therefore not in any way prejudicial. We cannot yield our assent to the proposition. The contention that there should be a reversal because the defendant might have introduced evidence at the trial in support of certain defenses set up in its answer other than prescription, if it had not relied upon the certainty of securing a reversal by this court of any judgment which might be obtained against it, because of what was deemed to be the erroneous rulings as to the interruption of the prescription, is without merit. What term of prescription was applicable to the action was a disputed question at the trial; and we cannot admit that the defendant, by neglecting to make full defense and by speculating on the chances of a verdict in its favor, could secure the right to a reversal of a verdict and judgment against it because of an error of law which in a legal sense occasioned no possible prejudice. And equally without merit is the contention that there would be prejudice if there be not a reversal, because in this court, relying upon the sufficiency of the errors assigned relating to the action of the court concerning the proof of interruption of the fifteen-year prescription, there was a neglect to assign other substantial errors, which it is asserted the trial court committed as to the admissibility of certain evidence and the striking out of various answers of a witness who had given testimony under a commission. As we are at liberty, however, despite the absence of an assignment of error on the subject, to consider a plain error arising on the record, we have given our attention to the subjects referred to, and content ourselves with saying that we think they are devoid of merit.

It remains only to consider the error alleged to have been committed by the trial court in allowing Lucas Amadeo to be made a party plaintiff.

The elementary rule is that amendments are within the sound discretion of the trial court, and are not susceptible of review on error, except for a clear abuse. Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623.

The objection made at the trial to the amendment was that VOL. CXCIX-24

it substituted a new party and an entirely new cause of action. That there was no clear abuse in this case we think results from article 156 of the Law of Civil Procedure for Cuba and Porto Rico, War Department Translation of 1899, providing as follows:

"Causes of action against several persons, or by several persons against one, arising from the same source of title or based upon the same cause of action, may be joined and brought in one action."

The claims of both parties depended upon the contract of insurance. There was no inherent antagonism between the two claims, since the amendment making Lucas Amadeo a party expressly alleged that his rights in and to the policy were subordinate to those of Miller, special master. We consider the provision of the code of procedure above quoted as analogous to the provision in the codes of a number of the States of the Union, by which an action is required to be brought in the name of the real parties in interest, and it is allowable to join as parties plaintiff those having an interest in the recovery sought. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Oregon Railroad Co., 45 Oregon, 53; Fairbanks v. San Francisco & North Pacific Ry. Co., 115 California 579; Home Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 112 Indiana 7; Winne v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. 185, 192; Pratt v. Radford, 52 Wisconsin 114.

The contention in the argument that the permitting of Lucas Amadeo to be joined as plaintiff was in legal effect a consolidation of pending causes, which could not be made after answer filed, relying on article 157 of the code of civil procedure, was not made below, since the ground of objection made at the trial was that the amendment substituted a new party and an entirely new cause of action, not that it was merely too late to permit the amendment.

But it is further contended that as the bill of exception states, that no evidence was offered proving or tending to prove any transfer, by the Credito Mercantil of the policy sued on to Lucas Amadeo, therefore there was no proof whatever

tending to establish title in Lucas Amadeo to the policy, and hence there must be a reversal. On the state of the record, however, this objection is not available. The amended declaration making Amadeo a party, and alleging a transfer to him by the Credito Mercantil, was not traversed. It is argued, however, that no express traverse was necessary, because the plea of the general issue filed to the declaration before the allowance of the amendment must be applied to the amendment, and, therefore, the amended declaration should be regarded as having been traversed. Conceding, for the sake of the argument, the rule ordinarily to be as stated, and further conceding that that rule obtained under the procedure in Porto Rico, we do not think that it is here applicable. We say this because the record establishes that the case was tried upon the hypothesis that the transfer to Amadeo by the Credito Mercantil was not disputed, but on the contrary was an admitted fact in the case. Thus, when the court came to charge the jury, it enumerated specifically various issues of fact which they were to determine, and among those issues was not embraced any controversy whatever upon the fact of the transfer by the Credito Mercantil to Lucas Amadeo, as alleged in the amendment to the declaration, and no exception was taken to the action of the court in this particular. Moreover, although various instructions were asked to be given to the jury, on behalf of the defendant, no request was made which in any way intimated that the defendant disputed the fact that Lucas Amadeo had acquired the interest, if any, of the Credito Mercantil in the policy in question, as alleged in the amended declaration. Indeed, we think the record affirmatively establishes that the case was tried below upon the assumption by all the parties that if there was a right to recover on the part of Miller, special master, and Lucas Amadeo had properly been joined as a party plaintiff, a joint recovery was not improper.

