu-
merated and delegated by the Constitution to Congress is compre-
hensive and complete, without other limitations than those found in
the Constitution itself. Ib.

10. New conditions embraced within scope of powers conferred.
The Constitution is a written instrument, and, as such, its meaning does
not alter. Its language, as a grant of power to the National Gov-
ernment, is general and, as changes come in social and political life,
it embraces all new conditions within the scope of the powers con-
ferred. Ib.

11. Power of National Government over license taxes.

The framers of the Constitution in granting to the National Government

full power over license taxes intended that the power should be com-
plete and not to be destroyed by the States extending their functions
in a manner not then contemplated. Ib.

12. Preservation of even balance between National and state governments.
To preserve the even balance between the National and state governments
and hold each in its separate sphere is the duty of all courts, and pre-
eminently of this court. Ib.

13. Recourse to common law and position of framers of Constitution in its
interpretation.

In interpreting the Constitution recourse must be had to the common law,
and also to the position of the framers of the instrument, and what they
must have understood to be the meaning and scope of the grants of
power contained therein must be considered. Ib.

14. Second jeopardy-Action of appellate court in finding appellants guilty
of higher crime than that of which convicted below.

Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the
Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and con-
victed of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' impris-
onment and a fine. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philip-
pine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty of
homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen
years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review
the judgment on the ground that the action of the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands amounted to putting the accused in second
jeopardy, held, that: There is a vital difference between an attempt of
VOL. CXCIX-40

the Government to review a verdict of acquittal in the court of first
instance, and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a
judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from
the higher one charged in the indictment. Kepner v. United States,
195 U. S. 100, distinguished. Where upon the indictment of a greater
offense the one accused is found not guilty thereof but guilty of a lower
offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new
trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new
trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment, and such new
trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the
same offense within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the
provisions in that regard in the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat.
691. The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver to
the plea of second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the
offense for which he has once been convicted and if that request be
granted he must take the burden with the benefit and go back for the
new trial upon the whole case. Quare, whether the constitutional
provision against second jeopardy was intended to apply to a judg-
ment under these circumstances. Trono v. United States, 521.

15. States; effect of first ten amendments on powers of States as to their own
people.

The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution operate on the Na-

tional Government only and were not intended to, and did not, limit
the powers of the States in respect to their own people. Jack v.
Kansas, 372.

16. States; power to grant to witness immunity for violation of Federal statute.
A State cannot by statute grant immunity to a witness from prosecution

by the United States for violation of a Federal statute, or prevent the
testimony given by him under compulsion of the statute from being
used against him in a prosecution by the United States, and the ab-
sence of such immunity from prosecution by the United States, does
not necessarily invalidate the statute under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Ib.

17. States; validity, under Federal Constitution, of Kansas anti-trust law in
respect of immunity from prosecution of witness.
The provisions in the Kansas anti-trust law, as construed by the highest
court of that State, compelling witnesses to testify as to violations of the
act, and granting immunity from prosecution for violations testified
to, or the use of the testimony against the witness, are not void under
the Fourteenth Amendment, because immunity from Federal prosecu-
tion is not granted; and one committed, in accord with the provisions
of the statute, for contempt for refusing to testify to acts within his
knowledge is not deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Ib.

18. Taking of property within meaning of constitutional provision as to com-
pensation.

Where there is a practical destruction, or material impairment of value, of
lands by overflowing them as the result of construction of dams, there
is a taking within the meaning of the Federal Constitution which de-
mands compensation, but otherwise when the owner is merely put,
as in this case, to additional expense in warding off the consequences
of the overflow, Manigault v. Springs, 473.

19. Taking private property, etc.-Sharing in common benefit as compensation.
Property rights of individuals must be subordinated to the general good

and if the owner of garbage suffers any loss by its destruction he is
compensated therefor in the common benefit secured by the regulation
requiring all garbage to be destroyed. Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
20. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of ordinance for cremation of
garbage.

An ordinance of the competent municipal authorities based upon reason-
able grounds for the cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated
place as a means for the protection of the public health is not a taking
of private property for public use without compensation within the
meaning of the Federal Constitution even though such garbage and
refuse may have some elements of value for certain purposes. Reduc-
tion Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306; Gardner v. Michigan, 325.

21. Taking private property, etc.; right to make claim based on.
Where the basis of the claim that an ordinance is unconstitutional as taking
private property for public use without compensation the claim must
be made by one whose property is taken, and it cannot be raised on
his behalf by others whose property is not taken. Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Reduction Works, 306.

22. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of exclusive privilege to dispose
of garbage.

The exclusive privilege granted to one company by the Board of Super-
visors of San Francisco to dispose of the garbage in the city and county
of San Francisco held not to be void as taking the property of house-
holders for public use without compensation. Ib.

1. Construction as to place of delivery of goods..

In construing a contract with the Commissary General for supplies to posts
in Cuba described at one place as "remote from the seacoast” and at

another as "in the interior of the island;" held, that the two phrases
meant the same thing and interpreted the word "interior," and that
the contemporaneous construction of the Commissary General in re-
fusing to take supplies for a post about eight miles from Havana and
the camping ground for that city, that the contract applied only to
posts remote from the seacoast, was correct. Also held that the written
contract could not be extended to places not specified therein, by an
indefinite oral agreement. Simpson v. United States, 397.

2. Mail; right of contractor to extra compensation.

In construing a contract for mail service in New York City, held that:
The new and additional mail messenger or transfer service which the
contractor could be required to perform under authority of the Post-
master General without additional compensation did not include a
vast amount of additional work necessitated by the opening of a new
post office not contemplated by either of the parties when the contract
was made. The same principles of right and justice which prevail
between individuals should control the construction and carrying out
of contracts between the Government and individuals. The contractor
had a right to presume the Government knew how many stations were
to be served; and, where the proposals positively specified that only
two elevated railroad stations were to be served, the contractor was
entitled to extra compensation for serving four stations notwithstand-
ing the proposal required the bidders to inform themselves as to facts
and stated that additional compensation would not be allowed for
mistakes. The contractor was not entitled to extra compensation
for "foot service," carrying mails up and down steps at elevated rail-
road stations, as delivery at the foot of the steps would have been
insufficient. United States v. Stage Company, 414.

Inspection of books by shareholders a matter of right.

The shareholder has a common law right, for proper purposes and under
reasonable regulations as to time and place, to inspect the books of the
corporation of which he is a member. The possibility of the abuse of
a legal right affords no ground for its denial, and while an examination
of the books of a corporation should not be granted for speculative or
improper purposes, it should not be denied when asked for legitimate
Guthrie v. Harkness, 148.

purposes.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;

LOCAL LAW (FLORIDA);

NATIONAL BANKS, 2, 3.