Federal interference or control, in what courts crime may be prosecuted and by what courts the prosecutions may be reviewed. Ib.
5. Due process and equal protection of laws-Validity of New York law regulating sale of milk.
Section 66 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York, regulating the sale of milk in that city, as the same has been construed by the highest court of that State, held not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment as depriving those engaged in that business of their property without due process of law or denying them the equal protection of the laws. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 552.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17; JURISDICTION, C 6;
STATES, 2, 8; TAXATION, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11.
6. Equal protection of laws-Effect of law of one county as to jury trial differ- ing from that of other counties.
The fact that a law relating to jury trials applicable to a particular county in a State is different from the general law on that subject applicable to all other counties is not necessarily a discrimination against the people of the county affected and a denial of the equal protection of the law, and so held, in this case, it appearing that every person within the county affected was accorded equal protection of the law prevailing there. Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
7. Equal protection of laws-Validity of legislation confined to a familiar and well-defined class of perils.
The statute of Minnesota, G. S., 1894, § 2701, providing that the liability of railroad companies for damages to employés shall not be diminished by reason of the accident occurring through the negligence of fellow servants, and excepting from its provisions damages sustained by em- ployés engaged in construction of new and unopened railroads, does not, as interpreted by the highest court of that State, discriminate against any class of railroads or deny to such class the equal protection of the laws; the exception merely marks the time when the statute takes effect. There is no objection under the Fourteenth Amendment to legislation confined to a peculiar and well-defined class of perils, and it is not necessary that they are shared by the public if they con- cern the body of citizens engaged in a particular work. Minnesota Iron Co. v. Kline, 593.
See STATES, 9;
TAXATION, 1, 2, 6.
Fourteenth Amendment. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 16, 17;
STATES, 9; TAXATION, 2, 10.
8. Implied inhibition as to interference of Federal and state government. That which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which
is expressed, and amongst the implied matters is that the Nation may
not prevent a State from discharging the ordinary functions of govern- ment, and no State can interfere with the National Government in the free exercise of the powers conferred upon it. South Carolina v. United States, 437.
9. Limitation of powers delegated to Congress.
The National Government is one of enumerated powers, and a power enu- merated and delegated by the Constitution to Congress is compre- hensive and complete, without other limitations than those found in the Constitution itself. Ib.
10. New conditions embraced within scope of powers conferred. The Constitution is a written instrument, and, as such, its meaning does not alter. Its language, as a grant of power to the National Gov- ernment, is general and, as changes come in social and political life, it embraces all new conditions within the scope of the powers con- ferred. Ib.
11. Power of National Government over license taxes.
The framers of the Constitution in granting to the National Government
full power over license taxes intended that the power should be com- plete and not to be destroyed by the States extending their functions in a manner not then contemplated. Ib.
12. Preservation of even balance between National and state governments. To preserve the even balance between the National and state governments and hold each in its separate sphere is the duty of all courts, and pre- eminently of this court. Ib.
13. Recourse to common law and position of framers of Constitution in its interpretation.
In interpreting the Constitution recourse must be had to the common law, and also to the position of the framers of the instrument, and what they must have understood to be the meaning and scope of the grants of power contained therein must be considered. Ib.
14. Second jeopardy-Action of appellate court in finding appellants guilty of higher crime than that of which convicted below.
Plaintiffs in error were tried for murder in the court of first instance in the Philippine Islands and were acquitted of the crime of murder and con- victed of the crime of assault and were sentenced to six months' impris- onment and a fine. They appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philip- pine Islands, which reversed that judgment and found them guilty of homicide and sentenced them to various terms from eight to fourteen years' imprisonment and a fine. On a writ of error seeking to review the judgment on the ground that the action of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands amounted to putting the accused in second jeopardy, held, that: There is a vital difference between an attempt of VOL. CXCIX-40
the Government to review a verdict of acquittal in the court of first instance, and the action of the accused in himself appealing from a judgment which convicts him of one offense while acquitting him from the higher one charged in the indictment. Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, distinguished. Where upon the indictment of a greater offense the one accused is found not guilty thereof but guilty of a lower offense included therein, and upon appeal from that judgment a new trial is granted by the appellate court, the accused can, on the new trial, be tried for the greater offense in the indictment, and such new trial does not amount to placing him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense within the meaning of the Federal Constitution or of the provisions in that regard in the Philippine Act of July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 691. The appeal of the accused in such case amounts to a waiver to the plea of second jeopardy by asking that he be again tried for the offense for which he has once been convicted and if that request be granted he must take the burden with the benefit and go back for the new trial upon the whole case. Quare, whether the constitutional provision against second jeopardy was intended to apply to a judg- ment under these circumstances. Trono v. United States, 521.