Judgment affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

199 U.S.

JACK v. KANSAS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS.

No. 54. Argued November 8, 1905.-Decided November 27, 1905.

This court is bound by the decision of the highest court of a State that a state statute does not violate any provision of the state constitution and is valid so far as that instrument is concerned.

The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution operate on the National Government only and were not intended to, and did not, limit the powers of the States in respect to their own people.

A State cannot by statute grant immunity to a witness from prosecution by the United States for violation of a Federal statute, or prevent the testimony given by him under compulsion of the statute from being used against him in a prosecution by the United States, and the absence of such immunity from prosecution by the United States, does not necessarily invalidate the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment. The provisions in the Kansas anti-trust law, as construed by the highest court of that State, compelling witnesses to testify as to violations of the act, and granting immunity from prosecution for violations testified to, or the use of the testimony against the witness, are not void under the Fourteenth Amendment, because immunity from Federal prosecution is not granted; and one committed, in accord with the provisions of the statute, for contempt for refusing to testify to acts within his knowledge is not deprived of his liberty without due process of law.

THE plaintiff in error seeks to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, affirming a judgment against him of imprisonment for contempt, entered by direction of the District Court of Shawnee County, in that State. The plaintiff in error had been duly subpoenaed as a witness to appear before the above-mentioned District Court and was examined before that court under and by virtue of the provisions of section 10 of chapter 265 of the Laws of Kansas of 1897. Gen. Stat. 1901, § 7873. The statute is known as the Kansas anti-trust act. Section 10 is reproduced in the margin.1

1 Section 10, being section 7873, General Statutes, 1901, reads: "The several District Courts of this State and the judges thereof shall have jurisdiction, and it shall be their duty, upon good cause shown and

The proceeding was commenced in September, 1903, by the Attorney General and County Attorney of Shawnee County, and those officers presented to the court their verified application, informing it of the existence of combinations of persons engaged in the operation of coal mines in Osage County to fix the price of coal at the mines, and the price to be charged to purchasers; that the members of the combination met at a place in Shawnee County monthly to fix the minimum price to be charged for coal, and that they would not sell coal for less than the minimum price so fixed, and that the agreements thus entered into were by them carried out and executed. The plaintiff in error was engaged in operating a coal mine in Osage County, and was named in the application as one who had a knowledge concerning the existence of the combination, and a subpoena was thereupon asked for to be served upon him. The district judge granted the application. The subpoena was duly served, and the plaintiff in error appeared pursuant thereto before the district judge and answered some questions that were propounded him by the Attorney General or County Attorney. Other questions were put to him in relation to his knowledge of the meetings, and as to the existence of any agreement be

upon written application of the County Attorney or the Attorney General, to cause to be issued by the clerk of said court subpoenas for such witnesses as may be named in the application of a County Attorney or Attorney General, and to cause the same to be served by the sheriff of the county where such subpoena is issued; and such witnesses shall be compelled to appear before such court or judge at the time and place set forth in the subpoena, and shall be compelled to testify as to any knowledge they may have of the violations of any of the provisions of this act; and any witness who fails or refuses to attend and testify shall be punished as for contempt, as provided by law. Any person subpoenaed and examined shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for any violation of this act about which he may testify. Neither shall the evidence of any such witness be used against him in any criminal proceeding. The evidence of all witnesses so subpoenaed shall be taken down by the reporter of said court, and shall be transcribed and placed in the hands of the County Attorney or the Attorney General, and he shall, in the proper courts, at once prosecute such violator or violators of this act as the testimony so taken shall disclose. Witnesses subpoenaed as provided for in this section shall be compelled to attend from any county in the State."