that the provisions of the preceding sections shall not be so construed as to warrant the sales of any lands belonging to the United States which shall be reserved for public purposes, or selected by the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries on the islands of Kadiak and Afognak, for the purposes of establishing a fish-culture station. As the President exercised the rights thus reserved, and declared the whole island appropriated for the purpose of establishing a fish-culture station, and warned all persons to depart therefrom, it is clear that the rights, if any, previously acquired by the settlement were terminated by the proclamation. Petitioner gained no additional consideration from the improvements put upon the land, since, if for no other reason, these were made prior to the act of 1891, when it was a mere trespasser and occupying the land without a shadow of title.

Affirmed.

ROYAL PACKING COMPANY v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 86. Argued November 29, 1905.-Decided December 29, 1905.

Decided on authority of Russian-American Packing Company v. United States, ante, p. 570.

Mr. Alexander Britton, with whom Mr. Aldis B. Browne was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Frederick De C. Faust, Special Attorney, with whom Mr. Assistant Attorney General Pradt was on the brief, for the United States.1

PER CURIAM. This case depends upon a similar state of facts, involves the same questions of law as those in the preceding case, and is also

Affirmed.

1 This case was argued simultaneously with, and upon the same briefs as, Russian-American Packing Company v. United States, ante, p. 570.

ALEXANDER v. CROLLOTT, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW

MEXICO.

No. 118. Submitted November 27, 1905.-Decided December 18, 1905.

Although a writ of prohibition will lie to an inferior court acting manifestly beyond its jurisdiction, the writ will issue only where there is no other remedy; and even though the judgment may be void, as that fact does not prevent its reversal on appeal, mandamus cannot be resorted to where the statute gives an appeal. The requirement of giving a bond on appeal is an ordinary incident of litigation and does not obviate the necessity of the appeal and justify the issuing of a writ of mandamus.

THIS is an appeal taken from a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico quashing a writ of prohibition issued by that court to the defendant Crollott, a Justice of the Peace of the County of Bernalillo, which commanded him to desist and refrain from any further proceedings in five several actions of forcible entry and detainer, instituted by one Cleland before said Justice and against Alexander and four other parties.

An appeal was taken from the ordes quashing the writ to this court.

Mr. Neill B. Field for appellant.

Mr. William B. Childers for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

Although a writ of prohibition will lie to an inferior court, when it is acting manifestly beyond its jurisdiction, such writ will issue only where there is no other remedy. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472, 495; In re Rice,

155 U. S. 396, 403; In re New York &c. Steamship Company, 155 U. S. 523, 531.

By his answer Alexander claimed to be the owner of the property, and alleged a want of jurisdiction on the part of the Justice to determine the question of ownership in a proceeding for forcible entry and detainer. The Justice decided against him. Under such circumstances he should have taken an appeal to the District Court under section 3358 of the New Mexican code, which provides that "An appeal shall be allowed to the District Court in all cases wherein judgment may be hereafter rendered in forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or both." No reason is apparent why this appeal was not taken.

The fact that the judgment may have been void will not prevent its reversal upon appeal, Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Cranch, 126; Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 473, 518, 566; M. C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382; Mexican &c. R. R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U. S. 201, 208; Jordan v. Dennis, 7 Met. 590; Waters v. Randall, 8 Met. 132; Striker v. Mott, 6 Wend. 465; Langford v. Monteith, 102 U. S. 145, nor does the requirement of a bond obviate the necessity of an appeal. It is one of the ordinary incidents of litigation.

Affirmed.

ECLIPSE BICYCLE COMPANY v. FARROW.

APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

Nos. 40, 217. Argued November 3, 1905.-Decided December 18, 1905.

A bicycle manufacturing company made a contract with an inventor to use, obtain patents for, and exploit the sale of, improved coaster brakes, for which applications for patents were then pending, the company to be relieved from payment of royalties in case of adverse action of the patent office. Subsequently the company having acquired and used other inven

tions the inventor brought suit alleging neglect to use diligence in obtaining the patents for, or pushing the sales of, his brakes and demanding royalties on all coaster brakes used and sold by the company. Held that: Although the company might not be able to obtain the patents as expected it could not rescind the contract without returning what it had received under it and it must pay royalties on any devices used by it embodying the invention unless and until final adverse action by the patent office. That as the contract was not made on the footing that no such brakes had ever been invented the inventor could not claim the entire field and was not entitled to royalties on other brakes used by the company radically different from his both in construction and operation and which could not have been an infringement of any patent contemplated by the contract.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. S. Worthington and Mr. H. L. Osgood, with whom Mr. C. Schuyler Davis and Mr. D. S. Mackall were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. Henry M. Earle and Mr. John C. Gittings for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an appeal from a final decree upon a bill for an account. As there was a technical doubt whether the decree first appealed from was final, a second decree was entered and a second appeal taken, but no point is made upon that matter here. There is one question and one case. See 16 App. D. C. 468; 18 App. D. C. 101.

The bill was brought upon an agreement under seal, dated June 5, 1897, of which the material portions are as follows. It begins with a recital that Farrow has invented certain improvements in bicycles, etc., pertaining to automatic mechanism for coasting and braking, for which he has made two numbered applications for patents and intends to file additional ones, and that the Eclipse Bicycle Company desires to acquire the entire right and title "to said inventions as described in the above

identified applications, and any letters patent that may be issued thereon," and to all improvements that may be made by Farrow upon the same. Then Farrow conveys to the company "his entire right, title and interest in and to the inventions in bicycles, as fully described and claimed in the applications above referred to," letters patent and improvements as above. The company is to pay $2,500 within certain short times as advanced payments on royalties, and to pay royalties, as specified, "on all the devices made or sold embodying the invention above referred to," and to that end to make returns of the number of devices sold. The title is to revert to Farrow in default of payment for more than sixty days. Arrangements are made for taking out foreign patents, and then the company agrees to "defend said invention against piracy or infringement," and to "use due business diligence in the manufacture and sale of the devices embodied in said letters patent, and push the sale by all proper and legitimate enterprise." Then follow further agreements as to taking out foreign patents, and finally it is covenanted that in case Farrow "for any reason fails to procure letters patent of the United States for the improvements above referred to, the [company] shall be relieved from the payment of all royalties from and after the date of final adverse action of the Patent Office on the application or applications for patents for said improvements." The invention described was an automatic brake and coaster, one of the applications being for a hub brake, the other for a tire brake, both operating on the rear wheel by back pedalling.

The bill alleges that soon after this agreement was made one Morrow, the defendant's general manager, applied for a patent on a device in effect the same as Farrow's, accomplishing the same result and being a mere mechanical equivalent for the same, that he forthwith assigned a half interest to the company's president, and that the company began to manufacture and sell the Morrow device. It further charges a failure to use the diligence which the company covenanted to use in pushing the Farrow device and a sale of substituted things. A supple