15. States; effect of first ten amendments on powers of States as to their own people.
The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution operate on the Na-
tional Government only and were not intended to, and did not, limit the powers of the States in respect to their own people. Jack v. Kansas, 372.
16. States; power to grant to witness immunity for violation of Federal statute. A State cannot by statute grant immunity to a witness from prosecution
by the United States for violation of a Federal statute, or prevent the testimony given by him under compulsion of the statute from being used against him in a prosecution by the United States, and the ab- sence of such immunity from prosecution by the United States, does not necessarily invalidate the statute under the Fourteenth Amend- ment. Ib.
17. States; validity, under Federal Constitution, of Kansas anti-trust law in respect of immunity from prosecution of witness. The provisions in the Kansas anti-trust law, as construed by the highest court of that State, compelling witnesses to testify as to violations of the act, and granting immunity from prosecution for violations testified to, or the use of the testimony against the witness, are not void under the Fourteenth Amendment, because immunity from Federal prosecu- tion is not granted; and one committed, in accord with the provisions of the statute, for contempt for refusing to testify to acts within his knowledge is not deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Ib.
18. Taking of property within meaning of constitutional provision as to com- pensation.
Where there is a practical destruction, or material impairment of value, of lands by overflowing them as the result of construction of dams, there is a taking within the meaning of the Federal Constitution which de- mands compensation, but otherwise when the owner is merely put, as in this case, to additional expense in warding off the consequences of the overflow, Manigault v. Springs, 473.
19. Taking private property, etc.-Sharing in common benefit as compensation. Property rights of individuals must be subordinated to the general good
and if the owner of garbage suffers any loss by its destruction he is compensated therefor in the common benefit secured by the regulation requiring all garbage to be destroyed. Gardner v. Michigan, 325. 20. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of ordinance for cremation of garbage.
An ordinance of the competent municipal authorities based upon reason- able grounds for the cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated place as a means for the protection of the public health is not a taking of private property for public use without compensation within the meaning of the Federal Constitution even though such garbage and refuse may have some elements of value for certain purposes. Reduc- tion Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306; Gardner v. Michigan, 325.
21. Taking private property, etc.; right to make claim based on. Where the basis of the claim that an ordinance is unconstitutional as taking private property for public use without compensation the claim must be made by one whose property is taken, and it cannot be raised on his behalf by others whose property is not taken. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 306.
22. Taking private property, etc.-Validity of exclusive privilege to dispose of garbage.
The exclusive privilege granted to one company by the Board of Super- visors of San Francisco to dispose of the garbage in the city and county of San Francisco held not to be void as taking the property of house- holders for public use without compensation. Ib.
1. Construction as to place of delivery of goods..
In construing a contract with the Commissary General for supplies to posts in Cuba described at one place as "remote from the seacoast” and at
another as "in the interior of the island;" held, that the two phrases meant the same thing and interpreted the word "interior," and that the contemporaneous construction of the Commissary General in re- fusing to take supplies for a post about eight miles from Havana and the camping ground for that city, that the contract applied only to posts remote from the seacoast, was correct. Also held that the written contract could not be extended to places not specified therein, by an indefinite oral agreement. Simpson v. United States, 397.
2. Mail; right of contractor to extra compensation.
In construing a contract for mail service in New York City, held that: The new and additional mail messenger or transfer service which the contractor could be required to perform under authority of the Post- master General without additional compensation did not include a vast amount of additional work necessitated by the opening of a new post office not contemplated by either of the parties when the contract was made. The same principles of right and justice which prevail between individuals should control the construction and carrying out of contracts between the Government and individuals. The contractor had a right to presume the Government knew how many stations were to be served; and, where the proposals positively specified that only two elevated railroad stations were to be served, the contractor was entitled to extra compensation for serving four stations notwithstand- ing the proposal required the bidders to inform themselves as to facts and stated that additional compensation would not be allowed for mistakes. The contractor was not entitled to extra compensation for "foot service," carrying mails up and down steps at elevated rail- road stations, as delivery at the foot of the steps would have been insufficient. United States v. Stage Company, 414.
Inspection of books by shareholders a matter of right.
The shareholder has a common law right, for proper purposes and under reasonable regulations as to time and place, to inspect the books of the corporation of which he is a member. The possibility of the abuse of a legal right affords no ground for its denial, and while an examination of the books of a corporation should not be granted for speculative or improper purposes, it should not be denied when asked for legitimate Guthrie v. Harkness, 148.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
LOCAL LAW (FLORIDA);
NATIONAL BANKS, 2, 3.
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